※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之铭言： : ※ 引述《aletheia (HERESY)》之铭言： : In my understanding, Goldman's causal theory of knowing seems to provide : a causality condition besides the traditional three. Although the extent of : knowledge in his causal theory slightly differs the traditional extent of : knowledge, basicly, his causal theory contains the truth, belief and : justification condition. Furthermore, the causality condition actually : confirms the legitimacy of the three conditions above. : In "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman surely argues from a focus : on 'causality'. He begins his analysis of knowledge with the discussion of : four major kinds of knowledge: knowledge by perception, knowledge by memory, : knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony. Then he proposes a causal : theory to specify the conditions for one to know something. However, his main : concern for 'causal connection' does not remove the traditional conditions : from his theory of knowledge. : Goldman formulates his analysis of knowing as follows: : S knows that P if and only if the fact P is causally connected in an : 'appropriate' way with S's believing P. : We can see the sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, for Goldman, : is 'the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's : believing P', in which 'appropriate' means warranted ways by perception, : memory, or reconstruction of a causal chain, as the major cases of knowledge : mentioned above. Here reconstruction of a causal chain leave room for other : possible causally perceived experiences, say ESP (extrasensory perception). : In short, he sets out from 'causality' but at last comes to 'truth', : 'belief', and 'justification.' Thus, 'causality' is certainly the forth : condition on the basis of the traditional analysis. : Perhaps I do not grasp your meaning of "以别的方式来进行", : your further comments are welcomed. 喔喔 我手边没有这篇 看过後不知道丢哪去了 我凭一些印象回答 有错的话先包含一下吧 在传统的三条件中，证成往往被视为要求S能够知道自己的证成，有股内在论的味道。 这点是连外在论也承认的，我想在常识中应该也没什麽问题。 毕竟当一个人说他知道时，我们总希望他要负起在当下说明的责任。 Goldman的casual theory 是外在论的方式， 产生信念的过程有因果连结就是证成，就算是S不知道这个连结 都没关系。传统所说的证成和信念的产生没有必然关系， 只要你能说明你的知识就好，谁管他从哪里来。而Gettier问题的起因就在於 传统谈的证成根本不对，必须要谈「恰当的产生」：知识的可靠性出於他的来源。 用他里头火山爆发的例子我想应该可以知道一二， 後来跑来的那个人不能说他知道火山爆发，其原因在於他 产生的p没有适当的因果连结，这样的知识不可靠。 我是有点想说Goldman以因果连结取代了传统上的第三-证成条件， 不过没有看到原文有点心虚，但意思应该是这样没错。 回到你刚上面写的，你也很清楚的写了他的定义 'appropriate way' 不就是证成吗？ 至少在我的印象中除了这个'appropriate way'之外， Goldman也没有提到关於要如何证成知识的咚咚。 --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 210.85.6.135 ※ 编辑: aletheia 来自: 210.85.6.135 (11/04 00:38)