其实I兄泼这段对讨论也蛮有帮助滴 你後来滴解释 我觉得看起来也都蛮合理滴 a兄质疑滴 大概是你之前滴解释吧? ※ 引述《IsaacStein (My Name)》之铭言： : In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names : are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have : been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been : Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who : have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, : we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' : have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can : refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what : might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that : 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases. 嗯 这就是我之前了解I所说滴 Kripke预料到有人会用transworld identity去质疑proper name做为rigid designator 而做出回应 有人会质疑proper name在所有可能世界所指涉的对象 为何是同一个呢?(为何不是多呢?) 哪些properties是这个对象的essential properties 以致於它在所有可能 世界都保持同一 kripke认为这种质疑有点本末倒置..我们已经先规定好了 我们是在谈论某个 特定的对象 transworld identification才不是个问题 当然 在这里有点puzzling 为啥kripke会认为 如此transworld identification才 不是个问题...我的解读是: 如果proper name不是指涉到某个特定对象的话 那transworld identification就会是个问题 从此条件句的前件推到後件 这是显而易见的 毕竟 若不是指涉某个特定对象的话 就可能是许多不同的对象 这时候就有了transworld identity的问题.. 以下有空再泼.. : The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter- : factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion : of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity : and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity, : and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying : properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify : the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to : identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon. : As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out' : about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible : worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking : at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop- : erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do : with properties used to identify it in the actual world. : 以上节录自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50 : 是他本人的论证，但原先的叙述不排除我个人的主观认知和诠释。 --

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