金融危機的一些教訓 2008年11月17日11:47 Stephen Schwarzman 眼下我們正身處幾十年來最嚴重的一場金融危機中。我們使出渾身解數想把自己從危機中解救出來，但卻鮮少關注今後該如何避免重蹈覆轍。 與其坐以待斃，不如現在就著手做些事情避免再次發生這樣的危機，或者至少在危機來臨時減弱它的沖擊力。以下是我的七項原則，全球金融監管和控制體系都該以此為基礎： 第一，我們需要制定一套全世界通用的會計準則。在全球市場上，你不能僅僅因為金融機構的總部設在不同的國家就遵循不同的會計準則和信息披露標準。 第二，世界主要市場的金融監管體制需要具有大體相同的結構。每個國家都要在政治層面上設一位財政部長，還要有央行，以及一個權限很廣的單獨的金融服務監管機構。 美國監管機構規模太小、集中程度過低、常常難以應對蔓延整個系統的危機。監管機構的參差不齊也讓金融機構有機會鑽監管的空子，轉向那些最寬鬆、最肯通融的監管者。任何主要金融市場都承受不起這種做法帶來的後果。 第三，財務報告要完全透明。任何信息都不應該被遺漏。那些突然出現在表內並造成嚴重破壞的表外金融工具是對信息披露原則的一大嘲諷。 第四，所有金融工具的全部信息都要向監管機構披露。如果金融市場有很大一部分對監管機構是“隱形”的，那麼任何監管機構都無法對市場風險和整體健康水平進行評估。監管機構必須能監督所有的衍生品，比如60萬億美元的信用違約掉期(CDS)。 第五，監管機構應該對參與市場的所有金融機構進行監督，無論它們的章程、所在地和法律地位如何。舉例來講，如果你擔心金融系統中的借貸水平，但卻把對沖基金等主要借款人排除在監管之外，這就說不通了。 第六，我們需要停止對難以估值的資產採用按市價核算的方法。現在，有越來越多的人開始意識到按市價核算的會計準則在這次危機中起了推波助瀾的作用。我所說的並不是市值一目了然的公開上市股票，而是那些出於投資目的而持有的証券，以及那些在經濟周期中的特定時期沒有顯而易見的市場的投資工具。這些証券和投資工具的信息應該一五一十地向監管者進行披露。不過，金融機構也不應該被迫以虛假的、大甩賣的價格馬上進行巨額沖減，進而加劇金融的不穩定性。 最後，我們必須轉向基於原則的監管體系，而不是基於具體規則的體系。一個由具體規則和規定構成的系統絕對無法應對現代金融體系的發展速度和復雜程度。目前証券交易委員會(SEC)和銀行的監管工作無法化解這場危機。 如果我們要把各類金融機構一古腦兒地置於單一一個監管者手中，那麼這個監管者必須有能力通過提出一套指導原則而不是頒布一系列越來越復雜的條款來進行監管。如果這些指導原則再加上強有力的信息披露和監管，那麼監管機構就會獲得所需的靈活性，應對一個不斷變化的金融格局，並為被監管機構提供一個明確的方向。 在這場危機之前，美國金融服務業的創新性和靈活性一直是世界所艷 的。我們不應該創造一個用不斷復雜的條款來扼殺創新的監管體系。薩班斯－奧克斯利法案(Sarbanes-Oxley)用對復雜條款的恪守取代了良好的判斷力。這並沒有令美國企業更加穩定或是盈利能力更強，反而損害了我們的競爭力，削弱了我們的國內金融市場。我們不能再重蹈覆轍了。 最後，為了實施一個新的全球金融監管和控制體系，我們需要一個新的全球監管者組織。我們生活在全球市場中，然而世界主要經濟體的監管機構卻大多各自為政。 這一新的世界金融監管者的組織將設全職人員，並經常召開會議。通過這個組織，世界主要經濟體的監管機構可以交換本國市場形勢的詳細信息。該組織的全職工作人員將迅速收集、分析並公布這類信息，幫助投資者和監管者及時糾正問題，防止問題變得更加嚴重。 那些在某一行業風險敞口過高或是在高風險金融工具上增長過快的市場通常是最先出現問題的，然而我們似乎從來沒有及時發現其中的問題、採取補救措施。從世界各個市場獲得了信息的監管機構和它們的同行將能採取更加明智的行動。 在未來的幾周或幾個月裡，我們無疑會花很多時間試圖分析我們為何會落到這步田地。然而更重要的是，我們接下來該怎麼做。怨天尤人可能會讓我們感覺好受一點兒，但是為了未來而修補我們的體系則會令我們更加安全。 （編者按：蘇世民(Stephen Schwarzman)為百仕通集團(Blackstone Group)董事長、聯合創始人兼首席執行長。） Some Lessons Of The Financial Crisis 2008年11月17日11:47 Stephen Schwarzman (Editor's Note: Mr. Schwarzman is chairman, cofounder and CEO of the Blackstone Group, an investment and advisory firm.) We are in the middle of the worst financial crisis in recent memory. Vast efforts are being made to extricate us from it, but there is little focus on preventing the next one. Rather than wait, there are things we can do now to avoid another crisis, or at least cushion the blow when it comes. I have seven principles that should underlie any system of global financial regulation and monitoring: First, we need to finalize a common set of accounting principles across borders. In global markets, you cannot have global institutions abiding by differing standards of accounting and disclosure simply because they are headquartered in different countries. Second, the financial regulatory regimes in the world's major markets need to be structured along broadly the same lines. Each country needs a finance minister at the political level, a central bank and one single financial services regulator with a very broad mandate. The regulatory agencies in the U.S. are too small, too fragmented and often not powerful enough to cope with a system-wide crisis. Our hodgepodge of regulatory agencies also encourages financial institutions to play regulatory arbitrage, seeking the most compliant and accommodating regulator. No major financial market can afford that. Third, you need full transparency for financial statements. Nothing should be eliminated. Off-balance-sheet vehicles that suddenly return to the balance sheet to wreak havoc make a mockery of principles of disclosure. Fourth, you need full disclosure of all financial instruments to the regulator. No regulator can do its job of assessing risk and systemic soundness if large parts of the financial markets are invisible to it. A regulator must be able to monitor all derivatives, including, for example, $60 trillion in credit default swaps. Fifth, the regulator should have oversight over all financial institutions that participate in the markets, regardless of their charter, location or legal status. For example, it makes no sense if you are worried about leverage in the system to exclude major categories of borrowers, such as hedge funds. Sixth, we need to abolish mark-to-market accounting for hard-to-value assets. There is now emerging a broad realization that mark-to-market accounting has exacerbated the current crisis. We are not talking about publicly traded equities with a readily ascertainable value. The problem involves securities held for investment purposes, and those instruments during certain times of the cycle for which there is no readily observable market. These securities and instruments would be fully disclosed to the regulator. However, a financial institution would not be forced to suddenly take huge write downs at artificial, fire-sale prices and thus contribute to financial instability. Finally, we have to move to a principles-based regulatory system rather than a rules-based system. A system of rules and regulations is utterly incapable of dealing with the speed and complexity of the modern financial system. Current SEC and bank regulation was unable to stem the current crisis. If we are to sweep a vast array of financial institutions into the net of a single regulator, then that regulator has to be able to regulate not by promulgating a blizzard of ever more complex rules, but by enunciating a set of guiding principles. If these principles are coupled with strong disclosure and oversight, they will give the regulator the flexibility needed to cope with an ever-changing financial landscape, and to provide a clear direction for the regulated institutions. Until the current crisis, the American financial services industry had been the envy of the world for its creativity and nimbleness. We must not create a new system of regulation that throttles innovation through the ever-increasing complexity of its rules. Sarbanes-Oxley has made a fetish of compliance with complex regulations as a substitute for good judgment. This has not made American corporations any more stable or profitable, but it has damaged our competitiveness and weakened our domestic financial markets. We must not make the same mistake. Finally, to implement a new system of global financial regulation and monitoring we need a new global organization of regulators. We live in global markets, but the regulators of the world's major economies are largely operating independently. This new international organization of financial regulators would be permanently staffed and constantly in session. Through it, the regulators of the world's major economies could exchange detailed information on what is happening in their respective markets. The organization's permanent staff would collect, analyze and publish that information quickly, helping investors, and helping regulators correct incipient problems before they become serious. Markets with excess exposures to any one sector or with excessive growth in risky financial instruments are the ones that implode first, yet we never seem to discover them in time to take remedial action. Regulators with input from the world's markets and their fellow regulators will be able to act more wisely. In the weeks and months to come we will no doubt spend a lot of time discovering how we got to this financial crisis. More important is what we do next. Affixing blame may make us feel better; fixing the system for the future will make us so much safer. --

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