按照plato.stanford.edu的说法, Groundwork就是a law of automonous wills.康德的意思好像是 CI=the law of autonomous wills=self governing. 如果要求每个人都有autonomous wills,那么那就是CI的本来意思 CI = I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. CI有三层意思. 最后一层意思是: CI="the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law" =act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws . <-plato.stanford.edu 这里强调的是的是universal law的给予者,而不是遵守者. 这里就有点autonomy的意思了: As with rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of ones own making . <-plato.stanford.edu 这就跟CI的第三层意思一样了.而且,这里的law是universal law. 所以道德有效性的一个necessary condition应该autonomy. 还有一个necessary condition是will rational will. 我理解rational will就是reason,就是moral law,比如不可撒谎等等.而moral law的实 质我觉得就是它的universality. 这里似乎有把moral law和moral legisimacy分开的嫌疑,可不可以分开呢?是个. 另外,我觉得似乎还欠缺一个对reason的普遍定义. 我提个也是个从plato.stanford.edu上看到的问题: A crucial move in Kant's argument is his claim that a rational will cannot act except “under the Idea” of its own freedom (4:448). The expression ‘acting under the Idea of freedom’ is easy to misunderstand. It does not mean that a rational will must believe it is free, since determinists are as free as libertarians in Kant's view. Indeed, Kant goes out of his way in his most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason, to argue that we have no ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, he ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ argues, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ‘things in themselves' apart from the causally determined world of appearan ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ eces.Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. For much the same ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ reason, Kant is not claiming that a rational will cannot operate without feel -ing free.Feelings, even the feeling of operating freely or the ‘looseness’ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ hume refers too when we act, cannot be used in an a priori argument to ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ estabilishes CI.since they are empirical data. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <-plato.stanford.edu 这里就有个问题了,如果自己的empirical feeling free都不可靠,那我们从何而言我们 的moral legitimacy呢? 这是不是说,其实我们永远都达不到complete moral legitimacy的高度呢? 嗯,我觉得moral permissible 和moral valuable 的说法还是挺有说服力. 前者只要universal,后者还要求autonomy.不过autonomy可能永远不能达到, 如果CI和autonomy是一致的,那么autonomy和universaility也应该一致. 那怎么会出现moral permissible和moral valuable的问题呢? 应该只有moral legitimate的问题才对. ...attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ~~~~~~~ 'things in themselves' apart from the causally determined world of appearanc -es.Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. 这段话有点玄,请指点. bibliography http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/kant-moral/ --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 220.172.22.19 ※ 编辑: supsymmetry 来自: 220.172.22.19 (02/28 15:26) ※ 编辑: supsymmetry 来自: 220.172.22.19 (02/28 15:45) ※ 编辑: supsymmetry 来自: 220.172.22.19 (02/28 15:48)