按照plato.stanford.edu的說法, Groundwork就是a law of automonous wills.康德的意思好像是 CI=the law of autonomous wills=self governing. 如果要求每個人都有autonomous wills,那么那就是CI的本來意思 CI = I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. CI有三層意思. 最后一層意思是: CI="the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" =act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws . <-plato.stanford.edu 這里強調的是的是universal law的給予者,而不是遵守者. 這里就有點autonomy的意思了: As with rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of ones own making . <-plato.stanford.edu 這就跟CI的第三層意思一樣了.而且,這里的law是universal law. 所以道德有效性的一個necessary condition應該autonomy. 還有一個necessary condition是will rational will. 我理解rational will就是reason,就是moral law,比如不可撒謊等等.而moral law的實 質我覺得就是它的universality. 這里似乎有把moral law和moral legisimacy分開的嫌疑,可不可以分開呢?是個. 另外,我覺得似乎還欠缺一個對reason的普遍定義. 我提個也是個從plato.stanford.edu上看到的問題: A crucial move in Kant's argument is his claim that a rational will cannot act except “under the Idea” of its own freedom (4:448). The expression ‘acting under the Idea of freedom’ is easy to misunderstand. It does not mean that a rational will must believe it is free, since determinists are as free as libertarians in Kant's view. Indeed, Kant goes out of his way in his most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason, to argue that we have no ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, he ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ argues, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘things in themselves' apart from the causally determined world of appearan ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ eces.Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. For much the same ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ reason, Kant is not claiming that a rational will cannot operate without feel -ing free.Feelings, even the feeling of operating freely or the ‘looseness’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ hume refers too when we act, cannot be used in an a priori argument to ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ estabilishes CI.since they are empirical data. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <-plato.stanford.edu 這里就有個問題了,如果自己的empirical feeling free都不可靠,那我們從何而言我們 的moral legitimacy呢? 這是不是說,其實我們永遠都達不到complete moral legitimacy的高度呢? 嗯,我覺得moral permissible 和moral valuable 的說法還是挺有說服力. 前者只要universal,后者還要求autonomy.不過autonomy可能永遠不能達到, 如果CI和autonomy是一致的,那么autonomy和universaility也應該一致. 那怎么會出現moral permissible和moral valuable的問題呢? 應該只有moral legitimate的問題才對. ...attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ~~~~~~~ 'things in themselves' apart from the causally determined world of appearanc -es.Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. 這段話有點玄,請指點. bibliography http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/kant-moral/ --

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