作者CREgodfather (教父<怀疑主义>)
看板Philosophy
标题[讨论] A defense of the beliefs of sensation
时间Fri Oct 18 01:14:23 2002
请参考 Keith Lehrer, "Why Not Skepticism?" 第62页 IV部分 :)
Lehrer指出我们有可能弄错自己的感觉及意识状态,
而我持反对意见,至少有某些感觉经验是不会错的。
There are some beliefs about one's mental state must be true,
while still others may be mistaken. To illustrate a false belief
about one's mental state, we can image a dead drunk person who
firmly believes that he is well conscious. However, consider a
person who claims an intense pain. Tortured with the unendurable
pain, he goes to a doctor, who finds nothing wrong at all after
extremely careful and complete examining the patient's physical
and psychological state. Could the doctor assert that the patient
is wrong and actually doesn't pain? No. We can concede that what
causes the pain is unknown, but there is no denying that he FEELS
pain (assuming the patient is honest.) It is beliefs of subjective
feelings that need no justificatory arguments to support. Indeed,
we are fallible in finding the explanation of the pain, since we
may allege the pain is caused by something when it is not.
Nevertheless, if a person believes that he pains, it is true and
justified that he pains.
--
问题不在於「他们能推理吗?」,
也不是「他们能说话吗?」,
而是「他们会感受到痛苦吗?」。
-《动物解放》
--
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