In Fed We Trust, Sometimes 在聯準會 我們偶而信任 Bad decisions leave little room for faith. 糟糕的決策使得信任的空間越來越小 出處: http://ppt.cc/2fgt Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images There’s an old saw in the investing world: don’t fight the Fed. Just as politicians shouldn’t square off with people who buy ink by the barrel, investors shouldn’t buck the folks who can print endless amounts of dollars. If the Fed says it wants rates to go down, and is prepared to buy bonds to make that happen, the market usually complies. 在投資界有一句古老的諺語：不要跟聯準會對抗。如同政客不跟口誅筆伐的人作 對一般，投資客不跟可無盡印鈔票的人過意不去。如果聯準會宣布要降息，而且 將以買債券達到他的目的，通常市場就會遵從他的意思。 But not this time. Ever since Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke’s announcement in November that the central bank would purchase $600 billion in government bonds in an effort to lower interest rates, politicians, monetary officials, and investors seem to be spoiling for a fight. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble dubbed the policy “clueless.” A gaggle of right-wing economists and policy wonks penned an angry letter accusing Bernanke of economic malpractice. The bond markets threw a collective fit, pushing up interest rates in defiance. Some of these attacks are motivated by crass politics. But it’s clear now that the Fed no longer possesses the imperium it had in the 1990s because, too frequently, it has been behind the curve. 但是這次不一樣，即使聯準會主席柏南克在11月時宣布，央行將購買6億美元的政 府公債以降低利率，政客、貨幣官員以及投資客似乎準備要大幹一場。德國財政部長 渥夫剛、史瓦布勒則戲稱這政策”無厘頭”。大批右翼經濟學家以及政治決策人世氣憤 地控訴柏南克不稱職。債券市場的集體反抗，反而推昇了債券的利率，其中還有一些 驅動於愚蠢的政策。於是現在情況非常明瞭，聯準會已經無法如同1990年代時擁有至 高無上的權力，歸咎於太頻繁與太不合時宜的政策。 In the 1990s then-chairman Alan Greenspan was way ahead of economic trends. His reputation was cemented by a critical insight and gamble: advances in globalization, the advent of China into the world trading system, and the telecommunications revolution meant the U.S. could grow at a higher rate without risking inflation. But that was last century. Since then, the Fed’s record under Greenspan and Bernanke has been one of overshooting, furious rushes to catch up, and frequent displays of bewilderment. 在1990年代，聯準會主席葛林斯潘政策領先於經濟趨勢，他的聲望鞏固於關鍵的決策以 及豪賭：在全球化的領先地位，中國進入世界貿易系統的預見，以及藉由無線通訊革命 ，美國可以避開通膨而進入高成長的時期。但是，這是上個世紀的事了。自此之後，聯 準會在葛林斯潘以及柏南克的政策不是太過，就是不夠，而且數度產生對未來的疑惑。 After several months of a jobless recovery, Greenspan took the federal-funds rate down to 1 percent in 2003 and left it there for 13 months, even as the economy was powering ahead. His lethargy in raising rates allowed the housing bubble to inflate. The Fed similarly dozed through the subprime mess. In May 2007 Bernanke said, “We believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.” In November 2007, when a congressman asked if subprime losses could reach $150 billion, Bernanke responded: “That’s in the ballpark.” 2003年在數個月的搶救失業率聲浪中，葛林斯潘宣布將聯邦準備率的利率調為1個百分點 ，並且連續13個月都沒有調動，即使經濟情況已經大幅的飛越。他的毫無作為導致了房市 泡沫擴張了起來。聯準會相同的"打盹"也吹起了次貸風暴。2007年五月柏南克說「我們相 信房市所造成的次貸危機看來已經限縮了，我們不希望次貸的危機會波及其他經濟與財政 系統」，2007年11月當國會議員問次貸風暴的損失是否會達到1億5000萬美元時，柏南克 回應「這只是"預估"而已」。 Bernanke, a fan of the woebegone Washington Nationals, must have had a large ballpark in mind. In June 2008, six months after the recession started, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee reported the consensus among its members was that the economy would grow between 1 and 1.6 percent for the year. Oops! And despite having responsibility for overseeing the financial sector, and despite employing hundreds of economists, the Fed was continually surprised as one domino fell after another—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Lehman Brothers, the whole economic system. 柏南克，一個愁眉苦臉的華盛頓國民隊球迷，一定有一個更大的”預估”在心中。 2008年6月，經濟蕭條半年之後，聯準會市場仍預估今年經濟成長會有1~1.6個百分比。 糟糕! 儘管他有責任監管財政部門、儘管他雇用了上百個經濟學家，聯準會仍持續的 意外看到骨牌一個接一個的倒下-房麗美、房地美、AIG、雷曼兄弟以及整個經濟體。 The accumulation of behind-the-curve performances has harmed the central bank’s credibility. And the suspicion that the Fed remains in that position explains a good chunk of the market’s current skepticism. Given that the Fed rarely recognizes when the economy is about to shift into a higher gear or go into idle, why should we take its word that its $600 billion purchase of government bonds is all that stands between us and a double dip? And why should we take it on faith when it assures us that its policies won’t ignite inflation? 累積下來的追著市場跑的政策已經重創了央行的信用。而聯準會還穩坐其位反而提供 了目前市場的懷疑論者猜疑的理由。認為聯準會很少會對於經濟上揚或是停滯會有 明確的認知，那麼我們為何要相信6億美元的政府公債可以確保我們遠離二次衰退？ 而且我們為何要相信這政策不會引爆通貨膨脹？ CBS’s 60 Minutes has long been a refuge for public figures seeking to restore credibility. So you can understand why Bernanke agreed to let Scott Pelley into the temple of monetary policy for the segment that aired Dec. 5. The gambit failed. In the days after Bernanke’s appearance, bond investors headed for the hills. Yields on the 10-year government bonds shot up to levels not seen in months. Sure, the tax deal between President Obama and congressional Republicans (implication: bigger deficits ahead) and perceptions that growth might accelerate played a part. But I can’t escape the feeling that the broad uncertainty about the Fed’s certainty accounted for a big chunk of the action. CBS的”60分鐘”長久以來作為政策恢復信用的庇護所，所以你不難想像柏南克在12月5號 接受了採訪，讓主持人史考特、裴林進入了貨幣政策的聖堂，不過這一招失敗了。 在柏南克當天出現之後，債券投資客攻上山頭，堆高了10年期政府公債的利率到數個月 的高點。當然了，歐巴馬與共和黨國會議員間的稅務改革(意味：還有更大的赤字)以及 預見未來成長的因素也推波助瀾，但是我不能跳脫廣泛對聯準會的不確定性才是主要的 原因。 Asked what degree of confidence he had in the Fed’s ability to control inflation, Bernanke responded: “One hundred percent.” Wrong answer, Ben! There are some historical dictums everyone should heed: Beware of Greeks bearing gifts. Don’t fight the Fed. And, oh, be cautious of financial titans who profess unvarnished confidence in their ability to manage affairs. 如果問到聯準會控制通膨的能力，柏南克會回應「100%有能力」。答錯了，Ben！ 有一些歷史格言你們要留意：「小心希臘人送有軸承的禮物」、「不要跟聯準會對抗」。 喔！還有，「要小心金融巨人毫不掩飾的宣稱他們有能力治理一切」 --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 60.250.141.178 ※ 編輯: derecklin 來自: 60.250.141.178 (12/13 17:26)