Sorry, my laptop crashed. can't type in chinese at the moment. so please bear with me. Seems to me that IsaacStein has made it clear that for Kripke, Aristotle ( the person) could have been given any other name (such as Adam, if you will) It might righly be wondered that if that's the case, why the name "Aristotle" refers to Aristotle the person in all possible worlds? Why doesn't it fail to refer in a world where Aristotle the person is named "Adam"? Think about the following statement "Aristotle could have been named Adam". or "It could have been the case that Aristotle was named Adam" Kripke's point, I take it, is that in all the counterfactual worlds, Aristotle must refer rigidly to Aristotle the person. Otherwise, the counterfactual statement is not really about Aristotle but rather about someone else. But remember, what we are talking about here in the counterfactual statement is that "Aristotle" could have been named Adam. Not anyone else. So "Aristotle" must refere to Aristotle the person in all counterfactual worlds (or situations). So even in a counterfactual world where Aristotle is named Adam, the proper name "Aristotle" still refers rigidly to Aristotle the person whose name is Adam in that world. anyway..just my two cents.. ※ 引述《A1Yoshi (好想做爱（♀）)》之铭言： : 似乎，Kripke对於专名的严格指称性的因果说明，还是有些问题（而 : 其实他本人好像也知道）。 : 我有想到一个问题，这问题来自：因果关系本身是偶然而非必然的关 : 系。 : 我们可以设想这样的状况是可能的： : 可能，在某命名仪式中，亚理司多德并不被命名叫做「亚理司多德」。 : 而在同样的可能设想下，或说，在那样的可能世界，亚理司多德叫做 : 「亚当」。 : 如果说严格指涉关系的建立仰赖因果链，而且在那样的世界里也一样 : ，那麽，当我们在那样的可能世界里做可能性设想时，「亚理司多德 : 」就不是严格指称到亚理司多德这个人了，因为在那个世界里，「亚 : 当」才是指到亚理司多德的严格指称词。 : 讲到这儿似乎有些吊诡。 : 因为，「亚理司多德」是严格指称词，且指到所有可能世界里的亚理 : 司多德才对。但在上述的「双重」可能设想下，显然「亚理司多德」 : 并没在所有可能世界里都有指到亚理司多德。 : 我没学过模态，可能这其实不是问题，还望有能者分享看法。 : 我想到可能的回应是： : 当我们在进行双重可能性设想时（即在可能世界里进行可能性设想）， : 我们并不是在use那个专名，而只是mention它。而当它只是被mention : 的时候，自然不是一个严格指称词了。 : 但当我们use it as a propername，它就是一个严格指称词，在所有可 : 能世界都挑选出那一个东西。 --

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