课程名称︰财政学 课程性质︰系必修 课程教师︰李显峰 开课学院：社会科学院 开课系所︰经济系 考试日期（年月日）︰99/11/16 考试时限（分钟）：110分钟 是否需发放奖励金：是 （如未明确表示，则不予发放） 注意：须附推理说明计算过程及理由，若只列出答案，即使答案对，并不予记分。 试题纸计一页。 1.(10%)(1)何谓福利经济学第一基本定理(The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics)? 福利经济学第二基本定理(The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics)? 二者有何关系？ (2)福利经济学第二基本定理是否说明经济效率(efficiency)与经济公平(equity)相 冲突? 福利经济学第二基本定理是否意涵着要求政府完全不参与经济活动？ 2.(20%)试问：(1)试问柏拉图效率条件(Pareto optimality)与「次佳理论」(theory of the second best)是否存在差异?对经济一般均衡的条件导致哪些变化? (2)若全社会只有一家公营事业及一家民营事业，分别都只生产一项产品。若公营 事业采取独占定价方式(monopoly pricing)，并且政府对民营事业课徵定额税(a unit tax)，另公营事业与民营事业的产品可互为替代品(subtitutes)，试绘图说明社会 福利水准将提高或降低? 3.(20%)Suppose that an economy consists of two peoples: Ms.T and Mr.J. Their marginal utility functions are given by: MU =600-2I and MU =700-3I , where I is Ms. T's income and I is Ms. J's T T J J T J income. There is a total income of I=700 generated by the economy. (1)Compute the optimal income distribution for the two people, assuming that society values each person's utility equally, i.e. W=U +U . Is this income T J distribution optimal? Why? (2)Draw a graph and identify the welfare loss to society of an egalitarian（均 等主义）income distribution where Ms. T and Mr. J are each allocated income of 350. Is an egalitarian income distribution also optimal? (3)Explain tha assumption made in this type of analysis (1) and (2), regarding the relationship between the income distribution and the total income in the economy. (4)Compare an Utilitarian model of income redistribution and an Rawlsian model of income redistribution, i.e. W=min[U ,U ]. How can one increase the social T J welfare level from these two models? Is it necessary that the slope of the expansion ray connecting the corners of the Rawlsian social welfare function be 45 degrees? Why? 4.(20%)请问(1)若社会中只有二个成员A与B，同时消费一种私有财X及一种 纯粹公共财Z，试绘图或以方程式说明纯粹公共财的最适供给条件。（注：不需以 方程式证明获得供给条件。） (2)若一个城市中只有A、B、C三位成员，以纳税方式支付路灯的成本，其享受 路灯的边际效益MB(marginal benefits)分别如下: A B C MB =150-0.5Z, MB =200-0.5Z, MB =200-Z, 假若所有路灯的边际成本为MC=100+Z，试问最适合的路灯数目为若干?A、 B、C三位成员分别须缴纳若干税款? (3)若三位成员中，只有B不愿纳税(即 free riding)，请问是否能设计一种机制来 防范？ 5.(15%)Suppose that the marginal benefit associated with SOO production is MB= 3.5. The marginal private cost of production SOO is MPC=2+0.1Q, where Q measures kilograms of SOO produces in thousands. The marginal damages caused by pollution in SOO prodution are given by MD=0.05Q. a. Compute the privately optimal output and the socially optimal output of SOO, and the social deadweight loss in each case. b. Compute new solutions for an increase in MB to MB=4.5. Explain what has happened and why? c. What is the Pigouvian tax revenue for the government, when the pollution could be solved? 6.(15%)目前柳丁滞销，政府为解决滞销的问题，拟实施下列政策措施：(1)每人 发一笔现金、(2)规定每人都须免费领数箱柳丁(in-kind transfer)、(3)补助每人买柳 丁的支出(price subsidy)，请问何者分别较能达到(1)政策目标?(2)受补助者最喜欢 的方式?(3)若欲透过每人发一笔现金与补助每人买柳丁的支出，须支出若干现金 补助才能达到相同的政策目的? 完 卷 --

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