※ 引述《IsaacStein (My Name)》之铭言： : : -- : : ◆ From: 218.160.180.124 : : → aletheia:这是Kripke本人的论证吗? 10/15 02:05 : : 推 realove:我其实跟一楼滴a兄有同样滴疑问.. 10/15 08:47 : : 推 realove:有可能是I对K的诠释?我是对pw是本体论上滴还是知识论上滴 10/15 09:58 : : → realove:那一段不太清楚罗... 10/15 10:00 : In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names : are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have : been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been : Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who : have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, : we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' : have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can : refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what : might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that : 'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases. : The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter- : factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion : of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity : and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity, : and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying : properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify : the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to : identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon. : As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out' : about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible : worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking : at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop- : erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do : with properties used to identify it in the actual world. : 以上节录自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50 : 是他本人的论证，但原先的叙述不排除我个人的主观认知和诠释。 可是看来你写的和他写的不太一样 我看不太懂你写的 引的这段Kripke倒是有看懂 他文中提到的只是依他的语意学来看 criteria of transworld identity这问题不存在 因为早先我们已经设定不同世界中的P都是同一个 Kripke一直有个重点 便是使用他的可能世界语意学 或着叫Kripke semantics 什麽叫可能世界或可能状态? 对Kripke来说 w1 access to w2 这叫w2是w1的可能世界 如果access不好懂 换种说法 w1 can see w2 如同他讲用望远镜看一样 如果按照这样来理解可能世界 那不用牵扯到知识论和形上学 或许可以说现实世界和可能世界的区分 现实世界是形上学上存在的 而可能世界则否 但区分现实和可能世界对界定什麽叫可能世界并没有太大的帮助 另外你多次提到"可能世界状态" 像是: 具有存有学意义的世界只有一个，就是我们所身处的 现实世界，而我们在言谈中所使用的模态概念（例如可能、必然）所 衍生出来的可能世界，其实只是众多的可能世界「状态」 还有 「在某个可能世界中，亚里斯多德不是亚历山大帝的 老师」时，我们并不是在说，存在着某一个可能世界W1，在该世界中 有某个人不是亚历山大帝的老师，但是他与在现实世界中亚历山大帝 的老师（同时是柏拉图的学生、逻辑的创始人、写了《形上学》一书 的伟大哲学家）是「同一个人」。对Kripke而言，这样一句话其实只 是表达了以下意思：「现实世界有一个可能的世界状态是，在其中亚 里斯多德不是亚历山大帝的老师」。 看来你说的可能世界状态和可能世界不一样 可以稍微说一下吗? 什麽叫做"可能世界状态" --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 59.117.242.142 ※ 编辑: aletheia 来自: 59.117.242.142 (10/16 01:48)