標題:Still simmering Oct 30th 2008 From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire Georgia may face more turmoil Two and a half months after an EU-brokered ceasefire called an end to the conflict between Russia and Georgia, tensions in and around the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to simmer. Russia and the de facto authorities have cut all residual links between the regions and Georgia proper, and are not allowing EU monitors access to the contested territories. Russia is oblivious to outside pressure and is progressively bolstering ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence it unilaterally recognised in late August. The Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, is maintaining an uncompromising stance on the breakaway provinces. With neither side backing down, and with Mr Saakashvili's domestic opposition possibly regrouping in the near future, there is a risk of either a further, disastrous flare-up, or another descent into domestic political turmoil. In either case, Mr Saakashvili would find it difficult to remain in power. Low-level violence intensifies Broadly in keeping with the revised accord signed in September by the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, and his French counterpart (and holder of the rotating EU presidency), Nicholas Sarkozy, Russian troops left the soil of Georgia proper on October 10th. However, the period of (very) relative calm that followed the cessation in August of hostilities between Russia and Georgia had already come to an end by then: on October 3rd an unexplained explosion in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, had killed at least 11 people, including seven Russian soldiers. Tensions have remained high, with both countries maintaining their long-standing habit of trading inflammatory accusations. The Russian government in mid-October accused Georgia of plotting terrorist atrocities on Russian soil, and Georgia has complained of an arms build-up in parts of South Ossetia immediately adjacent to the territory of Georgia proper. More worryingly, there have been more frequent reports of shootouts, and in recent days a number of killings have taken place in and around the larger of the breakaway provinces, Abkhazia. On October 23rd a senior Abkhaz military official was killed along with two other people in the Gali district of Abkhazia, which borders Georgia. Two days later, a Georgian government official and another person were killed by a mine just across the border. As usual, both sides offer diametrically opposed versions of events. The Georgian government, as well as the Abkhaz administration-in-exile loyal to Tbilisi, say that killings inside Abkhazia are the result of clashes between warring Abkhazian armed groups, whereas Abkhaz separatist authorities have accused the Georgian government of planning "large-scale terrorism". The two sides are not on speaking terms, and talks between them in Geneva on October 15th (which were organised as part of the ceasefire agreement) broke down before they could even start, reportedly because Georgia refused to let Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives participate in the plenary session along with the other state-level participants. The head of the EU monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM), Hansjorg Haber, on October 24th declared himself "pleasantly surprised" by developments on the ground, barring a few "isolated shootings". However, Russia and the breakaway authorities have accused EUMM of a pro-Georgian bias in allegedly turning a blind eye to, or worse yet providing cover for, the activities of Georgian special forces in the border areas. All in all, Mr Haber's statement appear to be a feeble attempt to paper over the cracks of a situation that is looking tense, and could become more so once weather conditions in the Caucasus permit. Twisting the knife Mr Haber also complained that EU monitors are not being let inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia to investigate allegations that Georgia is instigating turmoil. This would tend to argue against the allegations themselves. Russia's steadfast refusal to let EUMM inside the contested territories could also be construed as an attempt to cover up the destruction seemingly inflicted on predominantly Georgian-populated areas after their inhabitants left in the wake of the conflict. At any rate, Russia is dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on a strictly bilateral basis, without any regard for protestations coming from Europe or the US (let alone Georgia). In September Russia concluded "friendship" agreements with both provinces, covering various aspects of co-operation, but crucially focusing on military strengthening. Borders between the breakaway regions and Georgia proper have been bolstered, and any remaining links cut— Georgia accused Russia on October 24th of blowing up a bridge between the Gali district and the neighbouring Zugdidi district in Georgia proper, effectively making transit near-impossible for the ethnic Georgian population of Gali. Georgia has also accused Russia of amassing weapons in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia, which used to be under Georgian control before the August war. Russia has several reasons for gradually bolstering ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is a constant reminder to Mr Saakashvili (and the West) that it is Russia who calls the shots in the region, and further unhinges and wears down a Georgian leadership that was badly shaken by the August conflict and its aftermath. It also serves to deflect domestic attention away from the global financial crisis, which is taking an increasingly heavy toll on the Russian economy, and towards the perceived enemies on Russia's doorstep. The allegation that Georgia is planning terrorist atrocities against civilians on Russian soil is perhaps best viewed in this context. Short-term gain, but long-term pain? However, Mr Saakashvili may also be stoking tensions for his own ends. The approval at a donors' conference in Brussels on October 22nd of a whopping US$4.55bn (nearly half of 2007 GDP and over US$1bn greater than a World Bank-led mission had suggested would be needed) aid package to revive post-war economic prospects may afford Mr Saakashvili some much-needed relief. However, his claim that Georgia's role in the August war was a purely defensive one, in response to Russian aggression, has yet to backed up with convincing evidence. On the contrary, a BBC investigation of the start of hostilities in August, aired in late October, suggests that Georgian armed forces may have deliberately targeted civilians in Tskhinvali. Mr Saakashvili strongly refutes this, but a reassessment may be underway in Western capitals of his role in the events leading up to the war. The parliamentary commission set up to investigate the underlying causes of the August conflict contains several opposition MPs, but will not be issuing any binding recommendations. The opposition, while still largely disorganised, has been increasingly restless in recent weeks, as it clamours for a more thorough investigation of the facts leading up to the war with Russia, and as the first anniversary of the November 2007 street protests—which the government repressed brutally—approaches early next month. And in late November, the fifth anniversary of the Rose Revolution will provide another potential flashpoint. Demands for early presidential or parliamentary elections could mount around the time of the protest anniversary. The most expedient way for Mr Saakashvili to keep such pressures at bay is to play the patriotic card, keeping the country on a constant state of alert against the perceived risk of further Russian aggression, and keeping alive the prospect, however remote, of restoring territorial integrity. This touches a nerve among Georgians, many of whom will not soon be reconciled to the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By portraying himself as the only politician capable of keeping the country united in the face of Russian expansionism, Mr Saakashvili can keep a grip on power in the short term. However, as the events of November 2007 and August 2008 showed, the path to domestic political turmoil or ruinous armed conflict is short. A further relapse into either could spell doom for Mr Saakashvili's already battered leadership. http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12536205&fsrc=nwl 新聞來源: (需有正確連結) -- --

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