可以再請教大家嗎　　謝謝 　　　　　　　　the game of chicken Column Veer Straight Veer 4,4 1,6 Row　 Straight　 6,1 -3,-3 Suppose that Row plays the game of Chicken once with Column_1 and then once with Column_2 while Column plays the game first with Row_1 and then with Row_2. For simplicity, you may assume that when Row plays the second time, she does not yet know either what Column_1 played or the result of the game; similarly for Column. Thus you may treat the situation as a simple, twice-repeated game between Row and Column. a. Write down the payoff matrix for this game. 我覺得和第一次玩，也就是和題目 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　一樣，正確嗎? b. What, if any are the dominated strategies? 我覺得沒有，但是可以說選straight 的整體payoff比選veer少，所以 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 straight是dominated strategy嗎 e. Which equilibrium will Row and Column play?　因為沒有dominant strategy，兩個 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　均衡也沒有pareto superior的關係 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　，所以兩種均衡都有可能? Consider a more complex version of the game of Chicken in which Row and Column play each other twice but, in this version, each knows the play of the other and the outcome in the first round before they play the second round. How many strategies would each player have in this version of the game? 這個我就不知道要怎麼判斷了 謝謝　　　　　　　　　　 --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 216.165.4.103 ※ 編輯: yyvettee 來自: 216.165.4.103 (05/06 11:53)