一時之間沒翻到教科書提到二戰的頁數，所以找網路。 http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=317 以下節錄與翻譯皆著墨於二戰期間的美國。 Consider first the labor market. Although unemployment virtually disappeared, the disappearance owed nothing to Keynesian fiscal policy. In truth, it owed everything to massive conscription. Between 1940 and 1944, the number of unemployed persons fell by 4.62 million, while the armed forces increased by 10.87 million. For the whole war period, more than 10 million men were drafted. The enormous forced withdrawal—the number of draftees was equivalent to nearly 20 percent of the prewar labor force—drastically reduced the number of potential workers and depleted the ranks of the unemployed, and would have done so with or without the government’s budget deficit. The Keynesian correlation is spurious. 儘管失業確實消失了，此一消失與凱因斯財務政策無關，事實上，這完全是歸因於大規模 的動員。在1940和1944年間，失業人數下降了四百六十二萬人，而武裝力量則提升了一千 零八十七萬人。在整個戰爭期間，超過一千萬人被徵召。這一龐大人力的抽離─其人數 相當於戰前工人的兩成─嚴重的減少了潛在工人的數量並削減了失業人數，無論政府的 支出赤字如何都會如此。這與凱因斯政策的關係是個謬誤。 But what about the enormous increase of the economy’s total output? This, it turns out, is nothing more than an artifact of the accounting system used by the government to keep the national product accounts. In the official system, spending for military goods and services gets counted as part of the dollar value of national output, as does spending for consumer goods and new capital goods. So every dollar the government paid for the services of military personnel or for the purchase of battleships, tanks, bombers, and other munitions during the war was included in the GNP. Hardly surprising, then, that GNP skyrocketed as the government created a command economy geared for “ total war.” 那麼經濟方面總體產出的巨大成長呢? 這其實完全是基於政府用以計算全國產品帳目的而 訂定的會計系統。在官方系統中，軍事的產品與服務的支出被算入以美元計的全國產能中 ，正如民生用品和新的資本品。所以政府用於戰爭期間軍事人次支出或購買戰艦、坦克、 轟炸機和其他彈藥的每一元都被計入了GNP。不讓人驚訝的，此後GNP隨著政府製造了一個 用於總體戰爭的計畫經濟而快速成長。 But when we examine the rest of the GNP—the part consisting of spending for civilian consumer goods and new capital goods—we find that after 1941 (adjusted for actual as opposed to official inflation), it declined for two years; and even though it rose after 1943, it was still below its 1941 value when the war ended. Thus, the war years witnessed a reduction of the total real output flowing to civilian consumers and investors—a far cry from “ wartime prosperity.” 但當我們檢驗剩餘的GNP─也就是由民生用品和新的資本品所組成的部分時，我們發現在 1941年以後(已經過對通膨的修正)這數據下降了兩年，且儘管其在1943年開始上升，其 仍在戰爭結束時低於1941年的數值。因此，戰爭期間見證了對民生顧客與投資者的總真實 產能的下跌─一個對於「戰爭繁榮」的長嚎痛哭。 《中略》 Military Keynesianism was always an intellectually bankrupt theory. 軍事凱因斯理論永遠是一個在智識上破產的學說。 # # # # # 提供給各位做個參考。 -- The nation which forgets its defenders will be itself forgotten. ～John Calvin Coolidge, Jr. --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 140.112.25.106 ※ 文章網址: https://webptt.com/m.aspx?n=bbs/Warfare/M.1428913794.A.D13.html 或許吧，但是高強度總體戰爭期間民生與投資並不會因為動員與擴大支出而改善是事實。 ※ 編輯: jimmy5680 (140.112.25.105), 04/13/2015 20:01:45