作者TunaVentw ()
看板NTU-Exam
標題[試題] 107-2 鄧敦民 形上學 期末考
時間Thu Jun 20 17:50:11 2019
課程名稱︰形上學
課程性質︰哲學系必帶
課程教師:鄧敦民
開課學院:哲學系
開課系所︰文學院
考試日期(年月日)︰2019年06月20日
考試時限(分鐘):180分鐘
是否需發放獎勵金:是
(如未明確表示,則不予發放)
試題 :
Metaphysics 2019
NTU Philosophy
Final Exam
20 June 2019
Time: 14:20- 17:20 (3hr)
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Answer TWO of the following questions in a seperate answer sheet.
1.Consider the following argument for tealism. "There are a number of particu-
lar objects, say, a, b, c, ..., and so on, to which we may truly apply the
predicate F (i.e. such that it is true to say that a is F, b is F, and so
on). But why can all these objects be truely said to be F? This requires an
explanation. So there must be something about these objects in virtue of
which they are all F, and this something is what we call a universal. For
example, there are red houses, red noses, red sunsets, and so on. So there
must be something about these objects in virtue of which they are all red--
i.e. the universal redness. Consequently, universals exist." Do you find
this argument compelling? If so, elaborate it against possible oblections.
If not, provide your own objection.
2.Some philosophers think we need to explain why several different objects may
share the same attribute. Some philosophers think there is no such need.
Which view do you think is correct? Provide your own argument supporting
your answer.
3.According to the substratum theory, a particular is constituted by a group
of properties, together with an entity called 'substratum' which possesses
these properties and which differentiates it from other particulars. Against
this view, it is objected that the very notion of a 'substratum' is dubious,
for in itself the substratum has no properties, but it is absurd (or at
least quite mysterious) to suppose there is any entity with no properties at
all. Do you think this objection is compelling? If so, elaborate it showing
how it refutes the substratum theory. If not, offer your own response defen-
ding the substratum theory.
4.Suppose a sculptor creates a statue of Goliath on Monday by sticking two
pieces of clay together, such that he simultaneously brings into existence a
new piece of clay and a statue of Goliath. Suppose the sculptor destroys his
owrk on Tuesday by smashing the statue, such that he simultaneously termina-
tes the careers of both the piece of clay and the statue. Now, let 'Goliath'
be the name for the statue, and 'Lumpl' for the piece of clay in question.
So, clearly, Goliath is identical with Lumpl, for they share all the same
physical and historical properties, and they conincide in all of their care-
ers. But it is equally clear that Goliath isn't identical with Lumpl, for
they have different modal properties: Goliath could survive losing a hand,
but Lumpl couldn't surving losing any part. How would you deal with these
conflicting intuitions? Provide your own diagnosis of the problem and offer
your own justification.
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※ 編輯: TunaVentw (175.181.176.105 臺灣), 06/21/2019 01:06:06