标题:Dollar Shift: Chinese Pockets Filled as Americans’ Emptied 钱的方向：中国口袋满满，美国口袋空空 By MARK LANDLER Published: December 25, 2008 “Usually it’s the rich country lending to the poor. This time, it’s the poor country lending to the rich.” 通常是富国借钱给穷国。这次，是穷国借钱给富国。 — Niall Ferguson WASHINGTON — In March 2005, a low-key Princeton economist who had become a Federal Reserve governor coined a novel theory to explain the growing tendency of Americans to borrow from foreigners, particularly the Chinese, to finance their heavy spending. 2005年三月，一位低调的普林斯顿经济学家，出任联准会委员後，提出了一个 新颖的理论，解释美国逐渐增加向外国借贷（特别是中国）以维持其庞大支出的倾向。 The problem, he said, was not that Americans spend too much, but that foreigners save too much. The Chinese have piled up so much excess savings that they lend money to the United States at low rates, underwriting American consumption. 他认为，问不在美国花太多，而在外国存太多。中国人堆起的钱山多到能够以低利率 借给美国，支撑美国庞大的消费。 This colossal credit cycle could not last forever, he said. But in a global economy, the transfer of Chinese money to America was a market phenomenon that would take years, even a decade, to work itself out. For now, he said, “ we probably have little choice except to be patient.” 这庞大的信贷循环不可能长久，这位经济学家认为。但在全球市场环境下，中国钱转向 美国的整体过程可是个需要数年，甚至整个十年，才能完成的市场现象。就目前来说， 「除了耐心等待，我们或许没有多少选择。」 Today, the dependence of the United States on Chinese money looks less benign. And the economist who proposed the theory, Ben S. Bernanke, is dealing with the consequences, having been promoted to chairman of the Fed in 2006, as these cross-border money flows were reaching stratospheric levels. 现在，美国依赖中国钱看起来已经不是件好事了。而提出这个理论的经济学家伯南克， 如今也正以联准会主席的身份，应付美国依赖中国等外资的後果。就在伯南克2006年 上任时，跨国界的资金流动已经达到近似平流层的境界─量大，稳定，快速。 In the past decade, China has invested upward of $1 trillion, mostly earnings from manufacturing exports, into American government bonds and government-backed mortgage debt. That has lowered interest rates and helped fuel a historic consumption binge and housing bubble in the United States. 在过去十年间，中国投资美国政府国债和政府抵押贷款支持债券方面的资金，已经 超过一兆美金，且多是制造业出口盈余。这笔庞大财源把利率压低了，也成了制造 美国国内消费狂潮以及房市泡沫等现象。 China, some economists say, lulled American consumers, and their leaders, into complacency about their spendthrift ways. 一些经济学家认为，是中国把美国消费者和美国领导人给哄入了疯狂消费的陷阱中的。 “This was a blinking red light,” said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard and a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. “We should have reacted to it.” 「这警讯亮了，」哈佛教授、IMF首席经济学家Rogoff说道。「我们理应要有所 因应的。」 In hindsight, many economists say, the United States should have recognized that borrowing from abroad for consumption and deficit spending at home was not a formula for economic success. Even as that weakness is becoming more widely recognized, however, the United States is likely to be more addicted than ever to foreign creditors to finance record government spending to revive the broken economy. 一些经济学家的马後炮提到，美国政府应该要发现对外借贷以维持消费行为和家庭的 负债花费绝不是成功的经济公式。就当无限制消费的弱点逐渐获得重视，美国政府却 比以往更依赖外国资金来维持破纪录的政府支出，来重新唤醒衰落的美国经济。 To be sure, there were few ready remedies. Some critics argue that the United States could have pushed Beijing harder to abandon its policy of keeping the value of its currency weak — a policy that made its exports less expensive and helped turn it into the world’s leading manufacturing power. If China had allowed its currency to float according to market demand in the past decade, its export growth probably would have moderated. And it would not have acquired the same vast hoard of dollars to invest abroad. 当然，没有多少现成的解决方案。一些批评者认为，美国政府之前应该要对北京施加 更多压力，终止压低人民币价格的政策。这个压低人民币的政策就是中国政府能够以 低价出口、并转换中国经济成为世界生产强权的主因。如果中国在过去十年内能够 同意让人民币浮动，顺应市场需求，中国的成长或许就不会如此强劲。同时，中国 也就不会能够积累庞大的美金来进行海外投资。 Others say the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department should have seen the Chinese lending for what it was: a giant stimulus to the American economy, not unlike interest rate cuts by the Fed. These critics say the Fed under Alan Greenspan contributed to the creation of the housing bubble by leaving interest rates too low for too long, even as Chinese investment further stoked an easy-money economy. The Fed should have cut interest rates less in the middle of this decade, they say, and started raising them sooner, to help reduce speculation in real estate. 其他批评者则认为，联准会和财政部应该要正视中国借贷的本质：那是对美国经济体 的一股巨大刺激，且与联准会调降利率是完全不同的。这些批评者认为，葛林斯潘 领导下的联准会，无视利率长期过低，以及中国来的充沛资金，造成了房市泡沫。 联准会理应在过去十年减少调降利率，且应提早升息，来抑制房市方面的投机心态。 Today, with the wreckage around him, Mr. Bernanke said he regretted that more was not done to regulate financial institutions and mortgage providers, which might have prevented the flood of investment, including that from China, from being so badly used. But the Fed’s role in regulation is limited to banks. And stricter regulation by itself would not have been enough, he insisted. 如今，许多企业已然倾圮，伯南克说他对於之前无法做更多金融机构和信贷提供者的 管制措施，无法透过行动来避免泛滥的外资（包括中国的）被恣意花用。但他也强调， 联准会的管制权限本来就仅限於银行，而联准会这单一机构把管制加强也不会造成 显着效果。 “Achieving a better balance of international capital flows early on could have significantly reduced the risks to the financial system,” Mr. Bernanke said in an interview in his office overlooking the Washington Mall. 「提早维持较为良好、平衡的国际资金流动，或可显着地降低金融系统承担的风险，」 伯南克於一次办公室采访中说道。 “However,” he continued, “this could only have been done through international cooperation, not by the United States alone. The problem was recognized, but sufficient international cooperation was not forthcoming.” 「然而，要达成这个目的，必须要透过国际合作，而非美国单方面的行动。这个问题 有受到关注，但缺乏足够的国际合作来落实。」 The inaction was because of a range of factors, political and economic. By the yardsticks that appeared to matter most — prosperity and growth — the relationship between China and the United States also seemed to be paying off for both countries. Neither had a strong incentive to break an addiction: China to strong export growth and financial stability; the United States to cheap imports and low-cost foreign loans. 国际无作为的原因甚多，有政治的，有经济的。就关键性度量衡（如繁荣度和成长率） 来说，美中的金融互动关系对双方似乎都有利。任一方都没有戒掉成瘾的金融流动 惯性：中国能继续维持强势出口成长和金融稳定性；美国则能继续引进便宜的进口产品 以及低价的外资贷款。 In Washington, China was treated as a threat by some people, but mostly because it lured away manufacturing jobs. Others argued that China’s heavy lending to this country was risky because Chinese leaders could decide to withdraw money at a moment’s notice, creating a panicky run on the dollar. 华府圈内，一些人视中国为威胁，但多是因为中国把制造业工作给吸走了。其他人 强调，中国大举借钱给美国有极大风险，因为中国领导阶层可以在瞬间决定把钱给 抽走，造成美元市场的恐慌。 Mr. Bernanke viewed such international investment flows through a different lens. He argued that Chinese invested savings abroad because consumers in China did not have enough confidence to spend. Changing that situation would take years, and did not amount to a pressing problem for the Americans. 伯南克则用不同的角度来看这个国际资金流动的案例。他认为，中国将存底投资外国， 是因为中国消费者没有足够信心进行消费。改变这个情势可会旷日废时，并且不会对 美国造成显着压力。 “The global savings glut story did us a collective disservice,” said Edwin M. Truman, a former Fed and Treasury official. “It created the idea that the world was doing it to us and we couldn’t do anything about it.” 「全球存款过多的故事对我们造成了结构性的不便，」前联准会和财政部官员TRUMAN 说道。「这个故事型塑了一个概念，即：这个世界在搞我们，而我们就只好任世界 摆布。」 But Mr. Bernanke’s theory fit the prevailing hands-off, pro-market ideology of recent years. Mr. Greenspan and the Bush administration treated the record American trade deficit and heavy foreign borrowing as an abstract threat, not an urgent problem. 但伯南克的理论符合近年流行的自由放任主义意识型态。葛林斯潘与布希政府将 破纪录的美国贸易逆差和大举国债集资外国资金为一个架空的威胁，而非迫切的问题。 Mr. Bernanke, after he took charge of the Fed, warned that the imbalances between the countries were growing more serious. By then, however, it was too late to do much about them. And the White House still regarded imbalances as an arcane subject best left to economists. 伯南克出掌联准会後，警告国与国间的不平衡益趋严重。届时，解决不平衡的选择 会越来越少。而白宫仍然视不平衡为一个专属经济学家的晦涩议题。 By itself, money from China is not a bad thing. As American officials like to note, it speaks to the attractiveness of the United States as a destination for foreign investment. In the 19th century, the United States built its railroads with capital borrowed from the British. 单论本质而言，中国钱不是坏。如美国官员喜欢提的，中国钱代表美国是能够吸引外资 的最佳终点。19世纪时，美国就是用英国借来的资本建铁路的。 In the past decade, China arguably enabled an American boom. Low-cost Chinese goods helped keep a lid on inflation, while the flood of Chinese investment helped the government finance mortgages and a public debt of close to $11 trillion. 在过去十年间，中国名副其实地造就了美国经济发展。低价格的中国产品帮助压低通澎， 同时中国资金涌入帮助美国政府金融信贷以及政府债务飙至11兆美元。 But Americans did not use the lower-cost money afforded by Chinese investment to build a 21st-century equivalent of the railroads. Instead, the government engaged in a costly war in Iraq, and consumers used loose credit to buy sport utility vehicles and larger homes. Banks and investors, eagerly seeking higher interest rates in this easy-money environment, created risky new securities like collateralized debt obligations. 但美国没有用低成本的中国资金来建设。政府反而把钱大把洒在美伊战争上，而消费者 则用非常宽松的贷款购买跑车和大房子。银行和投资者在这个钱多的时代，积极地追求 高利率，制造具有高风险的债券和衍伸性债务负担。 “Nobody wanted to get off this drug,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican who pushed legislation to punish China by imposing stiff tariffs. “Their drug was an endless line of customers for made-in-China products. Our drug was the Chinese products and cash.” 「没人想要戒掉这个瘾，」参议员GRAHAM说道。这位参议员推动了惩罚中国的高额关税 法案。「他们的毒就是一长列的中国低价商品的顾客。我们的药就视中国产品和现金。」 Mr. Graham said he understood the addiction: he was speaking by phone from a Wal-Mart store in Anderson, S.C., where he was Christmas shopping in aisles lined with items from China. GRAHAM说他理解这个瘾劲儿：他讲这些话的时候，正在WALMART添购圣诞节物资，那一列 一列的产品中总有许多中国制的商品。 A New Economic Dance 新经济之舞 The United States has been here before. In the 1980s, it ran heavy trade deficits with Japan, which recycled some of its trading profits into American government bonds. 美国之前也曾经历这种浩劫。1980年代，美国对日本有巨大的贸易逆差，而日本也有 将贸易获利转成美国政府国债。 At that time, the deficits were viewed as a grave threat to America’s economic might. Action took the form of a 1985 agreement known as the Plaza Accord. The world’s major economies intervened in currency markets to drive down the value of the dollar and drive up the Japanese yen. 那时，对日贸易逆差被视为美国经济实力的严重威胁。针对此事，世界五大经济体 於1985年签订广场协议，介入货币市场，抛售压低美元价格，同时把日币价格抬高。 The arrangement did slow the growth of the trade deficit for a time. But economists blamed the sharp revaluation of the Japanese yen for halting Japan ’s rapid growth. The lesson of the Plaza Accord was not lost on China, which at that time was just emerging as an export power. 这个举动的确有把贸易逆差的成长率控制住。但经济学家认为这次大幅度重估日币 的行为使日本经济陷入泥沼。广场协议的教训被中国给记住了。那时中国才正在 塑造自己成为出口大国。 China tied itself even more tightly to the United States than did Japan. In 1995, it devalued its currency and set a firm exchange rate of roughly 8.3 to the dollar, a level that remained fixed for a decade. 中国硬是把自己黏着美国，甚至比日本更甚。1995年时，中国使人民币贬值， 并把对美元汇率定死在8.3左右。这个汇率维持了将近十年。 During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, China clung firmly to its currency policy, earning praise from the Clinton administration for helping check the spiral of devaluation sweeping Asia. Its low wages attracted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment. 在1997-98的亚洲金融风暴期间，中国坚持其货币政策，获得柯林顿政府的掌声， 特别是针对中国抵抗亚洲各国货币贬值的贡献。中国极低的工资吸引了数以亿计 的美元外资进入其市场。 By the early part of this decade, the United States was importing huge amounts of Chinese-made goods — toys, shoes, flat-screen televisions and auto parts — while selling much less to China in return. 最近几年，美国输入了庞大数量的中国产品─玩具、鞋子、平板电视、汽车零件─ 而对中国输出了极少的物资。 “For consumers, this was a net benefit because of the availability of cheaper goods,” said Laurence H. Meyer, a former Fed governor. “There’s no question that China put downward pressure on inflation rates.” 「对消费者而言，这个关系是净利：因为物资便宜且充沛，」前联准会委员MEYER说道。 「无疑地，中国把通澎压低了。」 But in classical economics, that trade gap could not have persisted for long without bankrupting the American economy. Except that China recycled its trade profits right back into the United States. 但就古典经济学而言，这种贸易差距不可能持久，也不可能不淘空美国经济。除非 中国将贸易利益回收，再投资给美国。 It did so to protect its own interests. China kept its banks under tight state control and its currency on a short leash to ensure financial stability. It required companies and individuals to save in the state-run banking system most foreign currency — primarily dollars — that they earned from foreign trade and investment. 中国的再投资是为了保障自己的利益。中国让自己的银行接受严格的国家控管， 并把人民币拴得牢牢的，确保金融系统稳定。中国要求公司与个人在国营银行系统内 投存透过国际贸易和投资所获得的盈余外汇（美元为主）。 As foreign trade surged, this hoard of dollars became enormous. In 2000, the reserves were less than $200 billion; today they are about $2 trillion. 既然外贸强势，中国所囤积的美元变得非常可观。2000年时，中国外汇存底为大约 2000亿美金；现在，大概两兆美金。 Chinese leaders chose to park the bulk of that in safe securities backed by the American government, including Treasury bonds and the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had implicit government backing. 中国领导班子选择把这一大部分的资金投资在安全的美国政府债券上，其中包括财政部 债券，以及政府默默支持的二房债券。 This not only allowed the United States to continue to finance its trade deficit, but, by creating greater demand for United States securities, it also helped push interest rates below where they would otherwise have been. For years, China’s government was eager to buy American debt at yields many in the private sector felt were too low. 这不仅让美国能够持续维持贸易逆差，同时强化了对美国各级债券的需求，并将 利率压低到不可思议的地步。多年来，中国政府对於购买美国债券十分感兴趣， 尽管这些债券对於私人企业界来说，低到无利可图。 This financial and trade embrace between the United States and China grew so tight that Niall Ferguson, a financial historian, has dubbed the two countries Chimerica. 美国和中国的金融和贸易关系紧密到连FERGUSON都为两造创了个字：「Chimerica」。 ‘Tiptoeing’ Around a Partner 超谨慎伙伴 Being attached at the hip was not entirely comfortable for either side, though for widely differing reasons. 美中的尴尬结合尽管有利，但因为许多原因，以致於双方都不感觉特别舒服。 In the United States, more people worried about cheap Chinese goods than cheap Chinese loans. By 2003, China’s trade surplus with the United States was ballooning, and lawmakers in Congress were restive. Senator Graham and Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, introduced a bill threatening to impose a 27 percent duty on Chinese goods. 就美国来说，许多人对中国产品的疑惧甚至大於中国资金。2003年时，中国对美国 的贸易顺差急速扩大，使得美国国会议员十分不安。参议员GRAHAM和SCHUMER於是 推动了一项法案，欲对中国商品课徵27％的关税，以做要胁筹码。 “We had a moment where we caught everyone’s attention: the White House and China,” Mr. Graham recalled. 「那时我们有吸引到华府和中国双方的注意，」GRAHAM回想到。 At the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, a consensus was also emerging in late 2004: China should break its tight link to the dollar, which would make its exports more expensive. Yu Yongding, a leading economic adviser, pressed the case. The American trade and budget deficits were not sustainable, he warned. China was wrong to keep its currency artificially depressed and depend too much on selling cheap goods. 中国人民银行方面，2004年时也有个共识产生：中国应该要与美元拖勾，避免让出口 商品价格更高。推动这项提议的是一位经济学家余永定。他警告到，美国不可能顶得 住贸易和预算赤字。中国主动干预货币，使币值过低，贩卖过多便宜商品，其实是 个错误。 Proponents of revaluation in China argued that the country’s currency policies denied the fruits of prosperity to Chinese consumers. Beijing was investing their savings in low-yielding American government securities. And with a weak currency, they said, Chinese could not afford many imported goods. 重新评估派的倡议者认为，中国的货币政策抑制了中国消费者应得的繁荣成果。 北京在投资低获利的美国政府证券。而中国货币若为弱势，就不可能负担大量 的进口商品。 The central bank’s English-speaking governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, was among those who favored a sizable revaluation. 中国央行总裁周小川也支持有一定规模的重新评估。 But when Beijing acted to amend its currency policy in 2005, under heavy pressure from Congress and the White House, it moved cautiously. The renminbi was allowed to climb only 2 percent. The Communist Party opted for only incremental adjustments to its economic model after a decade of fast growth. Little changed: China’s exports kept soaring and investment poured into steel mills and garment factories. 但当北京开始针对2005年的货币政策作调整，由於面对美国白宫和国会方面的极大压力， 所以步步为营，十分小心。人民币只被允许升值两个百分点。共产党希望只调整 目前急速成长的经济模型的极小部分。於是，改变是微幅的：中国不断出口，资金不断 涌入炼铁厂和成衣厂。 But American officials eased the pressure. They decided to put more emphasis on urging Chinese consumers to spend more of their savings, which they hoped would eventually bring the two economies into better balance. On a tour of China, John W. Snow, the Treasury secretary at the time, even urged the Chinese to start using credit cards. 但美国官方把压力降了下来。他们决定，要把压力施在鼓励中国消费者花用更多的存款， 藉此让双方经济情况步入佳境。当时的财政部部长SNOW甚至还鼓励中国人用信用卡。 China kicked off its own campaign to encourage domestic consumption, which it hoped would provide a new source. But Chinese save with the same zeal that, until recently, Americans spent. Shorn of the social safety net of the old Communist state, they squirrel away money to pay for hospital visits, housing or retirement. This accounts for the savings glut identified by Mr. Bernanke. 中国自己也发动了鼓励消费的各种行动，以寻找新动能。但中国人存钱的本性顽强，跟 美国人消费的本性一样强劲。摆脱了共产党国家的社会安全网罩，中国人把钱存着， 以备得用在看病、购屋、或是安排退休生活上。这就是伯南克指出的存款泛滥现象。 Privately, Chinese officials confided to visiting Americans that the effort was not achieving much. 私底下，中国官员告诉造访的美国人，鼓励消费措施没造成多大的影响。 “It is sometimes hard to change successful models,” said Robert B. Zoellick, who negotiated with the Chinese as a deputy secretary of state. “ It is prototypically American to say, ‘This worked well, but now you’ve got to change it.’ ” 「有时要改变成功的模型就是很困难，」负责与中国谈判的副国务卿ZOELLICK说道。 「典型美国人的说法就是：『这套很好，但现在你应该改一改』。」 In Washington, some critics say too little was done. A former Treasury official, Timothy D. Adams, tried to get the I.M.F. to act as a watchdog for currency manipulation by China, which would have subjected Beijing to more global pressure. 华府批评者则说，没有影响是因为做得太少。前财政部官员ADAMS试图要让IMF 监管中国控制货币政策，让中国面临更多国际上的压力。 Yet when Mr. Snow was succeeded as Treasury secretary by Henry M. Paulson Jr. in 2006, the I.M.F. was sidelined, according to several officials, and Mr. Paulson took command of China policy. 但是，当PAULSON於2006年出任财长时，许多人称IMF就坐了冷板凳，而以PAULSON主导 对中政策。 He was not shy about his credentials. As an investment banker with Goldman Sachs, Mr. Paulson made 70 trips to China. In his office hangs a watercolor depicting the hometown of Zhu Rongji, a forceful former prime minister. 包森对他自己的资历很有信心。在高盛任职期间，包森造访中国七十余次，且他办公室 里还挂了一幅朱熔基故乡的水彩画。 “I pushed very hard on currency because I believed it was important for China to get to a market-determined currency,” Mr. Paulson said in an interview. But he conceded he did not get what he wanted. 「我在货币方面着墨甚深，因为我相信对於中国而言，进入市场决定的货币机制是很 重要的进程，」包森於一次访问中说道。但他也承认，他没有达到他想要的目标。 In late 2006, Mr. Paulson invited Mr. Bernanke to accompany him to Beijing. Mr. Bernanke used the occasion to deliver a blunt speech to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in which he advised the Chinese to reorient their economy and revalue their currency. 2006年尾声将近时，包森邀请伯南克与他一同前往北京。伯南克用这个机会，对中国 社会科学院发表了极为尖锐的演说，其中他建议中国重新定位他们的经济本质，并且 重新评估他们的货币价值。 At the last minute, however, Mr. Bernanke deleted a reference to the exchange rate being an “effective subsidy” for Chinese exports, out of fear that it could be used as a pretext for a trade lawsuit against China. 但伯南克在演说前的最後一刻删掉了关於「汇率是对中国出口而言有效的补品」一话， 因为他怕这句话会被用为对中国发动贸易诉讼的前提。 Critics detected a pattern. They noted that in its twice-yearly reports to Congress about trading partners, the Treasury Department had never branded China a currency manipulator. 批评者发现了一个规律。他们指出，财政部一年两次对国会的贸易伙伴会报中， 财政部从来没有指控中国是货币操弄者。 “We’re tiptoeing around, desperately trying not to irritate or offend the Chinese,” said Thea M. Lee, public policy director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. “ But to get concrete results, you have to be confrontational.” 「我们很谨慎，不想要激怒或冒犯中国方面，」AFL─CIO公共政策主管LEE说道。「但是 要有确实结果，就必须要冲一点。」 An Embrace That Won’t Let Go 放不掉的拥抱 For China, too, this crisis has been a time of reckoning. Americans are buying fewer Chinese DVD players and microwave ovens. Trade is collapsing, and thousands of workers are losing their jobs. Chinese leaders are terrified of social unrest. 对中国来说，这次金融危机也是试炼期。中国产的DVD机跟微波烤炉在美国开始滞销。 贸易不顺遂了，数以千计的工人没了工作。社会动荡成了中国领导人最困扰的问题。 Having allowed the renminbi to rise a little after 2005, the Chinese government is now under intense pressure domestically to reverse course and depreciate it. China’s fortunes remain tethered to those of the United States. And the reverse is equally true. 2005年，中国政府让人民币微幅升值；但如今中国政府却面对国内庞大压力，要求 要抑制升值，甚至将人民币刻意贬值。中国的财富受制於美国，而美国也受制於中国。 In a glassed-in room in a nondescript office building in Washington, the Treasury conducts nearly daily auctions of billions of dollars’ worth of government bonds. An old Army helmet sits on a shelf: as a lark, Treasury officials have been known to strap it on while they monitor incoming bids. 在一间华府的办公室里，财政部每天都在贩卖数以亿计的政府公债。书架上有顶 旧了的陆军钢盔：有买家的时候，政府官员总开玩笑，把钢盔戴上。 For the past five years, China has been one of the most prolific bidders. It holds $652 billion in Treasury debt, up from $459 billion a year ago. Add in its Fannie Mae bonds and other holdings, and analysts figure China owns $1 of every $10 of America’s public debt. 过去五年来，中国一直都是最大买家。中国政府手中有六千五百二十亿美元的财政部 公债，比起去年的四千五百九十亿增长了不少。若把房利美和其他单位发行的公债 算进去，分析师认为每十元美国公债，就有一元是被中国买了去。 The Treasury is conducting more auctions than ever to finance its $700 billion bailout of the banks. Still more will be needed to pay for the incoming Obama administration’s stimulus package. The United States, economists say, will depend on the Chinese to keep buying that debt, perpetuating the American habit. 财政部现在为了集结七千亿银行抒困银弹，公债越卖越多。欧巴马上台後推动的 振兴经济方案将会需要更多美金。经济学家认为，美国政府会需要中国继续买 公债，来维系美国的消费惯性。 Even so, Mr. Paulson said he viewed the debate over global imbalances as hopelessly academic. He expressed doubt that Mr. Bernanke or anyone else could have solved the problem as it was germinating. 就算如此，包森说，他认为全球金融不平衡是个无可救药的学术问题。他不认为包括 伯南克在内的任何人有能力解决逐渐显露的全球金融不平衡问题。 “One lesson that I have clearly learned,” said Mr. Paulson, sitting beneath his Chinese watercolor. “You don’t get dramatic change, or reform, or action unless there is a crisis.” 「我得到了个教训，」包森说，端坐在他的中国水墨画下。「除非有危机， 就没有大幅改变，或改革，或行动。」 David Barboza contributed reporting from Shanghai, and Keith Bradsher from Hong Kong. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/26/world/asia/26addiction.html?pagewanted=3&th&emc=th 新闻来源: (需有正确连结) -- --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 140.123.43.211 ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 220.129.161.133 (12/26 22:18) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 220.129.161.133 (12/27 01:07) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 220.129.161.133 (12/27 01:51) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 220.129.161.194 (12/28 03:39) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 220.129.161.194 (12/28 10:00) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 140.123.43.211 (12/29 10:26)