※ [本文转录自 MLB 看板 #1J0cXso4 ] 作者: EEERRIICC (鲁蛇观止) 看板: MLB 标题: [外电] How Paying Established Closers Saves T 时间: Tue Feb 18 03:52:16 2014 How Paying Established Closers Saves Teams Money 签下正职终结者如何能节省球队开销 http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-paying-established-closers-saves-teams-money/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Teams that pay steep price tags for “proven closers” often get ridiculed by statistically-inclined baseball writers and readers, often for good reason. This tends to be especially true when these teams already have a viable replacement in their bullpen who is cheaper and maybe even a superior pitcher. 那些花一大把银子签下所谓“proven closers”的球队，常常是被那些数据派的作家 所嘲弄，在球队本身就有许多更便宜、甚至更优秀的替代人选之下更显得如此。 However, as Jeff Sullivan wrote on FanGraphs, when those teams include the Athletics and Rays, we tend to step back and reevaluate our positions since these teams typically know what they’re doing. When the A’s traded for Jim Johnson in early December it was a bit of a head-scratcher, as the team had two young relievers perfectly capable of handling the ninth inning in Ryan Cook and Sean Doolittle. While Sullivan pointed out at the time that the A’s roster was deep and it would be difficult for them to upgrade elsewhere, there was another reason that didn’t receive as much attention: signing a veteran reliever could keep the young relievers out of the closer role, thus reducing their cost. 就像Sullivan所写的一样，这些球队包含了运动家还有光芒。 当豆爷签下Jim Johnson时，大家的第一个反应就是搔搔头，因为A's本身就有两只年轻 牛棚可以担下终结者的重任(Cook & Doolittle)。 然而Sullivan却听出了弦外之音:签下一名有经验的终结者可以让年轻小牛远离终结者 这个位置，进而节省使用他们的代价。 (P.S.) Jeff Sullivan在FanGraph写的文章:http://ppt.cc/POoJ The Athletics were the most prominent team to make a move like this, but plenty of other situations where teams with excellent young relievers and departing closers opted to sign a veteran to take over the ninth inning. The Rays acquired Heath Bell (and later signed Grant Balfour) instead of giving strikeout machine Jake McGee a chance to close, and the Indians followed suit by signing John Axford (coming off a -0.5 WAR season) to handle the ninth inning despite Cody Allen’s strong 2013 campaign. Most recently, the Mariners committed $14 million so that Fernando Rodney could close out games while Danny Farquhar, with his 34.7 percent strikeout rate and 1.86 FIP in 2013, got bumped to a setup role. Earlier in the offseason, the Rockies signed journeyman LaTroy Hawkins to close despite the presence of Rex Brothers as well. 当然不只运动家这麽作，不少队伍在拥有优秀牛棚以及终结者从缺的状况下，GM们都倾向 签下一名有经验的终结者。光芒签下了Bell跟Balfour，无视三振机器McGee的表现； 印地安人签下了Axford处理第九局的任务，尽管Cody Allen上季是如此强悍；水手签下了 Rodney，去年34.7%三振率以及1.86FIP的Farquhar只能为他Set-up；更早之前，落矶签下 了浪人Hawkins担任终结者，而非Brothers亦是这种情况。 So what’s really happening here? In three of these cases, the veteran closer had actually performed significantly worse than the young set-up man in 2013, yet the teams went out and committed significant money to these free agents. While these moves may be frustrating for baseball fans, a deeper analysis reveals that these deals might make quite a bit of economic sense for these teams. The idea of saving money on young relievers is occasionally thrown around, but how much money can teams really save? 所以到底花生省魔术？ 上述案例中某些CP去年甚至表现的比原本队上的年轻小牛还要差，球队却还是选择把他们 签下来当终结者，这令球迷心碎挫折，但在更深层的分析之下，这些交易却有那麽一点 省钱的意味。 究竟省了多少呢? Let’s try to keep things relatively simple by focusing on the Athletics, given the fact that their in-house closer candidates have amassed multiple excellent seasons but have yet to reach arbitration. You can make a case that the other teams might not have been comfortable with their in-house options, but that argument simply doesn’t hold water for the A’s. Simple点，拿豆爷的魔球队伍出来看就好。 For the purpose of this research, we’ll assume that had the A’s kept their bullpen intact after Balfour’s departure, Ryan Cook would have handled the ninth inning. Cook has a 2.55 ERA over 148 innings in two seasons with the A’ s and 7.2 innings with Diamondbacks and has earned 16 saves in that time. So far, Cook looks like an elite set-up man, pitching mostly in the seventh and eighth innings and earning 44 holds with the A’s. Luckily for us, the cost for an elite set-up man in his first year of arbitration is pretty well defined as you can see from the pre-arbitration stats and first-year arbitration salaries in the table below. 让我们先假设运动家原封不动的把少了Balfour的牛棚搬到2014年，Cook理所当然会接下 9局的任务(约莫148局 2.55ERA 外带16SV)。 目前为止，Cook就是一位精英布局投手，在7、8两局上场并夺下了44个中继点。 幸运的是，在薪资仲裁的第一年，使用一位优秀的布局投手的代价几乎已经落入了窠臼， 如同下表所显示的仲裁前数据以及仲裁第一年的薪水。 ELITE SET-UP MEN, FIRST TIME THROUGH ARBITRATION Player IP ERA WAR SV Hold Arb 1 ($M) ---------------------------------------------------------------- David Robertson 172 2.62 4.0 3 53 1.6 Jonny Venters 171 1.89 2.9 6 59 1.6 Luke Gregerson 209 3.10 3.2 3 83 1.6 Tyler Clippard 239 2.52 3.0 1 64 1.6 Bobby Parnell 163 2.98 2.0 13 38 1.6 Sergio Romo 144 2.38 4.3 3 54 1.6 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Average 183 2.58 3.23 5 59 1.6 If we assume Cook maintains his current level of excellence in 2014, he’d project to beat most of this group in innings pitched (222), WAR (4.5) and holds (68). However, even players with lots of innings (Clippard) or holds (Gregerson) received the same $1.6 million figure. Cook also already has more saves than anyone in the group at 16, but once again we see that Parnell’s 13 saves didn’t help him out-earn the others. 假设Cook在2014能维持高档状态，他的预测数据将会打败上表在座的各位。 即使有球员吃了非常多局数(Clippard)或是拿了一堆中继点(Gregerson)，他们仲裁 第一年还是一样乖乖下去领1.6M。你说Cook有16次救援成功，海放表上的诸位， 可惜同样有着双位数救援的Parnell也没办法领的比其他人更多。 I think it’s safe to assume that if Cook remains an elite set-up man in 2014, he should project to earn $1.6 million in arbitration. Now, how much might Cook earn in his first year of arbitration if he were to succeed as the A’s closer in 2014? Luckily, there are a pair of decent comps from this past season for relievers who didn’t become full-time closers until their final pre-arb year. 现在来看看，若是Cook在2014年赶赴上任终结者，他会领多少钱。 刚好有两只牛在他们仲裁前一年当上了全职终结者，比比看。 ONE-YEAR CLOSERS, FIRST TIME THROUGH ARBITRATION Player IP ERA WAR SV Hold Arb 1 ($M) ------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Cishek 188 2.54 3.2 52 16 3.8 Ernesto Frieri 198 2.96 1.8 60 13 3.8 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Average 193 2.75 2.50 56 15 3.8 You can make a strong case that many of the relievers in the first group had actually pitched better than Cishek and Frieri. No matter, the 50+ saves from each of them pushed their earnings to $3.8 million. You could argue that Cook is better than these guys, but since we’re being conservative let’s just pencil in Ryan Cook the hypothetical closer for the same $3.8 million. 很明显的，上一个表中的球员，有几个其实投的比Cishek或Frieri都好，但是50+的救援 次数却能有效的在仲裁中把他们的薪资推到3.8M。 或许你会觉得Cook比他们几位都还强，但我们就保守估计吧，假设他在2014年就接下终结 者的状况下会领到3.8M。 Looks like Billy Beane has already saved $2.2 million from his 2015 payroll, not too shabby. But since we know that arbitration raises are built off of the previous year, saving $2.2 million in year one will also lead to savings in years two and three. This is where the numbers get a bit more difficult. Let’s go back to the first group and look at what a few of the relievers earned in the rest of arbitration. 看起来豆爷只为球团在2015薪资表中省了2.2M。(3.8 - 1.6 = 2.2) 但我们知道，仲裁是会依年资累积的，明年省了2.2M也会间接省到後面几年的开销。 让我们回到第一个表，看看其中几位在接下来几次仲裁中领了多少。 ELITE SET-UP MEN, ALL TIMES THROUGH ARBITRATION Player Arb1 Arb2-SV Arb2 Arb3-SV Arb3 Arb Total ---------------------------------------------------------------------- David Robertson 1.6 5 3.1 8 5.2 9.9 Tyler Clippard 1.6 33 4.0 33 5.9 11.5 Bobby Parnell 1.6 35 3.7 (2015) (2015) ? (P.S.)此表中的SV，是各个仲裁的年度所累积的生涯救援数字 Robertson appears to be the best comp for an elite set-up man who never gets a chance to close, earning just under $10 million over the course of his contract. Clippard and Parnell fit what we might expect if Cook gets a shot to close in 2015 after Johnson’s contract expires, although Clippard went back to being a set-up man in his penultimate year and we won’t know Parnell ’s final arbitration contract for another year. Robertson是最好的例子，几乎没有救援机会的他在这些日子里领了不到10M。 而另外两位刚好符合了Cook在2015时Johnson离开球队後的状况。 Since Clippard’s ERA (3.72) and Parnell’s low innings total (50 IP) leading into their second arbitration year may have cost them, let’s assume Cook can beat the pair and earn $4.2 million in 2015 in his first year as a full-time closer. To fill in the rest of the blanks, let’s take a look at a few recent relievers who followed similar paths to see how their arbitration costs escalated. Clippard的ERA跟Parnell的局数降低了使用他们的代价，我们假设优秀的Cook可以在 2015接下终结者後拿到4.2M，为了预测未来几年的薪资成长，让我们来看看其他几只 状况类似的牛，薪资是如何成长的。 RECENT CLOSERS, ALL TIMES THROUGH ARBITRATION Player Super2 Arb Arb1 Arb2 Arb3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chris Perez 2.2 4.5 7.3 Non-Tender Jim Johnson 1.0 2.6 6.5 10.0 Joel Hanrahan N/A 1.4 4.1 7.0 Matt Capps N/A 2.4 3.5 7.2 It’s not easy to find pitchers who didn’t start closing until their third or fourth year of team control, so unfortunately, three of the four recent comps were super-twos, two weren’t all that great, two were non-tendered, and one is Johnson himself. Perez got a $2.8 million raise after a season with 39 saves and a 3.59 ERA, while Hanrahan and Capps both earned $3.7 million raises after eclipsing the 40-save mark with ERAs under 2.5. The key takeaway here is that an effective pitcher who is earning saves as a full-time closer will see raises of $2-4 million in arbitration. While a reliever like Cook is certainly capable of putting up a monster season and earning a $3.5-4 million raise, let’s keep things simple and use $3 million. Perez在拿到了39SV之後，薪资涨了2.8M；Capps跟Hanrahan在40+救援的加持下，涨幅 也达到了3.7M。关键在於，一个球员开始接下终结者工作後，仲裁会给他2-4M的薪资 涨幅。 当然Cook是绝对有能力制造一个怪物球季并拿到3.5-4M的薪资涨幅，我们姑且就用3M 来算算看。 (P.S.) Super 2的规则: http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/super-two/ Using this knowledge, we can put together a table estimating Ryan Cook’s expected arbitration cost if he had become a full-time closer in 2014 versus waiting until 2015 to close out games. 有了这些数据可以推断，我们作出Cook在2014赶赴上任或等到2015才接下终结者後， 未来薪资的比较表。 RYAN COOK, POTENTIAL VS. PROBABLE EARNINGS Player Arb 1 Arb 2 Arb 3 Arb Total ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ryan Cook w/ Johnson 1.6 4.2 7.2 13.0 Ryan Cook, closer 3.8 6.8 9.8 20.4 There you have it. By keeping Cook out of the ninth inning for just one year, the A’s appear to be saving around $7.4 million in arbitration costs. This makes the net cost of having Jim Johnson close for the A’s in 2014 around $3M. You could argue that these numbers are a bit generous, but assuming that Cook continues to be an effective reliever, the A’s appear to be saving at least $5 million with this move. A $10 million Jim Johnson doesn’t look too great, but at $3-5 million he has to be considered a steal. 恭喜大家得到它了。 原来让Cook少投一年的第九局，可以在未来替球队省下约7.4M的开销，这让签下Johnson的 净花费变成了不到3M。 你说这太理想了，好吧那假设这个动作只为球队省至少5M好了，那只花3-5M就签到Johnson ，也能在豆爷的神偷事蹟中加上一笔了。 This analysis also shows us the importance of the first year of arbitration. Since the salaries build on one another, an inflated figure in the first year will have a big impact on the subsequent years. Therefore, the difference in cost between a pitcher who starts closing during his first year of arbitration and one who starts closing during his final pre-arbitration year is much greater than the difference between the former pitcher and one who doesn’t close at all. 这分析显示了第一年薪资仲裁的重要性，毕竟仲裁是会让薪资水涨船高的。 总之仲裁前一年不让好牛被推上火线关门是很重要的。 We also see the degree to which saves trump skill in the arbitration process. A pitcher like Chris Perez (0.8 career WAR in 333 innings) pitching in the ninth will end up being significantly more expensive than David Robertson (7.6 career WAR in 329 innings). 从Robertson跟Perez的比较中，也可以看到这种策略是如何替球队省下开销。 So where does this leave us? Teams that have effective young relievers in their pre-arbitration years when a vacancy in the ninth inning opens up are put in a tough position. If they hand over the keys to the ninth, they’re almost certain to pay the price in arbitration. 如果操之过急，让仲裁前一年的好牛上去关门，那个球队有可能就要准备多付一笔。 However, if teams sign a veteran closer to keep their young guy from racking up saves until after his first arbitration hearing, they stand to save a lot of money, possibly as much as $7-8 million. At the start of 2011, the Atlanta Braves chose to hand the keys to rookie flamethrower Craig Kimbrel. Now, he’ s about to earn more than any other first-time arbitration-eligible reliever and may become so expensive that the Braves have to consider trading him. 然而球队如果签下了老牌终结者，不让年轻人有机会累积救援数据，那麽就可以省下约 7-8M的钱。 2011年，勇士队让Kimbrel接下九局重任。比起其他第一次仲裁的牛棚投手，Kimbrel 现在身价不同凡响，甚至让勇士要考虑交易掉他。 (P.S.)勇士已於2/16与Kimbrel达成4年延长合约，4年42M Given the amount of money on the line, it’s not surprising that nearly every team that lost its closer to free agency and had a pre-arbitration reliever posed to take over opened up its wallet and signed a veteran. Effectively, these teams have a coupon that gives them a huge rebate on a free-agent closer, but they have to use it this offseason. For a team with deep pockets, it might make sense to simply let the best reliever close. However, smaller-market teams that need to squeeze more value of their cost-controlled players might be more likely to take advantage of this discount. In this context, these types of acquisitions become not only defensible, but actually quite brilliant. 所以说在前述情况下，打开钱包签下一个有经验的终结者可说是稀松平常。 口袋深一点的球队或许就直接让年轻小牛接下九局，但小市场球队必须利用这种策略， 制造出更多的价值。 Earlier in the offseason, Eno Sarris explored some of the complexities of the arbitration process on the FanGraphs website and podcast, noting how savvy teams could manipulate the system to save money. Nowhere is there a greater gap between the arbitration process and the open market than in the premium placed on saves. As front offices get wiser and it becomes more difficult to find values on the free-agent market, teams (especially those with tighter budgets) are always searching for new market inefficiencies to get an edge. Judging by some of these transactions, it appears that teams are realizing the economic advantage that they can get by exploiting the arbitration process to suppress the costs of their own players. FEBRUARY 12, 2014 BY MATTHEW MURPHY http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-paying-established-closers-saves-teams-money/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 简单说，签下Johnson是让Cook或Doolittle没有机会累积救援数据，使得他们在仲裁 第一年时没办法拉高薪资，进而在接下来几年为球队省钱。 简评:化消了我对豆爷签Johnson的疑惑 非逐字翻译，请见谅，有错麻烦不吝指正。 --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 219.71.226.108 是的，本文是理想状态的策略， 我在猜如果签到一个烂CP，要把小牛推上火线， 那麽与日俱增的committee形式是否就是这种策略之下的因应之道? Jim Johnson不是BS天王，怎麽会觉得豆爷无视九局守成呢? 签Johnson --> 牛棚强化 未来签自家小牛便宜 未来小牛维持水准，运动家投资得宜，省了一笔钱去补其他位置 未来小牛失去水准，运动家也不用花更多钱当冤大头 进可攻 退可守的策略 其实不错 很值得深思的一篇文 已修正 谢谢:) 谢谢 ※ 编辑: EEERRIICC 来自: 219.71.226.108 (02/18 12:27)

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ※ 转录者: condition0 (180.176.29.216), 04/11/2014 03:08:50