有關兩院制與美國首都政經分離的思辨 往往涉及地緣、選舉/官員任命、權力制衡，如何機會平等與多樣性 etc 1. 兩院制參議權各州等值 -> Connecticut Compromise = Great Compromise of 1787 2. 眾議院發起總統/最高法院大法官的彈劾，由參議院主持審判 3. 參議院行使由總統提名的內閣官員、最高法院大法官等同意權 4. 聯邦政府採政經分離制，不少州層級仍可看到這個規劃精神 在台灣鮮少討論 200 多年前美國開國元勳的觀點 但今天台灣遇到的不少問題，都是幾百年前這些討論就可以預見到的。 (以下直接 google 翻譯可能會有些許失真，建議看原文) 想說順便記錄下來發在本版 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 檔案來源：美國國會圖書館 Volume 2 https://www.loc.gov/resource/llscdam.llfr002/?sp=1&st=grid #Page 42 Mr Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeachments, of the Executive. If the Judges were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides agst. referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as one, that as the seat of Govt. must be in some one State, and the Executive would remain in office for a considerable time, for 4, 5, or 6 years at least he would insensibly form local & personal attachments within the particular State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere, of an equal chance of promotion. Mason 先生 法官的任命方式可能在某種程度上取決於彈劾行政官員的審判方式。 如果法官要組成一個用於此目的的法院，那麼他們肯定不應該由行政官員任命。 除了將任命權交給行政部門之外，還有其他無法克服的反對意見。 他提到了其中一個理由，即由於政府所在地必須位於某個州， 而且行政官員將在任相當長一段時間，至少 4 年、5 年或 6 年， 他將不可避免地對特定州內的地方和個人產生依戀， 這將剝奪其他地方同樣優秀的人獲得晉升的機會。 #Page 42 Mr. Ghorum. As the Executive will be responsible in point of character at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look through all the States for proper characters. — The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of Govt where they reside, as the Executive. If they can not get the man of the particular State to which they may respectively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Ghorum 先生 (Nathaniel Gorham) 由於行政官員至少在品行方面要為公正和忠誠地履行職責負責， 因此他會仔細審視所有州的合適人選。 參議員在政府所在地任職期間，就像行政官員一樣，更容易和當地的 (官員) 建立依附 關係。 如果他們得不到自己所屬州的人選，他們對其他州的人選將會漠不關心。 #Page 127 Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the genel. sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Genl. Govt. Gerry 先生 (Elbridge Gerry) 整個美國的普遍看法是，聯邦政府的所在地不應該是任何一個州政府的所在地， 也不應該是任何大型商業城市。 #Page 128 Mr. Butler was for fixing (by the Constitution) the place, & a central one, (for the seat of the Natl Govt) Butler 先生 (Pierce Butler) 在憲法中確定國家政府所在地，並且這個地點應該位於中心位置。 Volume 1 https://www.loc.gov/item/11005506/ #Page 200 The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable one, and Ishould, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had adifferent Constitu- tion, some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries were con-tested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present when such dif- ferences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of aState is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Smal. States are more easily well & happily governed than large ones! If therefore in such an equal division, it should be found nec- essary to diminish Pennsylvania, Ishould not be averse to the giving apart of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjust-ing such adivision; and however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augumentation of inhabitants in some States, and their [more] 8 fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent occasion for new divisions, Ibeg leave to pro- pose for the consideration of the Committee another mode which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature. Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union. Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion. The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress. The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal num-ber of Delegates from each State: nd their decisions to be by the majority of individual members voting. If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occa- sions not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful States for farther aids, to be volun-tarily afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper. 各位尊敬的閣下，規模較大的州自然不願意將財產交由較小的州支配， 就如同較小的州也不願意將財產交由規模較大的州支配一樣。 一位可敬的紳士為了避免這個難題，暗示了一個均衡各州權力的提議。 在我看來，這是一個公正的提議，我個人並不反對這樣的措施，如果它是可行的。 過去，的確幾乎每個州都擁有不同的憲法，有些擁有較多的特權，有些則較少。 因此，當邊界受到爭議時，邊境居民就很在意分界線後他們會被劃入哪一邊。 而現在，由於這些差異已經消失，這就沒那麼重要了。 一個州的利益是由其個別成員的利益所組成的。如果他們沒有受到傷害， 州就沒有受到傷害。規模小的州比規模大的州更容易實現良好和幸福的治理！ 因此，如果在這樣的平等分配中，發現有必要縮小賓夕法尼亞州的規模， 我並不反對將它的一部分劃給新澤西州，另一部分劃給德拉瓦州。 但是，調整這樣的劃分可能會帶來相當大的困難；即使一開始劃分得再公平， 它也會隨著一些州人口的增加以及其他州人口的相對固定比例而不斷變化， 從而導致頻繁需要新的劃分。因此，我冒昧地向委員會提出另一種模式供其考慮， 在我看來，這種模式更加公正，更容易實施，而且更具持久性。 讓實力最弱的州說出它願意且能夠為聯州的整體目的提供的資金或兵力比例。 讓所有其他州承諾各自提供相同的比例。 所有這些聯合供應的絕對支配權屬於國會。 在這種情況下，國會由來自每個州數量相同的代表組成， 他們的決定由個別成員投票的多數票產生。 如果這些聯合和均等的供應在特定情況下不足，國會可以向富裕和強大的州 提出進一步援助的要求，這些援助將是自願提供的，每個州都有權考慮 所要求援助的必要性和實用性，並根據需要提供更多或更少援助。 -- 社群理念 首都設中部，社會住宅蓋中南部 https://www.facebook.com/NCPBTW/ 首都機能移轉計劃 New Capital Plan for Better Taiwan --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 59.127.124.8 (臺灣) ※ 文章網址: https://webptt.com/m.aspx?n=bbs/Geography/M.1717684388.A.B77.html ※ 編輯: ckTHU (59.127.124.8 臺灣), 06/06/2024 22:48:25 ※ ckTHU:轉錄至看板 Urban_Plan 06/13 14:50