可以再请教大家吗　　谢谢 　　　　　　　　the game of chicken Column Veer Straight Veer 4,4 1,6 Row　 Straight　 6,1 -3,-3 Suppose that Row plays the game of Chicken once with Column_1 and then once with Column_2 while Column plays the game first with Row_1 and then with Row_2. For simplicity, you may assume that when Row plays the second time, she does not yet know either what Column_1 played or the result of the game; similarly for Column. Thus you may treat the situation as a simple, twice-repeated game between Row and Column. a. Write down the payoff matrix for this game. 我觉得和第一次玩，也就是和题目 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　一样，正确吗? b. What, if any are the dominated strategies? 我觉得没有，但是可以说选straight 的整体payoff比选veer少，所以 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 straight是dominated strategy吗 e. Which equilibrium will Row and Column play?　因为没有dominant strategy，两个 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　均衡也没有pareto superior的关系 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　，所以两种均衡都有可能? Consider a more complex version of the game of Chicken in which Row and Column play each other twice but, in this version, each knows the play of the other and the outcome in the first round before they play the second round. How many strategies would each player have in this version of the game? 这个我就不知道要怎麽判断了 谢谢　　　　　　　　　　 --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 216.165.4.103 ※ 编辑: yyvettee 来自: 216.165.4.103 (05/06 11:53)