作者loloface (宝)
看板Economics
标题[问题] 赛局理论 求贝氏均衡
时间Sun Dec 7 10:33:47 2008
1. Recall from Section 1.3 that Matching Pennies (a static game of complete
information) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but has one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium: each player plays H with probability 1/2
Player2
H T
┌──┬──┐
H │1,-1│-1,1│
Player1 ├──┼──┤
T │-1,1│1,-1│
└──┴──┘
Provide a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a corresponding game of
incomplete information such that as the incomplete incomplete information
disappears, the player' behavior in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium approaches
their behavior in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the original game of
complete information.
2.
http://www.wretch.cc/album/show.php?i=wwwpppjjj&b=32764&f=1411333389&p=2
题目在相簿里
麻烦帮我解一下这两题好吗
第一题我自己的想法是要用Harsanyi转换，但我不晓得 (T,H) (H，T) 是否需要转换
第二题我可以画出树状图，但是後来就不知道要怎麽解了
请大家帮帮我吧 拜托~
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※ loloface:转录至看板 Wanted 12/07 16:54