課程名稱︰個體經濟學 課程性質︰ 課程教師︰ 開課學院： 開課系所︰經濟系 考試日期（年月日）︰970501 考試時限（分鐘）：120（10:00~12:00） 是否需發放獎勵金：是 （如未明確表示，則不予發放） 試題 : 選擇題：共十題 每題兩分 1.One of the differenses between the Cournot-Nash model and the Stackelberg model is that (a) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a greater total industry output and lower price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (b) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a greater total industry output and higher price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (c) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a smaller total industry output and lower price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (d) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a smaller total industry output and higher price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 2.The Bertrand model is a (a) simultaneous move game in which the outcome is that price exceeds marginal cost. (b) simultaneous move game in which the outcome is that price equals marginal cost. (c) sequential move game in which the outcome is that price exceeds marginal cost. (b) sequential move game in which the outcome is that price equals marginal cost. Game Matrix I Player A can play the strategies　♣ and　♠,and Player Bcan play the strategies 　♦ and　♥. Player B's Strategies 　♦ 　♥ Player A's Strategies 　♣ A gets 7 A gets 2 B gets 3 B gets 2 　♠ A gets 9 A gets 6 B gets 1 B gets 4 3.Refer to Game Matrix I. What are the dominant strategies in the game? (a) A's dominant strategy is　♠,and B's dominant strategy is　♥. (b) A's dominant strategy is　♠,but B does not have a dominant strategy. (c) B's dominant strategy is　♥,but A does not have a dominant strategy. (d) Neither player have a dominant strategy. 4.Refer to Game Matrix I. The only Nash equilibrium for the game is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. 5.Refer to Game Matrix I. The only outcome in this game is not Pareto optimal is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. 6.Refer to Game Matrix I. If this game is played sequentially with player A first, the Stackelberg equilibrium is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. Game Matrix II The following questions refer to the game matrix below. Player A can play the strategies UP and DOWN,and Player B can play the strategie LEFT and RIGHT. Player B's Strategies LEFT RIGHT Player A's Strategies UP A gets 10 A gets 30 B gets 10 B gets 8 DOWN A gets 8 A gets 20 B gets 30 B gets 20 7.Refer to Game Matrix II. The Nash equilibrium for the game is (a) UP,LEFT (b) UP,RIGHT (c) DOWN,LEFT (d) DOWN,RIGHT 8.Which of the following statements are false? (a) Player A has a dominant strategy. (b) Player B has a dominant strategy. (c) This is a prisoner's Dilemma. (d) This game has no Nash equilibrium. 9.Consider each pair of strategies other than UP,RIGHT. which of the following statements is not ture about tose pairs? (a) They are all Pareto Optimal. (b) None of them are a Nash equilibrium. (c) The players would not mutually agree to play any of them if such an agreement were possible. (d) Each is requires that a player play a dominated strategy. 10.One reason that DOWN,RIGHT is not a Nash equilibrium is that (a) Player B receives a payoff of 8 as opposed to payoff of 20 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (b) Player B receives a payoff of 20 as opposed to payoff of 30 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (c) Player A receives a payoff of 20 as opposed to payoff of 30 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (d) The statement is false. DOWN,RIGHT is a Nash equilibrium. 計算題 1.小英與阿長兩人在仙島販賣一種名為希望的產品，仙島對於希望的市場需求為 P=14-2Q, Q為兩人販賣希望數量之和。兩人的成本結構為MC =MC =AC =AC =2. 請問 英 長 英 長 (1) 在給定阿長生產４單位的希望的前提下，作圖說明阿英的 residual demand, residual marginal revenue, 最適產量以及市場價格 (5%) (2) 求解兩人在 Cournot 競爭下的最適反應函數(best response curve) (5%) (3) 求解 Cournot 均衡下之市場價格，兩人各自生產的數量及其利潤 (5%) (4) 若兩人在密室會商後決定勾結 collude，請計算市場價格及兩人各自生產的數量(5%) (5) 假設善於行銷的阿長每次都先出招而阿英只能跟著接招 a) 作圖說明阿長的 residual demand, residual marginal revenue. (5%) b) 求解 Stackelberg model 的價格與雙方生產數量 (5%) (6) 回到小題(3)，若現在市場上有ｎ個同質(identical) 希望廠商，求解市場價格與廠 商數目間的關係。當ｎ趨近於無窮大時，會發生什麼狀況？ (5%) 2.承1，現若阿英的邊際與平均成本不變，但是阿長的邊際與平均成本比阿英高了10%，其 餘條件皆相同，則 (1) 誰比較可能是 Stackelberg leader？為什麼？ (2%) (2) 求解 follower 的 Cournot 反應函數。 (3%) (3) 求解 leader 的residual demand。 (5%) (4) 求解 Stackelberg equilibrium 下兩者產量與市場價格。 (5%) 3.承1， (1) 若兩者所販賣的希望無任何差別(no product differentiation)，作圖說明兩人在 Bertrand competition 下的反應函數並求出他們的定價和產量。 (5%) (2) 若兩人的希望是異質產品，並面對以下的對稱需求函數 Q =4-(1/3)P +(1/3)P self self rival 求解兩人在 Bertrand competition 下的反應函數產量以及價格。 4.請繪圖說明產品獨賣 (Monopoly)、要素讀買 (Monopsony)及雙邊獨占 (Bilateral Monopoly)下之市場均衡。 (20%) (註：圖形中請清楚標示各線之名稱以及均衡點) --

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