课程名称︰个体经济学 课程性质︰ 课程教师︰ 开课学院： 开课系所︰经济系 考试日期（年月日）︰970501 考试时限（分钟）：120（10:00~12:00） 是否需发放奖励金：是 （如未明确表示，则不予发放） 试题 : 选择题：共十题 每题两分 1.One of the differenses between the Cournot-Nash model and the Stackelberg model is that (a) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a greater total industry output and lower price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (b) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a greater total industry output and higher price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (c) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a smaller total industry output and lower price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (d) the Stackelberg equilibrium yields a smaller total industry output and higher price than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 2.The Bertrand model is a (a) simultaneous move game in which the outcome is that price exceeds marginal cost. (b) simultaneous move game in which the outcome is that price equals marginal cost. (c) sequential move game in which the outcome is that price exceeds marginal cost. (b) sequential move game in which the outcome is that price equals marginal cost. Game Matrix I Player A can play the strategies　♣ and　♠,and Player Bcan play the strategies 　♦ and　♥. Player B's Strategies 　♦ 　♥ Player A's Strategies 　♣ A gets 7 A gets 2 B gets 3 B gets 2 　♠ A gets 9 A gets 6 B gets 1 B gets 4 3.Refer to Game Matrix I. What are the dominant strategies in the game? (a) A's dominant strategy is　♠,and B's dominant strategy is　♥. (b) A's dominant strategy is　♠,but B does not have a dominant strategy. (c) B's dominant strategy is　♥,but A does not have a dominant strategy. (d) Neither player have a dominant strategy. 4.Refer to Game Matrix I. The only Nash equilibrium for the game is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. 5.Refer to Game Matrix I. The only outcome in this game is not Pareto optimal is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. 6.Refer to Game Matrix I. If this game is played sequentially with player A first, the Stackelberg equilibrium is (a) the upper left-hand corner. (b) the upper right-hand corner. (c) the lower left-hand corner. (d) the lower right-hand corner. Game Matrix II The following questions refer to the game matrix below. Player A can play the strategies UP and DOWN,and Player B can play the strategie LEFT and RIGHT. Player B's Strategies LEFT RIGHT Player A's Strategies UP A gets 10 A gets 30 B gets 10 B gets 8 DOWN A gets 8 A gets 20 B gets 30 B gets 20 7.Refer to Game Matrix II. The Nash equilibrium for the game is (a) UP,LEFT (b) UP,RIGHT (c) DOWN,LEFT (d) DOWN,RIGHT 8.Which of the following statements are false? (a) Player A has a dominant strategy. (b) Player B has a dominant strategy. (c) This is a prisoner's Dilemma. (d) This game has no Nash equilibrium. 9.Consider each pair of strategies other than UP,RIGHT. which of the following statements is not ture about tose pairs? (a) They are all Pareto Optimal. (b) None of them are a Nash equilibrium. (c) The players would not mutually agree to play any of them if such an agreement were possible. (d) Each is requires that a player play a dominated strategy. 10.One reason that DOWN,RIGHT is not a Nash equilibrium is that (a) Player B receives a payoff of 8 as opposed to payoff of 20 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (b) Player B receives a payoff of 20 as opposed to payoff of 30 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (c) Player A receives a payoff of 20 as opposed to payoff of 30 that he would receive if he changed his strategy. (d) The statement is false. DOWN,RIGHT is a Nash equilibrium. 计算题 1.小英与阿长两人在仙岛贩卖一种名为希望的产品，仙岛对於希望的市场需求为 P=14-2Q, Q为两人贩卖希望数量之和。两人的成本结构为MC =MC =AC =AC =2. 请问 英 长 英 长 (1) 在给定阿长生产４单位的希望的前提下，作图说明阿英的 residual demand, residual marginal revenue, 最适产量以及市场价格 (5%) (2) 求解两人在 Cournot 竞争下的最适反应函数(best response curve) (5%) (3) 求解 Cournot 均衡下之市场价格，两人各自生产的数量及其利润 (5%) (4) 若两人在密室会商後决定勾结 collude，请计算市场价格及两人各自生产的数量(5%) (5) 假设善於行销的阿长每次都先出招而阿英只能跟着接招 a) 作图说明阿长的 residual demand, residual marginal revenue. (5%) b) 求解 Stackelberg model 的价格与双方生产数量 (5%) (6) 回到小题(3)，若现在市场上有ｎ个同质(identical) 希望厂商，求解市场价格与厂 商数目间的关系。当ｎ趋近於无穷大时，会发生什麽状况？ (5%) 2.承1，现若阿英的边际与平均成本不变，但是阿长的边际与平均成本比阿英高了10%，其 余条件皆相同，则 (1) 谁比较可能是 Stackelberg leader？为什麽？ (2%) (2) 求解 follower 的 Cournot 反应函数。 (3%) (3) 求解 leader 的residual demand。 (5%) (4) 求解 Stackelberg equilibrium 下两者产量与市场价格。 (5%) 3.承1， (1) 若两者所贩卖的希望无任何差别(no product differentiation)，作图说明两人在 Bertrand competition 下的反应函数并求出他们的定价和产量。 (5%) (2) 若两人的希望是异质产品，并面对以下的对称需求函数 Q =4-(1/3)P +(1/3)P self self rival 求解两人在 Bertrand competition 下的反应函数产量以及价格。 4.请绘图说明产品独卖 (Monopoly)、要素读买 (Monopsony)及双边独占 (Bilateral Monopoly)下之市场均衡。 (20%) (注：图形中请清楚标示各线之名称以及均衡点) --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 61.228.95.221