※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之銘言： : ※ 引述《aletheia (HERESY)》之銘言： : In my understanding, Goldman's causal theory of knowing seems to provide : a causality condition besides the traditional three. Although the extent of : knowledge in his causal theory slightly differs the traditional extent of : knowledge, basicly, his causal theory contains the truth, belief and : justification condition. Furthermore, the causality condition actually : confirms the legitimacy of the three conditions above. : In "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman surely argues from a focus : on 'causality'. He begins his analysis of knowledge with the discussion of : four major kinds of knowledge: knowledge by perception, knowledge by memory, : knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony. Then he proposes a causal : theory to specify the conditions for one to know something. However, his main : concern for 'causal connection' does not remove the traditional conditions : from his theory of knowledge. : Goldman formulates his analysis of knowing as follows: : S knows that P if and only if the fact P is causally connected in an : 'appropriate' way with S's believing P. : We can see the sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, for Goldman, : is 'the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's : believing P', in which 'appropriate' means warranted ways by perception, : memory, or reconstruction of a causal chain, as the major cases of knowledge : mentioned above. Here reconstruction of a causal chain leave room for other : possible causally perceived experiences, say ESP (extrasensory perception). : In short, he sets out from 'causality' but at last comes to 'truth', : 'belief', and 'justification.' Thus, 'causality' is certainly the forth : condition on the basis of the traditional analysis. : Perhaps I do not grasp your meaning of "以別的方式來進行", : your further comments are welcomed. 喔喔 我手邊沒有這篇 看過後不知道丟哪去了 我憑一些印象回答 有錯的話先包含一下吧 在傳統的三條件中，證成往往被視為要求S能夠知道自己的證成，有股內在論的味道。 這點是連外在論也承認的，我想在常識中應該也沒什麼問題。 畢竟當一個人說他知道時，我們總希望他要負起在當下說明的責任。 Goldman的casual theory 是外在論的方式， 產生信念的過程有因果連結就是證成，就算是S不知道這個連結 都沒關係。傳統所說的證成和信念的產生沒有必然關係， 只要你能說明你的知識就好，誰管他從哪裡來。而Gettier問題的起因就在於 傳統談的證成根本不對，必須要談「恰當的產生」：知識的可靠性出於他的來源。 用他裡頭火山爆發的例子我想應該可以知道一二， 後來跑來的那個人不能說他知道火山爆發，其原因在於他 產生的p沒有適當的因果連結，這樣的知識不可靠。 我是有點想說Goldman以因果連結取代了傳統上的第三-證成條件， 不過沒有看到原文有點心虛，但意思應該是這樣沒錯。 回到你剛上面寫的，你也很清楚的寫了他的定義 'appropriate way' 不就是證成嗎？ 至少在我的印象中除了這個'appropriate way'之外， Goldman也沒有提到關於要如何證成知識的咚咚。 --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 210.85.6.135 ※ 編輯: aletheia 來自: 210.85.6.135 (11/04 00:38)