【2017 心智哲学研究所春季系列演讲】 意识与认知：哲学与科学的跨领域观点 【主讲人】Sascha Fink （德国马德堡大学哲学-神经科学-认知学程 助理教授） 【讲题】经验的私密性 时间：2017年2月21日星期二，下午2:00~4:00 地点：阳明大学第二教学大楼4楼243教室（电梯请按5楼） 报名网址：https://goo.gl/forms/WNrcV0l9E8Mue5gJ2 简介： 传统上，我们认为自己的感官经验是无法共享的，自己的感觉和经验，只有自己能感受， 其他人无法触及，这是意识的「私密性」。由於此特性，以科学（客观的）方法研究（主 观、私密的）意识，面临各种困境。Sascha Fink（德国马德堡大学哲学-神经科学-认知学 程）以哲学的观点，探讨意识的私密性，如何为意识的科学解套。 Abstract According to a traditional view, some parts of our mental life are hidden from others, the phenomenal aspects being probably the best candidate: I can know first-hand what my dream was like, but I can keep others from knowing about my dreams. All that anybody else but me can claim about my dreams is second-hand, relying on testimony, or is inferred by some fallible theory or supported by some more or less reliable evidence. Several prominent neuroscientists (Edelman & Tononi 2000, Frith 2007, Kosslyn & Ochsner 1994, Palmers 2003, Seth 2010) believe that the privacy of phenomenal experiences raises methodological issues for researching consciousness and limits its scope: Either a science of consciousness cannot be strongly objective, or is limited only to the structural aspects of experiences, or fails to uphold scientific anarchism. In this talk, I analyze which notion of privacy would be necessary to raise such a strong problem. However, I am skeptical that we have reason to believe that phenomenality is private in such a strong sense. Conceptual and empirical arguments show that phenomenality is not public. But not everything that is not public is directly private. So I illustrate a possibility how phenomenality in the actual world can be neither public nor private. In such a "Conscious Clubs", different subjects may share first-hand access to the same phenomenal token. If accepted, any argument for limiting the scope of consciousness studies based on some alleged privacy fails. ＊本场演讲将以英语进行 欢迎对心灵哲学、意识研究以及哲学的跨领域探讨感兴趣的朋友们一起来共襄盛举！ --

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