※ 引述《kinddog (为自己加加油)》之铭言： : : Gettier's Problem : : In his short 1963 paper, "Is justified true belief knowledge?", : : Edmund L. Gettier proposed two counterexamples to the traditional : : analysis. In this article, Gettier intends to argue that the three : : sufficient and necessary conditions of knowledge, in the past firmly : : asserted by many, are indeed not sufficient for knowledge. That is to say, : : the three conditions for a proposition P do not logically make it knowledge. : : Gettier demonstrated that to us in the opposite way, that is, 'S knows that P' : : is not the necessary condition for the three statements. (That A is : : the sufficient condition for B is identical with that B is the necessary : : condition for A.) Even though the conditions above are true, S still does : : not know that P. thus, P is exclude from knowledge. He described two cases, : : in which (1), (2) and (3) are true but 'S knows that P' is false, that is, : : S do not know that P. : : In case one, Smith believes and is justified in believing that : : 'The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket', for the president : : assured him that Jones would get the job and he had just counted the coins : : in Jones's pocket. At last, Smith got the job and, unknown to him, he : : happened to have ten coins in his pocket. So what Smith believes is true, : : but Smith doesn't know it. In case two, the similar situation offers : : the counterexample to argue that 'S knows that P' is false when the : : alleged sufficient conditions is true. : case2跟case1有何不同呢? : 看不出来ㄟ Here I do not depict the case 2, for it is similar to the case 1 in the point that the justified belief turned out to be true out of luck. So, the case 2, in my opinion, is the same as the case 1 , offering a counterexample to deny the traditionally alledged sufficient conditions for knowledge. : : An Alternative Approach : : Above, we noted that the role of the justification condition is to ensure : : that the analysis does identify as knowledge a belief that is true out of : ^^^^ : 我觉得这里应该是"does not" : 降子跟下一句话比较接的起来 I am sure that it is 'does'. In priciple, the justification condition is to guarantee the accuracy of the traditional analysis in identifying knowledge. As a matter of fact, it fails to serve the purpose of guaratee. Therefore, in the next sentence, I wrote that "the justification condition by itself cannot ensure this." Thank you for your comments. : luck. : : The lesson to be learned from the Gettier problem is that the justification : : condition by itself cannot ensure this. Even a justified belief, understood : : as a belief based on good evidence, can be true out of luck. Thus if the : : traditional analysis of knowledge is to exclude all cases in relation : : to luck, it must be amended with a suitable fourth condition, a condition : : that succeeds in the qualification of knowledge. --

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