其實I兄潑這段對討論也蠻有幫助滴 你後來滴解釋 我覺得看起來也都蠻合理滴 a兄質疑滴 大概是你之前滴解釋吧? ※ 引述《IsaacStein (My Name)》之銘言： : In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names : are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have : been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been : Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who : have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, : we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' : have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can : refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what : might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that : 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases. 嗯 這就是我之前瞭解I所說滴 Kripke預料到有人會用transworld identity去質疑proper name做為rigid designator 而做出回應 有人會質疑proper name在所有可能世界所指涉的對象 為何是同一個呢?(為何不是多呢?) 哪些properties是這個對象的essential properties 以致於它在所有可能 世界都保持同一 kripke認為這種質疑有點本末倒置..我們已經先規定好了 我們是在談論某個 特定的對象 transworld identification才不是個問題 當然 在這裡有點puzzling 為啥kripke會認為 如此transworld identification才 不是個問題...我的解讀是: 如果proper name不是指涉到某個特定對象的話 那transworld identification就會是個問題 從此條件句的前件推到後件 這是顯而易見的 畢竟 若不是指涉某個特定對象的話 就可能是許多不同的對象 這時候就有了transworld identity的問題.. 以下有空再潑.. : The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter- : factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion : of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity : and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity, : and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying : properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify : the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to : identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon. : As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out' : about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible : worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking : at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop- : erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do : with properties used to identify it in the actual world. : 以上節錄自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50 : 是他本人的論證，但原先的敘述不排除我個人的主觀認知和詮釋。 --

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