※ 引述《fw190a (las)》之铭言： : 标题: Re: [心得] 由系统面来看闪电战 : 时间: Wed Jan 22 12:28:23 2025 : : : https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA435929.pdf : 你也承认内文就是来自翻译这个，但说的有点不清楚吧。 : 然後也不是直译与否问题，而是你就摘录个别段落出来。 : 分别是开头对闪电战定义，和结尾的结论。 : : 中间的东西支离破碎散掉，或加自己的料， : 然後你要批评他常识? : 我被迫在中间加料，因为它在作战阶层的部分写得不好；你可以下一原文，原文对作战阶层 的解释如下: creative use of distributed operations for the purpose of strategy that are characterized by an ensemble of deep maneuvers and distributed battles extended in space and time integrated in a campaign unified by a common aim in retention or denial of freedom of action punctuated by a period of inaction 作战阶层是分散作战的创造性运用，旨在实现战略目标，其特点是由一系列纵深机动和分 散战斗所组成，这些行动在空间与时间上延展，并整合於一个统一目标的战役之中——无 论是为了维持还是剥夺行动自由——并以阶段性的停滞为特徵。 鬼知道分散作战(distributed operations)是啥屁?然後又被迫去查啥叫分散作战。 Distributed Operations (DO) is a warfighting concept developed by the United States Marine Corps, primarily through their Warfighting Laboratory, in response to the evolving environment of the Global War on Terror. The emergence of adaptive enemies and a more complex operational landscape necessitated that conventional forces retain the ability to decentralize decision-making and distribute their forces effectively. The overarching goal of DO is to enhance a Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander's ability to employ tactical units across the depth and breadth of a non-linear battlespace. 所以我采用这个解释，这个解释也是我加在参考资料里的 https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/ Operational art is among the most noteworthy and controversial concepts in modern military thought. Operational art emerged out of the Soviet Union during the interwar era, and by the end of the twentieth century was an integral component of the doctrine of the major military powers. The theoretical construct of operational art combines characteristics of the tactical and strategic levels of war while providing a linkage to make tactical actions serve strategic ends. Operational art ensures this harmony of effort by translating abstract strategic goals into mechanical terms that commanders can then accomplish. In this way, operational art serves as the “ mediating, integrative synthesis standing between modern strategy and tactics ” and “ensures that the arrangement of tactical actions is not random, but more importantly, that the device that always and everywhere unites the arrangement of tactical actions is the pursuit of the strategic objective, not some other factor.”This article discusses the development of the concept of operational art in the Soviet Union, its eventual adoption by the U.S. Army, and contemporary debates about the utility of operational art. 作战阶层是现代军事思想中最重要且最具争议的概念之一。它起源於两次世界大战之间的 苏联，并在二十世纪末成为主要军事强权教义中的核心要素。作战阶层的理论架构结合了 战术与战略层面的特徵，并建立起一条连结，使战术行动能够服务於战略目标。作战阶层 透过将抽象的战略目标转化为指挥官可以执行的具体行动，确保行动的一致性。如此一来 ，作战阶层成为「介於现代战略与战术之间的中介、整合性综合体」，并且「确保战术行 动的安排不是随机的，更重要的是，始终统一战术行动安排的核心因素，是对战略目标的 追求，而非其他因素。」 然後你从原文的P25看到P30，你有看到任何闪电战如何跟作战阶层关联在一起的内容吗?没 有。 比如第28页: Mechanization increased the depth and speed at which lethal and resilient formations could operate, while the introduction of aircraft added a fourth physical dimension to warfare. These new combinations and dimensions required a commander to possess the gift of vision—the ability to holistically design and execute campaigns. The expansion of the battlespace necessitated that both the commander and his staff possess this operational vision. They must be able to creatively envision all actions within a theater of operations as a cohesive and coherent pattern of activity, extended across space and time, yet unified by a common objective. Similarly, the enemy must also possess an operational mindset, being trained, armed, equipped, structured, and commanded in a manner similar to the friendly forces. 机械化扩展了致命且持久作战编队的纵深和速度，而飞机的应用则为战争引入了第四个物 理维度。 这些新的组合与维度要求指挥官具备远见的能力，即全面设计和执行战役的能力。战场空 间的扩展使指挥官及其参谋人员必须拥有这种作战视野。他们需要能够创造性地将作战区 内的所有行动视为一个整体且连贯的活动模式，该模式在空间和时间上延伸，并以共同目 标为统一核心。 这一段话会让人觉得，2战诱发了作战阶层观念的诞生，这个观念是大错特错，德军不是在 2战才把作战阶层纳入他们的军事，而是大家都是11路公车的1860~1914年，德军就有作战 阶层的概念了。 : : 比如德军的共同愿景是啥，但原文语焉不详，对德军的共同愿景，也理解错误(德军的 : : 共同愿景并不只是建立装甲师)。 : : The critical analysis instituted by General Von Seeckt and weekly articles : in the Militär-Wochenblatt ultimately led to the conceptual creation of : the Panzer Division, a combined arms mechanized force capable of operating : with the Luftwaffe. : : 他并没有说德军愿景是建立装甲师，而是说导致了装甲师的诞生。 德军的共同愿景导致了装甲师的诞生，你不觉得这样的说法会让读者误解为德军的共同愿 景=诞生装甲师? : : General Hans Von Seeckt clearly articulated that the goal of the German Army : was a return to movement in hopes of avoiding the stagnant trench warfare of : World War I. : : 德军的共同愿景简单说就是，想透过运动战，避免陷入一战那种壕沟消耗战。 原文写冯.赛克特将军(General Hans Von Seeckt)的愿景是想透过运动战，避免陷入一战 那种壕沟消耗战，并不是写德军，请别扭曲原文。 就算原文不是这个意思，我也觉得他解释的不够清楚，所以我才加上德军的共同愿景= 在下一场战争中恢复机动战，避免消耗战。 : There was no way that Hitler’s Germany could defeat the force preponderance : of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. : This had been as true in 1914 as it was in 1941. : : 这段是独立的，但你自己加入和前段有所谓的"这导致"的关系。 : : 因为你看不懂他在说明的是，战略上跟作战层级上脱钩导致失败， : 还想要解释成是"战术没有执行得更完美，导致作战层级境界不够"的方向。 : : The degradation of the political-military relationship within Germany was an : inherent problem for blitzkrieg in that the link back to the strategic level : was severed once protracted war began. : : : : 如果使用得当，闪电战可以执行目标，同时允许战地指挥官灵活地利用当地情况和环境， : : 当政治驱动的战略寻求全面的征服和敌人的消耗时，《闪电战》被迫面对其创造者未曾预 : : 想到的局面，以一种不符合其预期作用的方式使用时，闪电战失败了，导致意想不到的後 : : 果。 : : 这个教训可以也应该适用於当代系统的规划者和领导者考虑的业务计划和他们的实现。闪 : : 电战作为一种作战系统提供了洞察灵活的价值学说、军事文化和作战计划。 : 所以他到最後说的已经不是你熟悉的那个战术上的闪电战， : 而是作为一个"作战层级"思考模式的。 : 本文的结论 Blitzkrieg was an effective operational system, designed and intended to wage short-duration wars against similarly structured and equipped enemies. However, it became ineffective when German military planners failed to adapt their doctrine and strategies to accommodate their government’s ever-increasing demands for employing military forces without a coherent overarching strategic concept. 闪电战是一种有效的作战体系，其设计和目的是针对结构和装备相似的敌人进行短期战争 。然而，当德国军事策划者未能调整其战略与战术，以适应政府不断增长的军事需求，而 这些需求缺乏一致的整体战略构想时，闪电战便变得无效。 请问这段跟我说的"随着战争的进行，德国军队没能调整他们的体制，无法改变其军事组 织 模式，也没有对他们的战争方式进行改革和现代化，这导致德国无法击败了英国、苏联和 美国的军事优势"有啥不同? 本文第33页是怎样讲的? The eventual failure of the Blitzkrieg system cannot be attributed to any single commander or event. Although many scholars argue that Hitler or the Russian campaigns explain its downfall, the root cause may lie in what Dö rner refers to as the Logic of Failure. 闪电战体系的最终失败，不能归因於某位特定指挥官或单一事件。尽管许多学者认为希特 勒或俄罗斯战役是其失败的原因，但问题的根源或许正如迪纳所说的「失败的逻辑」 -意思就是德国的整个体系没有随战争的长期化而调整。 本文的第30页是怎样讲的: Dr. Schneider’s last two conditions are characterized as strategic requirements: nations having the capacity to wage war and continuous mobilization. The subversive nature in which the German industrial preparations germane to this monograph. However, it cannot be contended that Germany readied socially, and militarily for war. 施耐德博士提出的最後两个条件被定义为战略需求：国家发动战争的能力以及持续动员的 能力。德国在《凡尔赛条约》下进行的工业准备，其隐蔽性与本专论无关。然而，不可否 认的是，德国在政治、社会和军事方面并未做好充分的战争准备。 不管是《德军的神话与现实》还是M.奇蒂诺在《国防军-节节败退，1943年失败的战争》 里都提到德军的机动战"已死"，比如《德军的神话与现实》提到当机动战失效时，德军无 法把它的体系转换成消耗战；M.奇蒂诺还提到德国战略的困境。 M.奇蒂诺在前言的第八页提到20世纪的工业化战争，是国家、政治制度与经济的较量，已 经不是军事文化间的单纯对决，所以你一直提到闪电战的失败来自作战阶层与战略脱钩， 这种纯军事面的看法，是否狭隘?我对闪电战的失败解释是否更为宽广? : Much of the value of this monograph lies with to those in leadership : positions that interface with the political dimension of war. : Utilized appropriately, blitzkrieg met operational objectives while allowing : field commanders the flexibility to exploit local situations and : circumstances. : : 你没翻的地方就是，该文自认为价值是在， : 要考虑到战争政治面的领导那个层级。 : : 所以是从那个层级往下看闪击战这概念能怎麽用， : 而不是从军队角度看我们怎麽执行完美的闪击战。 : : 我真的没看出此文在哪边跟政治面有关，也看不出它能对政战争的规划者有啥帮助。 --

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