文章来源：媒抗--石头 http://www.socialforce.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=10444 The New Order of Battle What the cabinet shake-up means for Bush's continuing war efforts. 新战术 - 内阁异动对布许未来持续作战努力的影响 作者﹕美国企业研究所 Tom Donnelly 发表於11/18/2004标准周刊 网址﹕http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/932xxjxo.asp 网址﹕http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.21576,filter.all/news_detail.asp 美国总统大选过後﹐Tom Donnelly开始逐篇讨论布许总统未来的执政方针﹐ 最近内阁的变异﹐以及它们对中东策略和伊拉克战事的连带意义。 这些都值得我们拿来思考台湾的走向。 石头会尽快翻译出来与大家分享。 原文如下: WITH THE NOMINATIONS of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of State and Stephen Hadley to replace her as National Security adviser, the shape of the supreme command of Bush II is pretty clear: Rumsfeld is staying; Bush II will be like Bush I, only more so. 先提名莱斯为国务卿﹐继之以海德利为首席国安顾问﹐ 布许二世的最高统御权已显然成型﹕ 伦斯斐留任﹐布许二世越来越有乃父之风﹐ 恐怕还有过之而无不及。 It's not that the neocon cabal is preparing for the next invasion or that the "hardliners have won." In some sense, the hardliners "won" in the moment of the president's immediate reaction to the September 11 attacks. And the true neocons remain largely outside the administration. But President Bush has at last decided to try to take charge of his foreign policy bureaucracy. The resignation of Colin Powell has been a moment to reflect on a man of near-mythic stature in Washington, a dedicated public servant both in uniform and out. He remains immensely popular, an image to Americans of the fundamental decency of our society. He's also been physically courageous, not least in the past year as he has battled disease, and is yet perpetually a public gentleman. He's been a major figure for 20 years even though he is just 67-years-old. 这不代表新保守派正在准备新一波侵略行动﹐ 或表示“强硬派终究赢了”。 从某些观点而言﹐强硬派阵营赢的是总统在911遭攻击後立即反应的那一时刻﹐ 虽然真正的新保守派大多根本连执政团的边儿都沾不上。 不过布许总统到底终於下定决心要整顿他的外交政策单位了。 科林鲍尔的辞职值得大夥儿深思 - 无论担任军职与否﹐他都是位尽忠职守的公仆﹐ 在华盛顿占有几近於神话的崇高地位。至今仍极受人拥戴﹐ 被视为美国社会真善美基础的表徵。他同时又勇气十足﹐ 即使近年不断在与病魔缠斗﹐ 对外仍是一以贯之的谦谦君子。虽然年纪轻轻才不过67岁而已﹐ 20几年来却一直都是大众熟知的主角人物。 At the same time he has been a reflection of the failing conventional wisdom of the Cold War era. To be sure, Powell has been more alert to changing international circumstances than some of his peers --think Brent Scowcroft--but his failures have not simply been bureaucratic --they have been genuinely strategic. A creature of the status quo, his isolation in the administration was a measure not so much of his lack of ideology, but a lack of imagination. The Bush Doctrine may bear the imprint of the deepest traditions of American strategic culture, but it bears few of Powell's fingerprints. 然而他也反应着正在逐渐消逝的传统冷战思维。 与他的某些同侪相比(例如Brent Scowcroft)﹐ 鲍尔的确对变化多端的国际情势更加敏锐﹐ 他的失败实际说来跟政策有关﹐ 而不能简单视为官僚政治的变迁而已。 他拘泥於现状因而在执政团队中遭到孤立﹐ 与其说是因为缺乏共同意识形态的缘故﹐ 倒不如说是因为他的缺乏想像力。 布许主义虽然反应出最深切的美国传统战略思维﹐ 可是鲍尔在此几乎毫无着墨之地。 Nor can it be said that he ran his department all that well. It is one thing to debate policy and to disagree, quite another to tell all to Bob Woodward, even as part of a conscious effort to spin the Washington establishment. More importantly, Powell's example encouraged his subordinates to undercut the president in the press. Pundits are now bemoaning the loss of "independence" at the State Department--but the Constitution's separation of powers aren't meant to extend to the executive branch. 我们也不认为他把国务院经营的很上轨道。自己私下讨论或不赞同是一回事﹐ 跑去对记者Bob Woodward (当年揭发水门案的华盛顿邮报记者)之流 大曝内幕可就大不同了﹐ 即使如此刻意努力的原因是为了期望能影响华盛顿高层也要不得。 更要紧的是﹐ 鲍尔影响所及﹐ 连他自己的属下在记者面前都敢让总统下不了台。 如今有群学者为了国务院的失去“独立自主权”而唉声叹气﹐ 却浑然忘了宪法中明定的三权分力并不代表权力可以在行政部门无限上纲。 So it's reasonable to expect the same quality of complaint we now see under Porter Goss at the CIA (though perhaps with less intensity) once Dr. Rice takes charge at Foggy Bottom. By naming his closest confidant to be his chief diplomat, President Bush has told the foreign service professionals that he's now paying attention and keeping score. 所以﹐一如高斯(Porter Goss)接掌中央情报局後的怨声载道一样﹐ 将来莱斯博士执掌国务院後会传来如此抱怨是必然。 布许总统把自己的亲信派来作首席外交官﹐ 就是要老实不客气的警告这一群职业外交人员﹐ 他正在眼睁睁的边看边做记录。 The dog that hasn't barked in this transition--and by all "rumint" isn't going to bark any time soon--is the ousting of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Given that the Pentagon's management of the Iraq war was President Bush's greatest campaign liability, there's at least a paradox in Rumsfeld's retention. 在这一系列政治大搬风下未遭波及而在最近的将来也还不致受任何影响的﹐ 倒是国防部长伦斯菲的去职问题。 其实正因五角大厦对伊拉克处里不当而造成布许总统最大的累赘﹐ 伦斯菲的留任﹐ 多少不免有些自相矛盾。 On the other hand, the Pentagon's sins have been of omission and misjudgment, not of commission and obstructionism, as at State and the CIA. Moreover, the war in Iraq is perhaps at a decisive crossroads--if the campaign in the Sunni heartland continues after a successful start in Falluja, and elections happen more or less on schedule in January. It's a moment for continuity and certainty of command. Finally, Rumsfeld's greatest shortcoming--his failure to fully and rapidly adapt his program of transformation to post-September 11, post-Iraq realities--can only be fixed by the White House in the form of an expansion of U.S. ground forces and increasing the baseline defense budget. It's above the secretary's pay grade. 而从另一角度来看﹐ 五角大厦错在忽视与误断﹐ 而不是像国务院和中央情报局一样﹐ 受人委托却阻挠成事。 再者﹐如果法鲁加之役能成功拓展在苏尼教派腹地的战事的话﹐ 伊拉克战事现在可能处於决定性的转捩关头﹐ 此刻最需要的是维持统帅的持续无疑。 而且伦斯菲最大的短处在於未能全面快捷的调整计划以面对911 与伊拉克战事後实况﹐ 而这也必须借白宫之力﹐ 加强驻军并提高基本国防军费才办得到。 国防部长一个人是办不到的。 In sum, although Rumsfeld has been part of the problem, he can still be part of the solution in ways that Powell could not. If the Pentagon has been slow to reshape itself to new missions in the Middle East, it's in part because it's got a lot of other worries: like rogue nuclear states and China. Besides, it's a Washington tradition to reward failures with a larger budget. 总结而言﹐ 虽然伦斯菲曾经是问题的一部份﹐ 他仍可提供部份解决之道﹐ 这是鲍尔不及之处。 如果说五角大厦以前在处理中东事件时手脚太慢﹐ 有一部份也是因为它要考虑的事情太多了﹐ 譬如流氓核武国家﹐ 还有中国。 再说华盛顿反正一向就习惯以更多的经费来奖励失败。 -- 拨乱反正、清新思维，先从「与媒体对抗」开始 http://www.socialforce.org --

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