標題:Dollar Shift: Chinese Pockets Filled as Americans’ Emptied 錢的方向：中國口袋滿滿，美國口袋空空 By MARK LANDLER Published: December 25, 2008 “Usually it’s the rich country lending to the poor. This time, it’s the poor country lending to the rich.” 通常是富國借錢給窮國。這次，是窮國借錢給富國。 — Niall Ferguson WASHINGTON — In March 2005, a low-key Princeton economist who had become a Federal Reserve governor coined a novel theory to explain the growing tendency of Americans to borrow from foreigners, particularly the Chinese, to finance their heavy spending. 2005年三月，一位低調的普林斯頓經濟學家，出任聯準會委員後，提出了一個 新穎的理論，解釋美國逐漸增加向外國借貸（特別是中國）以維持其龐大支出的傾向。 The problem, he said, was not that Americans spend too much, but that foreigners save too much. The Chinese have piled up so much excess savings that they lend money to the United States at low rates, underwriting American consumption. 他認為，問不在美國花太多，而在外國存太多。中國人堆起的錢山多到能夠以低利率 借給美國，支撐美國龐大的消費。 This colossal credit cycle could not last forever, he said. But in a global economy, the transfer of Chinese money to America was a market phenomenon that would take years, even a decade, to work itself out. For now, he said, “ we probably have little choice except to be patient.” 這龐大的信貸循環不可能長久，這位經濟學家認為。但在全球市場環境下，中國錢轉向 美國的整體過程可是個需要數年，甚至整個十年，才能完成的市場現象。就目前來說， 「除了耐心等待，我們或許沒有多少選擇。」 Today, the dependence of the United States on Chinese money looks less benign. And the economist who proposed the theory, Ben S. Bernanke, is dealing with the consequences, having been promoted to chairman of the Fed in 2006, as these cross-border money flows were reaching stratospheric levels. 現在，美國依賴中國錢看起來已經不是件好事了。而提出這個理論的經濟學家伯南克， 如今也正以聯準會主席的身份，應付美國依賴中國等外資的後果。就在伯南克2006年 上任時，跨國界的資金流動已經達到近似平流層的境界─量大，穩定，快速。 In the past decade, China has invested upward of $1 trillion, mostly earnings from manufacturing exports, into American government bonds and government-backed mortgage debt. That has lowered interest rates and helped fuel a historic consumption binge and housing bubble in the United States. 在過去十年間，中國投資美國政府國債和政府抵押貸款支持債券方面的資金，已經 超過一兆美金，且多是製造業出口盈餘。這筆龐大財源把利率壓低了，也成了製造 美國國內消費狂潮以及房市泡沫等現象。 China, some economists say, lulled American consumers, and their leaders, into complacency about their spendthrift ways. 一些經濟學家認為，是中國把美國消費者和美國領導人給哄入了瘋狂消費的陷阱中的。 “This was a blinking red light,” said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard and a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. “We should have reacted to it.” 「這警訊亮了，」哈佛教授、IMF首席經濟學家Rogoff說道。「我們理應要有所 因應的。」 In hindsight, many economists say, the United States should have recognized that borrowing from abroad for consumption and deficit spending at home was not a formula for economic success. Even as that weakness is becoming more widely recognized, however, the United States is likely to be more addicted than ever to foreign creditors to finance record government spending to revive the broken economy. 一些經濟學家的馬後砲提到，美國政府應該要發現對外借貸以維持消費行為和家庭的 負債花費絕不是成功的經濟公式。就當無限制消費的弱點逐漸獲得重視，美國政府卻 比以往更依賴外國資金來維持破紀錄的政府支出，來重新喚醒衰落的美國經濟。 To be sure, there were few ready remedies. Some critics argue that the United States could have pushed Beijing harder to abandon its policy of keeping the value of its currency weak — a policy that made its exports less expensive and helped turn it into the world’s leading manufacturing power. If China had allowed its currency to float according to market demand in the past decade, its export growth probably would have moderated. And it would not have acquired the same vast hoard of dollars to invest abroad. 當然，沒有多少現成的解決方案。一些批評者認為，美國政府之前應該要對北京施加 更多壓力，終止壓低人民幣價格的政策。這個壓低人民幣的政策就是中國政府能夠以 低價出口、並轉換中國經濟成為世界生產強權的主因。如果中國在過去十年內能夠 同意讓人民幣浮動，順應市場需求，中國的成長或許就不會如此強勁。同時，中國 也就不會能夠積累龐大的美金來進行海外投資。 Others say the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department should have seen the Chinese lending for what it was: a giant stimulus to the American economy, not unlike interest rate cuts by the Fed. These critics say the Fed under Alan Greenspan contributed to the creation of the housing bubble by leaving interest rates too low for too long, even as Chinese investment further stoked an easy-money economy. The Fed should have cut interest rates less in the middle of this decade, they say, and started raising them sooner, to help reduce speculation in real estate. 其他批評者則認為，聯準會和財政部應該要正視中國借貸的本質：那是對美國經濟體 的一股巨大刺激，且與聯準會調降利率是完全不同的。這些批評者認為，葛林斯潘 領導下的聯準會，無視利率長期過低，以及中國來的充沛資金，造成了房市泡沫。 聯準會理應在過去十年減少調降利率，且應提早升息，來抑制房市方面的投機心態。 Today, with the wreckage around him, Mr. Bernanke said he regretted that more was not done to regulate financial institutions and mortgage providers, which might have prevented the flood of investment, including that from China, from being so badly used. But the Fed’s role in regulation is limited to banks. And stricter regulation by itself would not have been enough, he insisted. 如今，許多企業已然傾圮，伯南克說他對於之前無法做更多金融機構和信貸提供者的 管制措施，無法透過行動來避免氾濫的外資（包括中國的）被恣意花用。但他也強調， 聯準會的管制權限本來就僅限於銀行，而聯準會這單一機構把管制加強也不會造成 顯著效果。 “Achieving a better balance of international capital flows early on could have significantly reduced the risks to the financial system,” Mr. Bernanke said in an interview in his office overlooking the Washington Mall. 「提早維持較為良好、平衡的國際資金流動，或可顯著地降低金融系統承擔的風險，」 伯南克於一次辦公室採訪中說道。 “However,” he continued, “this could only have been done through international cooperation, not by the United States alone. The problem was recognized, but sufficient international cooperation was not forthcoming.” 「然而，要達成這個目的，必須要透過國際合作，而非美國單方面的行動。這個問題 有受到關注，但缺乏足夠的國際合作來落實。」 The inaction was because of a range of factors, political and economic. By the yardsticks that appeared to matter most — prosperity and growth — the relationship between China and the United States also seemed to be paying off for both countries. Neither had a strong incentive to break an addiction: China to strong export growth and financial stability; the United States to cheap imports and low-cost foreign loans. 國際無作為的原因甚多，有政治的，有經濟的。就關鍵性度量衡（如繁榮度和成長率） 來說，美中的金融互動關係對雙方似乎都有利。任一方都沒有戒掉成癮的金融流動 慣性：中國能繼續維持強勢出口成長和金融穩定性；美國則能繼續引進便宜的進口產品 以及低價的外資貸款。 In Washington, China was treated as a threat by some people, but mostly because it lured away manufacturing jobs. Others argued that China’s heavy lending to this country was risky because Chinese leaders could decide to withdraw money at a moment’s notice, creating a panicky run on the dollar. 華府圈內，一些人視中國為威脅，但多是因為中國把製造業工作給吸走了。其他人 強調，中國大舉借錢給美國有極大風險，因為中國領導階層可以在瞬間決定把錢給 抽走，造成美元市場的恐慌。 Mr. Bernanke viewed such international investment flows through a different lens. He argued that Chinese invested savings abroad because consumers in China did not have enough confidence to spend. Changing that situation would take years, and did not amount to a pressing problem for the Americans. 伯南克則用不同的角度來看這個國際資金流動的案例。他認為，中國將存底投資外國， 是因為中國消費者沒有足夠信心進行消費。改變這個情勢可會曠日廢時，並且不會對 美國造成顯著壓力。 “The global savings glut story did us a collective disservice,” said Edwin M. Truman, a former Fed and Treasury official. “It created the idea that the world was doing it to us and we couldn’t do anything about it.” 「全球存款過多的故事對我們造成了結構性的不便，」前聯準會和財政部官員TRUMAN 說道。「這個故事型塑了一個概念，即：這個世界在搞我們，而我們就只好任世界 擺佈。」 But Mr. Bernanke’s theory fit the prevailing hands-off, pro-market ideology of recent years. Mr. Greenspan and the Bush administration treated the record American trade deficit and heavy foreign borrowing as an abstract threat, not an urgent problem. 但伯南克的理論符合近年流行的自由放任主義意識型態。葛林斯潘與布希政府將 破紀錄的美國貿易逆差和大舉國債集資外國資金為一個架空的威脅，而非迫切的問題。 Mr. Bernanke, after he took charge of the Fed, warned that the imbalances between the countries were growing more serious. By then, however, it was too late to do much about them. And the White House still regarded imbalances as an arcane subject best left to economists. 伯南克出掌聯準會後，警告國與國間的不平衡益趨嚴重。屆時，解決不平衡的選擇 會越來越少。而白宮仍然視不平衡為一個專屬經濟學家的晦澀議題。 By itself, money from China is not a bad thing. As American officials like to note, it speaks to the attractiveness of the United States as a destination for foreign investment. In the 19th century, the United States built its railroads with capital borrowed from the British. 單論本質而言，中國錢不是壞。如美國官員喜歡提的，中國錢代表美國是能夠吸引外資 的最佳終點。19世紀時，美國就是用英國借來的資本建鐵路的。 In the past decade, China arguably enabled an American boom. Low-cost Chinese goods helped keep a lid on inflation, while the flood of Chinese investment helped the government finance mortgages and a public debt of close to $11 trillion. 在過去十年間，中國名副其實地造就了美國經濟發展。低價格的中國產品幫助壓低通澎， 同時中國資金湧入幫助美國政府金融信貸以及政府債務飆至11兆美元。 But Americans did not use the lower-cost money afforded by Chinese investment to build a 21st-century equivalent of the railroads. Instead, the government engaged in a costly war in Iraq, and consumers used loose credit to buy sport utility vehicles and larger homes. Banks and investors, eagerly seeking higher interest rates in this easy-money environment, created risky new securities like collateralized debt obligations. 但美國沒有用低成本的中國資金來建設。政府反而把錢大把灑在美伊戰爭上，而消費者 則用非常寬鬆的貸款購買跑車和大房子。銀行和投資者在這個錢多的時代，積極地追求 高利率，製造具有高風險的債券和衍伸性債務負擔。 “Nobody wanted to get off this drug,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican who pushed legislation to punish China by imposing stiff tariffs. “Their drug was an endless line of customers for made-in-China products. Our drug was the Chinese products and cash.” 「沒人想要戒掉這個癮，」參議員GRAHAM說道。這位參議員推動了懲罰中國的高額關稅 法案。「他們的毒就是一長列的中國低價商品的顧客。我們的藥就視中國產品和現金。」 Mr. Graham said he understood the addiction: he was speaking by phone from a Wal-Mart store in Anderson, S.C., where he was Christmas shopping in aisles lined with items from China. GRAHAM說他理解這個癮勁兒：他講這些話的時候，正在WALMART添購聖誕節物資，那一列 一列的產品中總有許多中國製的商品。 A New Economic Dance 新經濟之舞 The United States has been here before. In the 1980s, it ran heavy trade deficits with Japan, which recycled some of its trading profits into American government bonds. 美國之前也曾經歷這種浩劫。1980年代，美國對日本有巨大的貿易逆差，而日本也有 將貿易獲利轉成美國政府國債。 At that time, the deficits were viewed as a grave threat to America’s economic might. Action took the form of a 1985 agreement known as the Plaza Accord. The world’s major economies intervened in currency markets to drive down the value of the dollar and drive up the Japanese yen. 那時，對日貿易逆差被視為美國經濟實力的嚴重威脅。針對此事，世界五大經濟體 於1985年簽訂廣場協議，介入貨幣市場，拋售壓低美元價格，同時把日幣價格抬高。 The arrangement did slow the growth of the trade deficit for a time. But economists blamed the sharp revaluation of the Japanese yen for halting Japan ’s rapid growth. The lesson of the Plaza Accord was not lost on China, which at that time was just emerging as an export power. 這個舉動的確有把貿易逆差的成長率控制住。但經濟學家認為這次大幅度重估日幣 的行為使日本經濟陷入泥沼。廣場協議的教訓被中國給記住了。那時中國才正在 塑造自己成為出口大國。 China tied itself even more tightly to the United States than did Japan. In 1995, it devalued its currency and set a firm exchange rate of roughly 8.3 to the dollar, a level that remained fixed for a decade. 中國硬是把自己黏著美國，甚至比日本更甚。1995年時，中國使人民幣貶值， 並把對美元匯率定死在8.3左右。這個匯率維持了將近十年。 During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, China clung firmly to its currency policy, earning praise from the Clinton administration for helping check the spiral of devaluation sweeping Asia. Its low wages attracted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment. 在1997-98的亞洲金融風暴期間，中國堅持其貨幣政策，獲得柯林頓政府的掌聲， 特別是針對中國抵抗亞洲各國貨幣貶值的貢獻。中國極低的工資吸引了數以億計 的美元外資進入其市場。 By the early part of this decade, the United States was importing huge amounts of Chinese-made goods — toys, shoes, flat-screen televisions and auto parts — while selling much less to China in return. 最近幾年，美國輸入了龐大數量的中國產品─玩具、鞋子、平板電視、汽車零件─ 而對中國輸出了極少的物資。 “For consumers, this was a net benefit because of the availability of cheaper goods,” said Laurence H. Meyer, a former Fed governor. “There’s no question that China put downward pressure on inflation rates.” 「對消費者而言，這個關係是淨利：因為物資便宜且充沛，」前聯準會委員MEYER說道。 「無疑地，中國把通澎壓低了。」 But in classical economics, that trade gap could not have persisted for long without bankrupting the American economy. Except that China recycled its trade profits right back into the United States. 但就古典經濟學而言，這種貿易差距不可能持久，也不可能不淘空美國經濟。除非 中國將貿易利益回收，再投資給美國。 It did so to protect its own interests. China kept its banks under tight state control and its currency on a short leash to ensure financial stability. It required companies and individuals to save in the state-run banking system most foreign currency — primarily dollars — that they earned from foreign trade and investment. 中國的再投資是為了保障自己的利益。中國讓自己的銀行接受嚴格的國家控管， 並把人民幣拴得牢牢的，確保金融系統穩定。中國要求公司與個人在國營銀行系統內 投存透過國際貿易和投資所獲得的盈餘外匯（美元為主）。 As foreign trade surged, this hoard of dollars became enormous. In 2000, the reserves were less than $200 billion; today they are about $2 trillion. 既然外貿強勢，中國所囤積的美元變得非常可觀。2000年時，中國外匯存底為大約 2000億美金；現在，大概兩兆美金。 Chinese leaders chose to park the bulk of that in safe securities backed by the American government, including Treasury bonds and the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had implicit government backing. 中國領導班子選擇把這一大部分的資金投資在安全的美國政府債券上，其中包括財政部 債券，以及政府默默支持的二房債券。 This not only allowed the United States to continue to finance its trade deficit, but, by creating greater demand for United States securities, it also helped push interest rates below where they would otherwise have been. For years, China’s government was eager to buy American debt at yields many in the private sector felt were too low. 這不僅讓美國能夠持續維持貿易逆差，同時強化了對美國各級債券的需求，並將 利率壓低到不可思議的地步。多年來，中國政府對於購買美國債券十分感興趣， 儘管這些債券對於私人企業界來說，低到無利可圖。 This financial and trade embrace between the United States and China grew so tight that Niall Ferguson, a financial historian, has dubbed the two countries Chimerica. 美國和中國的金融和貿易關係緊密到連FERGUSON都為兩造創了個字：「Chimerica」。 ‘Tiptoeing’ Around a Partner 超謹慎伙伴 Being attached at the hip was not entirely comfortable for either side, though for widely differing reasons. 美中的尷尬結合儘管有利，但因為許多原因，以致於雙方都不感覺特別舒服。 In the United States, more people worried about cheap Chinese goods than cheap Chinese loans. By 2003, China’s trade surplus with the United States was ballooning, and lawmakers in Congress were restive. Senator Graham and Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, introduced a bill threatening to impose a 27 percent duty on Chinese goods. 就美國來說，許多人對中國產品的疑懼甚至大於中國資金。2003年時，中國對美國 的貿易順差急速擴大，使得美國國會議員十分不安。參議員GRAHAM和SCHUMER於是 推動了一項法案，欲對中國商品課徵27％的關稅，以做要脅籌碼。 “We had a moment where we caught everyone’s attention: the White House and China,” Mr. Graham recalled. 「那時我們有吸引到華府和中國雙方的注意，」GRAHAM回想到。 At the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, a consensus was also emerging in late 2004: China should break its tight link to the dollar, which would make its exports more expensive. Yu Yongding, a leading economic adviser, pressed the case. The American trade and budget deficits were not sustainable, he warned. China was wrong to keep its currency artificially depressed and depend too much on selling cheap goods. 中國人民銀行方面，2004年時也有個共識產生：中國應該要與美元拖勾，避免讓出口 商品價格更高。推動這項提議的是一位經濟學家余永定。他警告到，美國不可能頂得 住貿易和預算赤字。中國主動干預貨幣，使幣值過低，販賣過多便宜商品，其實是 個錯誤。 Proponents of revaluation in China argued that the country’s currency policies denied the fruits of prosperity to Chinese consumers. Beijing was investing their savings in low-yielding American government securities. And with a weak currency, they said, Chinese could not afford many imported goods. 重新評估派的倡議者認為，中國的貨幣政策抑制了中國消費者應得的繁榮成果。 北京在投資低獲利的美國政府證券。而中國貨幣若為弱勢，就不可能負擔大量 的進口商品。 The central bank’s English-speaking governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, was among those who favored a sizable revaluation. 中國央行總裁周小川也支持有一定規模的重新評估。 But when Beijing acted to amend its currency policy in 2005, under heavy pressure from Congress and the White House, it moved cautiously. The renminbi was allowed to climb only 2 percent. The Communist Party opted for only incremental adjustments to its economic model after a decade of fast growth. Little changed: China’s exports kept soaring and investment poured into steel mills and garment factories. 但當北京開始針對2005年的貨幣政策作調整，由於面對美國白宮和國會方面的極大壓力， 所以步步為營，十分小心。人民幣只被允許升值兩個百分點。共產黨希望只調整 目前急速成長的經濟模型的極小部分。於是，改變是微幅的：中國不斷出口，資金不斷 湧入煉鐵廠和成衣廠。 But American officials eased the pressure. They decided to put more emphasis on urging Chinese consumers to spend more of their savings, which they hoped would eventually bring the two economies into better balance. On a tour of China, John W. Snow, the Treasury secretary at the time, even urged the Chinese to start using credit cards. 但美國官方把壓力降了下來。他們決定，要把壓力施在鼓勵中國消費者花用更多的存款， 藉此讓雙方經濟情況步入佳境。當時的財政部部長SNOW甚至還鼓勵中國人用信用卡。 China kicked off its own campaign to encourage domestic consumption, which it hoped would provide a new source. But Chinese save with the same zeal that, until recently, Americans spent. Shorn of the social safety net of the old Communist state, they squirrel away money to pay for hospital visits, housing or retirement. This accounts for the savings glut identified by Mr. Bernanke. 中國自己也發動了鼓勵消費的各種行動，以尋找新動能。但中國人存錢的本性頑強，跟 美國人消費的本性一樣強勁。擺脫了共產黨國家的社會安全網罩，中國人把錢存著， 以備得用在看病、購屋、或是安排退休生活上。這就是伯南克指出的存款氾濫現象。 Privately, Chinese officials confided to visiting Americans that the effort was not achieving much. 私底下，中國官員告訴造訪的美國人，鼓勵消費措施沒造成多大的影響。 “It is sometimes hard to change successful models,” said Robert B. Zoellick, who negotiated with the Chinese as a deputy secretary of state. “ It is prototypically American to say, ‘This worked well, but now you’ve got to change it.’ ” 「有時要改變成功的模型就是很困難，」負責與中國談判的副國務卿ZOELLICK說道。 「典型美國人的說法就是：『這套很好，但現在你應該改一改』。」 In Washington, some critics say too little was done. A former Treasury official, Timothy D. Adams, tried to get the I.M.F. to act as a watchdog for currency manipulation by China, which would have subjected Beijing to more global pressure. 華府批評者則說，沒有影響是因為做得太少。前財政部官員ADAMS試圖要讓IMF 監管中國控制貨幣政策，讓中國面臨更多國際上的壓力。 Yet when Mr. Snow was succeeded as Treasury secretary by Henry M. Paulson Jr. in 2006, the I.M.F. was sidelined, according to several officials, and Mr. Paulson took command of China policy. 但是，當PAULSON於2006年出任財長時，許多人稱IMF就坐了冷板凳，而以PAULSON主導 對中政策。 He was not shy about his credentials. As an investment banker with Goldman Sachs, Mr. Paulson made 70 trips to China. In his office hangs a watercolor depicting the hometown of Zhu Rongji, a forceful former prime minister. 包森對他自己的資歷很有信心。在高盛任職期間，包森造訪中國七十餘次，且他辦公室 裡還掛了一幅朱鎔基故鄉的水彩畫。 “I pushed very hard on currency because I believed it was important for China to get to a market-determined currency,” Mr. Paulson said in an interview. But he conceded he did not get what he wanted. 「我在貨幣方面著墨甚深，因為我相信對於中國而言，進入市場決定的貨幣機制是很 重要的進程，」包森於一次訪問中說道。但他也承認，他沒有達到他想要的目標。 In late 2006, Mr. Paulson invited Mr. Bernanke to accompany him to Beijing. Mr. Bernanke used the occasion to deliver a blunt speech to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in which he advised the Chinese to reorient their economy and revalue their currency. 2006年尾聲將近時，包森邀請伯南克與他一同前往北京。伯南克用這個機會，對中國 社會科學院發表了極為尖銳的演說，其中他建議中國重新定位他們的經濟本質，並且 重新評估他們的貨幣價值。 At the last minute, however, Mr. Bernanke deleted a reference to the exchange rate being an “effective subsidy” for Chinese exports, out of fear that it could be used as a pretext for a trade lawsuit against China. 但伯南克在演說前的最後一刻刪掉了關於「匯率是對中國出口而言有效的補品」一話， 因為他怕這句話會被用為對中國發動貿易訴訟的前提。 Critics detected a pattern. They noted that in its twice-yearly reports to Congress about trading partners, the Treasury Department had never branded China a currency manipulator. 批評者發現了一個規律。他們指出，財政部一年兩次對國會的貿易伙伴會報中， 財政部從來沒有指控中國是貨幣操弄者。 “We’re tiptoeing around, desperately trying not to irritate or offend the Chinese,” said Thea M. Lee, public policy director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. “ But to get concrete results, you have to be confrontational.” 「我們很謹慎，不想要激怒或冒犯中國方面，」AFL─CIO公共政策主管LEE說道。「但是 要有確實結果，就必須要衝一點。」 An Embrace That Won’t Let Go 放不掉的擁抱 For China, too, this crisis has been a time of reckoning. Americans are buying fewer Chinese DVD players and microwave ovens. Trade is collapsing, and thousands of workers are losing their jobs. Chinese leaders are terrified of social unrest. 對中國來說，這次金融危機也是試煉期。中國產的DVD機跟微波烤爐在美國開始滯銷。 貿易不順遂了，數以千計的工人沒了工作。社會動盪成了中國領導人最困擾的問題。 Having allowed the renminbi to rise a little after 2005, the Chinese government is now under intense pressure domestically to reverse course and depreciate it. China’s fortunes remain tethered to those of the United States. And the reverse is equally true. 2005年，中國政府讓人民幣微幅升值；但如今中國政府卻面對國內龐大壓力，要求 要抑制升值，甚至將人民幣刻意貶值。中國的財富受制於美國，而美國也受制於中國。 In a glassed-in room in a nondescript office building in Washington, the Treasury conducts nearly daily auctions of billions of dollars’ worth of government bonds. An old Army helmet sits on a shelf: as a lark, Treasury officials have been known to strap it on while they monitor incoming bids. 在一間華府的辦公室裡，財政部每天都在販賣數以億計的政府公債。書架上有頂 舊了的陸軍鋼盔：有買家的時候，政府官員總開玩笑，把鋼盔戴上。 For the past five years, China has been one of the most prolific bidders. It holds $652 billion in Treasury debt, up from $459 billion a year ago. Add in its Fannie Mae bonds and other holdings, and analysts figure China owns $1 of every $10 of America’s public debt. 過去五年來，中國一直都是最大買家。中國政府手中有六千五百二十億美元的財政部 公債，比起去年的四千五百九十億增長了不少。若把房利美和其他單位發行的公債 算進去，分析師認為每十元美國公債，就有一元是被中國買了去。 The Treasury is conducting more auctions than ever to finance its $700 billion bailout of the banks. Still more will be needed to pay for the incoming Obama administration’s stimulus package. The United States, economists say, will depend on the Chinese to keep buying that debt, perpetuating the American habit. 財政部現在為了集結七千億銀行抒困銀彈，公債越賣越多。歐巴馬上台後推動的 振興經濟方案將會需要更多美金。經濟學家認為，美國政府會需要中國繼續買 公債，來維繫美國的消費慣性。 Even so, Mr. Paulson said he viewed the debate over global imbalances as hopelessly academic. He expressed doubt that Mr. Bernanke or anyone else could have solved the problem as it was germinating. 就算如此，包森說，他認為全球金融不平衡是個無可救藥的學術問題。他不認為包括 伯南克在內的任何人有能力解決逐漸顯露的全球金融不平衡問題。 “One lesson that I have clearly learned,” said Mr. Paulson, sitting beneath his Chinese watercolor. “You don’t get dramatic change, or reform, or action unless there is a crisis.” 「我得到了個教訓，」包森說，端坐在他的中國水墨畫下。「除非有危機， 就沒有大幅改變，或改革，或行動。」 David Barboza contributed reporting from Shanghai, and Keith Bradsher from Hong Kong. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/26/world/asia/26addiction.html?pagewanted=3&th&emc=th 新聞來源: (需有正確連結) -- --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 140.123.43.211 ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.161.133 (12/26 22:18) ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.161.133 (12/27 01:07) ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.161.133 (12/27 01:51) ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.161.194 (12/28 03:39) ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.161.194 (12/28 10:00) ※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 140.123.43.211 (12/29 10:26)