作者popandy (pop)
看板W-Philosophy
标题Re: The Analysis of Knowledge
时间Mon Nov 3 20:48:49 2003
※ 引述《aletheia (HERESY)》之铭言:
: ※ 引述《popandy (pop)》之铭言:
: : An Alternative Approach
: : Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is to
: : ensure that the analysis does identify as knowledge a belief that is true
: : out of luck. The lesson to be learned from the Gettier problem is that the
: : justification condition by itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified
: : belief, understood as a belief based on good evidence, can be true
: : out of luck. Thus if the traditional analysis of knowledge is to exclude
: : all cases in relation to luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth
: : condition, a condition that succeeds in the qualification of knowledge.
: 版主写的吗?
: 还不错咧,你英文蛮在行的。
: 不过我对这段有点想法
: 「必定要追寻第四个条件」有点太武断,这第四条件有时第五第六都出来了。
: 或许可作些修改?
: 像Alvin Goldman就是以别的方式来进行,详见 A causal theory of knowing
: 试图解答Gettier's problem
In my understanding, Goldman's causal theory of knowing seems to provide
a causality condition besides the traditional three. Although the extent of
knowledge in his causal theory slightly differs the traditional extent of
knowledge, basicly, his causal theory contains the truth, belief and
justification condition. Furthermore, the causality condition actually
confirms the legitimacy of the three conditions above.
In "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman surely argues from a focus
on 'causality'. He begins his analysis of knowledge with the discussion of
four major kinds of knowledge: knowledge by perception, knowledge by memory,
knowledge by inference and knowledge by testimony. Then he proposes a causal
theory to specify the conditions for one to know something. However, his main
concern for 'causal connection' does not remove the traditional conditions
from his theory of knowledge.
Goldman formulates his analysis of knowing as follows:
S knows that P if and only if the fact P is causally connected in an
'appropriate' way with S's believing P.
We can see the sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, for Goldman,
is 'the fact P is causally connected in an 'appropriate' way with S's
believing P', in which 'appropriate' means warranted ways by perception,
memory, or reconstruction of a causal chain, as the major cases of knowledge
mentioned above. Here reconstruction of a causal chain leave room for other
possible causally perceived experiences, say ESP (extrasensory perception).
In short, he sets out from 'causality' but at last comes to 'truth',
'belief', and 'justification.' Thus, 'causality' is certainly the forth
condition on the basis of the traditional analysis.
Perhaps I do not grasp your meaning of "以别的方式来进行",
your further comments are welcomed.
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◆ From: 140.112.248.231
1F:→ kinddog:ESP包括"第六感"吗? 很怪的问题... 推 218.34.21.61 11/03
2F:→ aletheia:是的 不过我相信他是写好玩的 推 210.85.6.135 11/03
3F:→ popandy:这是Goldman自己写的耶~~ 推140.112.248.231 11/04
4F:→ aletheia:写下来并不表示他真的相信如此 推 210.85.6.135 11/04
5F:→ aletheia:那段他在标榜自己的理论连这都能包含而已 推 210.85.6.135 11/04
6F:→ popandy:我也没说他相信阿,只是如果可能的话 推140.112.248.231 11/05
7F:→ popandy:有科学证据的话,他也会相信吧! 推140.112.248.231 11/05
8F:→ aletheia:大概吧^^ 呵呵 推 210.85.6.135 11/05