文章來源：媒抗--石頭 http://www.socialforce.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=10444 The New Order of Battle What the cabinet shake-up means for Bush's continuing war efforts. 新戰術 - 內閣異動對布許未來持續作戰努力的影響 作者﹕美國企業研究所 Tom Donnelly 發表於11/18/2004標準週刊 網址﹕http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/932xxjxo.asp 網址﹕http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.21576,filter.all/news_detail.asp 美國總統大選過後﹐Tom Donnelly開始逐篇討論布許總統未來的執政方針﹐ 最近內閣的變異﹐以及它們對中東策略和伊拉克戰事的連帶意義。 這些都值得我們拿來思考台灣的走向。 石頭會儘快翻譯出來與大家分享。 原文如下: WITH THE NOMINATIONS of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of State and Stephen Hadley to replace her as National Security adviser, the shape of the supreme command of Bush II is pretty clear: Rumsfeld is staying; Bush II will be like Bush I, only more so. 先提名萊斯為國務卿﹐繼之以海德利為首席國安顧問﹐ 布許二世的最高統御權已顯然成型﹕ 倫斯斐留任﹐布許二世越來越有乃父之風﹐ 恐怕還有過之而無不及。 It's not that the neocon cabal is preparing for the next invasion or that the "hardliners have won." In some sense, the hardliners "won" in the moment of the president's immediate reaction to the September 11 attacks. And the true neocons remain largely outside the administration. But President Bush has at last decided to try to take charge of his foreign policy bureaucracy. The resignation of Colin Powell has been a moment to reflect on a man of near-mythic stature in Washington, a dedicated public servant both in uniform and out. He remains immensely popular, an image to Americans of the fundamental decency of our society. He's also been physically courageous, not least in the past year as he has battled disease, and is yet perpetually a public gentleman. He's been a major figure for 20 years even though he is just 67-years-old. 這不代表新保守派正在準備新一波侵略行動﹐ 或表示“強硬派終究贏了”。 從某些觀點而言﹐強硬派陣營贏的是總統在911遭攻擊後立即反應的那一時刻﹐ 雖然真正的新保守派大多根本連執政團的邊兒都沾不上。 不過布許總統到底終於下定決心要整頓他的外交政策單位了。 科林鮑爾的辭職值得大夥兒深思 - 無論擔任軍職與否﹐他都是位盡忠職守的公僕﹐ 在華盛頓佔有幾近於神話的崇高地位。至今仍極受人擁戴﹐ 被視為美國社會真善美基礎的表徵。他同時又勇氣十足﹐ 即使近年不斷在與病魔纏鬥﹐ 對外仍是一以貫之的謙謙君子。雖然年紀輕輕才不過67歲而已﹐ 20幾年來卻一直都是大眾熟知的主角人物。 At the same time he has been a reflection of the failing conventional wisdom of the Cold War era. To be sure, Powell has been more alert to changing international circumstances than some of his peers --think Brent Scowcroft--but his failures have not simply been bureaucratic --they have been genuinely strategic. A creature of the status quo, his isolation in the administration was a measure not so much of his lack of ideology, but a lack of imagination. The Bush Doctrine may bear the imprint of the deepest traditions of American strategic culture, but it bears few of Powell's fingerprints. 然而他也反應著正在逐漸消逝的傳統冷戰思維。 與他的某些同儕相比(例如Brent Scowcroft)﹐ 鮑爾的確對變化多端的國際情勢更加敏銳﹐ 他的失敗實際說來跟政策有關﹐ 而不能簡單視為官僚政治的變遷而已。 他拘泥於現狀因而在執政團隊中遭到孤立﹐ 與其說是因為缺乏共同意識形態的緣故﹐ 倒不如說是因為他的缺乏想像力。 布許主義雖然反應出最深切的美國傳統戰略思維﹐ 可是鮑爾在此幾乎毫無著墨之地。 Nor can it be said that he ran his department all that well. It is one thing to debate policy and to disagree, quite another to tell all to Bob Woodward, even as part of a conscious effort to spin the Washington establishment. More importantly, Powell's example encouraged his subordinates to undercut the president in the press. Pundits are now bemoaning the loss of "independence" at the State Department--but the Constitution's separation of powers aren't meant to extend to the executive branch. 我們也不認為他把國務院經營的很上軌道。自己私下討論或不贊同是一回事﹐ 跑去對記者Bob Woodward (當年揭發水門案的華盛頓郵報記者)之流 大曝內幕可就大不同了﹐ 即使如此刻意努力的原因是為了期望能影響華盛頓高層也要不得。 更要緊的是﹐ 鮑爾影響所及﹐ 連他自己的屬下在記者面前都敢讓總統下不了臺。 如今有群學者為了國務院的失去“獨立自主權”而唉聲嘆氣﹐ 卻渾然忘了憲法中明定的三權分力並不代表權力可以在行政部門無限上綱。 So it's reasonable to expect the same quality of complaint we now see under Porter Goss at the CIA (though perhaps with less intensity) once Dr. Rice takes charge at Foggy Bottom. By naming his closest confidant to be his chief diplomat, President Bush has told the foreign service professionals that he's now paying attention and keeping score. 所以﹐一如高斯(Porter Goss)接掌中央情報局後的怨聲載道一樣﹐ 將來萊斯博士執掌國務院後會傳來如此抱怨是必然。 布許總統把自己的親信派來作首席外交官﹐ 就是要老實不客氣的警告這一群職業外交人員﹐ 他正在眼睜睜的邊看邊做記錄。 The dog that hasn't barked in this transition--and by all "rumint" isn't going to bark any time soon--is the ousting of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Given that the Pentagon's management of the Iraq war was President Bush's greatest campaign liability, there's at least a paradox in Rumsfeld's retention. 在這一系列政治大搬風下未遭波及而在最近的將來也還不致受任何影響的﹐ 倒是國防部長倫斯菲的去職問題。 其實正因五角大廈對伊拉克處裡不當而造成布許總統最大的纍贅﹐ 倫斯菲的留任﹐ 多少不免有些自相矛盾。 On the other hand, the Pentagon's sins have been of omission and misjudgment, not of commission and obstructionism, as at State and the CIA. Moreover, the war in Iraq is perhaps at a decisive crossroads--if the campaign in the Sunni heartland continues after a successful start in Falluja, and elections happen more or less on schedule in January. It's a moment for continuity and certainty of command. Finally, Rumsfeld's greatest shortcoming--his failure to fully and rapidly adapt his program of transformation to post-September 11, post-Iraq realities--can only be fixed by the White House in the form of an expansion of U.S. ground forces and increasing the baseline defense budget. It's above the secretary's pay grade. 而從另一角度來看﹐ 五角大廈錯在忽視與誤斷﹐ 而不是像國務院和中央情報局一樣﹐ 受人委託卻阻撓成事。 再者﹐如果法魯加之役能成功拓展在蘇尼教派腹地的戰事的話﹐ 伊拉克戰事現在可能處於決定性的轉捩關頭﹐ 此刻最需要的是維持統帥的持續無疑。 而且倫斯菲最大的短處在於未能全面快捷的調整計劃以面對911 與伊拉克戰事後實況﹐ 而這也必須借白宮之力﹐ 加強駐軍並提高基本國防軍費才辦得到。 國防部長一個人是辦不到的。 In sum, although Rumsfeld has been part of the problem, he can still be part of the solution in ways that Powell could not. If the Pentagon has been slow to reshape itself to new missions in the Middle East, it's in part because it's got a lot of other worries: like rogue nuclear states and China. Besides, it's a Washington tradition to reward failures with a larger budget. 總結而言﹐ 雖然倫斯菲曾經是問題的一部份﹐ 他仍可提供部份解決之道﹐ 這是鮑爾不及之處。 如果說五角大廈以前在處理中東事件時手腳太慢﹐ 有一部份也是因為它要考慮的事情太多了﹐ 譬如流氓核武國家﹐ 還有中國。 再說華盛頓反正一向就習慣以更多的經費來獎勵失敗。 -- 撥亂反正、清新思維，先從「與媒體對抗」開始 http://www.socialforce.org --

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