我看的是英文版的《会战成瘾》（The Allure of Battle），我觉得helldog 你的解读和原文不太一样，似乎是在断章取义。你驳斥作者是如何偏颇无知， 你的见解是如何如何，但是却没有把作者原本的想法好好呈现出来。 举例来说，helldog你驳斥《会战成瘾》的作者，说他轻视德军的突破战术， 却不知道协约国的战术成功，是靠更多的资源，和侦察机反炮兵云云： : 比如他把stormtrooper战术批评的一文不值，却大大称赞英国的SS143手册 : (英国版的stormtrooper战术)，他大力称赞协约国坦克战术的成功， : 但资深一点的军迷都知道，一战的坦克工艺还不够成熟，自己抛锚的机率 : 还远高於被敌人击毁，协约国的战术成功与其说是坦克战术，还不如说 : 协约国有更多的炮兵、更多的炮弹、还有自己版本的渗透战术； : 炮击终於能摧毁德军前线，还能把弹幕滚动到摧毁德国炮兵， : 因为反炮兵技术有大突破；透过侦察机与对炮火火光的观察， : 找出敌军炮兵的位置，而德国人只能听音辨位； : 渗透战术让步兵能用较小的代价拿下占领阵地。 作者在《会战成瘾》第12章的原文提到： Heading into the final offensives of 1918, the British Army developed innovative small unit tactics that employed enhanced firepower with Lewis guns, rifle grenades and mortars. This allowed platoon-sized units to fight their way ahead, supported where possible by armored cars and lighter and faster Whippet tanks. ...... On the other hand, the Germans had an offensive system developed by, and informally named for, General Oskar von Hutier. His infiltration tactics were developed on the Eastern Front, then brought to the Western Front in 1918. They rejected Allied-style frontal assaults after long artillery preparation in favor of shorter bombardments and attacks led by Sturmtruppen (“assault troops”). Instead of rifles, elite lead infantry used close-assault weapons (grenades, flamethrowers, pistols) to infiltrate through, rather than try to storm over, opposing trenches. They bypassed strongpoints under orders to maintain momentum of attack, pressing deep into rear positions to sow panic and confusion, and to disrupt communications and delay reinforcement. They left heavy bunkers and machine gun nests behind for the regular infantry that followed to isolate and take care of. These assault tactics proved quite successful, but they were not enough. By 1918 everyone knew how to break through enemy trenches, whether by Hutier tactics, innovative British Army small unit tactics or French combined arms assaults with tanks and aircraft. The key difference was that Allied armies and generals now had the numbers and resources to make their technological innovations and tactical systems work on a war-winning and not just battle-winning scale. Germans did not. 到了1918年的最後攻势时，英国陆军开发了创新的小部队战术，使用 路易士机枪、枪榴弹和迫击炮，以增强火力。这样让排级单位能够在 装甲车和轻快的小灵犬坦克支援下向前推进。…… 另一方面，德国人拥有由奥斯卡·冯·胡蒂尔将军开发，并以他的名字 非正式命名的进攻系统。他的渗透战术是在东线发展出来，1918年被 引入西线。这些战术摒弃了像盟军在长时间炮火准备之下的正面攻击， 转而采用短促的炮击和突击部队（Sturmtruppen）率领的进攻。精锐 的步兵先锋进攻时，使用近战突击武器（手榴弹、火焰喷射器、手枪） 取代步枪，渗透敌方战壕，而非直接猛冲。他们奉命绕过坚固据点， 保持冲击力，深入後方阵地，制造恐慌和混乱，扰乱通讯，拖延增援。 他们放过重型掩体和机枪阵地，让随後跟进的一般步兵去孤立和解决。 事实证明，这些突击战术非常成功，却还是不够。 1918年时，每个人都知道如何突破敌人的战壕，无论是用胡蒂尔战术、 英国陆军创新的小部队战术，还是法国使用坦克和飞机进行联合攻击。 关键区别在於，协约国将领现在拥有足够的数量和资源，可以让他们 的技术创新和战术系统在战争中发挥作用，而不仅仅是在战斗中取胜。 德国人却没有。 可以看到作者不像helldog你所说的「把stormtrooper战术批评的一文不值」， 反而称赞『这些突击战术非常成功』，也没有「大大称赞英国的SS143手册」。 作者持平地叙述了各国发展的突破战术，接着强调，突破战术的最终关键， 还是在於协约国比起德国拥有更多的数量和资源。 实际上，作者这一小节的重点是在讨论，德国於1917年时的军工产能和技术 远远落後於协约国，在这样的情势下，双方相对应的战术发展与战略变化， 协约国最终以消耗战取得胜利，以及後续造成的种种影响。 作者也再三提到，一战时空中力量的重要作用，是用侦察机为炮兵寻找目标 和引导炮击： Then it was realized that scout planes had advantages of distant observation unequaled in the history of war as they followed the retreating German armies, told Allied generals exactly where they were, and guided in attacks and artillery. ...... Fixed-wing scouts soon became critical to all sides, their cameras the keen eyes of the big guns, of mapmakers and operations planners. ...... French air power, on the other hand, played a key role. Once air superiority was established over the battlefield the accuracy of massed artillery (nearly 3,000 French guns by June) markedly improved. ...... In contrast, German corps lacked enough spotter aircraft to properly coordinate even counterbattery fire, ...... ...... while air superiority gave them advantages of target-spotting and long-range indirect artillery fire. ...... 接着人们意识到，侦察机的远距离观察优势，在战争史上无可比拟，他们 可以追踪撤退的德军，告知协约国将领敌人的确切位置，并引导攻击和炮击。 ……定翼侦察机很快成为各方面的关键，他们的相机成为重炮、地图制作、 作战规画的敏锐目光。…… 另一方面，法军的空中力量则发挥了关键作用。当战场上拥有空优时， 法军大规模火炮（到6月时有将近3千门）的精准度就会显着提升。…… 相较之下，德军缺乏足够的侦察机，甚至无法妥善协调反炮兵火力…… ……空优为他们提供了定位目标修正弹着，与长程间接炮击的优势。…… 我觉得helldog你引用资料时，不应该老是用这种断章取义的态度。 --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc), 来自: 114.44.48.57 (台湾) ※ 文章网址: https://webptt.com/cn.aspx?n=bbs/Warfare/M.1714023269.A.CD9.html ※ 编辑: carsen (114.44.48.57 台湾), 04/25/2024 14:05:34 你一堆断章取义，没有先把作者的论述好好说明，却只顾着讲你自己想讲的。 举另一个例子，作者以数千字篇幅，讨论二战德军接受了纳粹的种族主义， 造成许多残酷行为，论述德军这样极端的军事文化，影响纳粹德国的失败： https://bit.ly/4aQUx6R 然而helldog你却把作者的论述用两句话带过，调头大谈特谈日军占领政策、 德国军事教育，强调作者态度偏颇。但是你没有针对作者的论述好好讨论。 关於默兹河的桥梁是在第12章。作者在这一章的讨论重点是一战的消耗战； 这一章的主要核心是凡尔登战役的惨烈消耗，作者探讨了德军与法军在此的 长期大规模消耗战，对於双方整体情势的剧烈影响。许多内容是叙述战役中 火炮的杀伤威力。而作者在这一章提到飞机效用的4个段落中，全部都提到了 飞机指引火炮的优势，包含默兹河桥梁的段落也是如此： The key to French success at Verdun was resupply. Fresh corps, food and shells, fodder and horses, everything traveled the last 50 miles on a single-track railway or by light trucks on a narrow second-class road, though one quickly widened to handle more traffic. The internal combustion engine came of age and went to war at Verdun as trucks rolled night and day. At the height of the effort, 6,000 trucks and cars arrived at the terminus every 24 hours, or one every 14 seconds. Discipline was ruthlessly enforced on a no-stops lifeline French called the Voie Sacrée—the Holy Road. For ten months it was the pulsing jugular of the French Army: cut it and France would bleed to death. German air power proved not up to the job, as not one bridge over the Meuse was bombed, and the trucks and trains rolled on. Verdun was all about logistics. The Germans missed the point, and the bridges. French air power, on the other hand, played a key role. Once air superiority was established over the battlefield the accuracy of massed artillery (nearly 3,000 French guns by June) markedly improved. ...... 法军在凡尔登的成功关键在於补给。增援部队、粮食、炮弹、草料、马匹， 所有的物资都要靠单线铁路，或狭窄公路上的轻型卡车运送50英里到前线， 然而这条公路很快就拓宽，加强车辆通行能力。卡车不停地昼夜行驶，在 凡尔登战场展现内燃机引擎的战争效用。到了战役最激烈的关头，每天有 6千辆卡车与汽车抵达，每14秒就有1辆。交通纪律无情地执行，让法国人 称为「神圣之路」的生命线毫不停歇。长达十个月，这一直是法军的命脉： 切断它，法军会流血至死。但德军空中力量无法达成任务，没有任何一座 默兹河的桥梁被炸毁，卡车与汽车持续运补。凡尔登战役的关键在於後勤， 德国人错过这一点，也错过了桥梁。另一方面，法军的空中力量则发挥了 关键作用。当战场上拥有空优时，法军大规模火炮（到6月时有将近3千门） 的精准度就会显着提升。…… 关於默兹河桥梁的段落，作者是引述自Paul Jankowski的《Verdun》，在该书 的第77页，Jankowski讨论当时的军事空中力量尚处於起步阶段，还无法大力 发展战略轰炸，因而德军对於凡尔登的後勤攻击不足。 No one knew how to employ their fledgling air power or their lumbering long-range artillery to close down a 50-mile roadway or destroy the bridges across the Meuse. Shells landed on the road, and trucks were hit, but the 380 mm guns were inadequate in number and range to interdict such intense traffic on such a long stretch. Along its ditches over 8,000 men worked day and night to maintain it. German airships and fighter squadrons bombed the stations and cut the rail line and damaged the roads out of Verdun. But visibility was too poor and the loss rate too high to deflect them from the primary tasks of reconnaissance, artillery observation, and control of the air, and to allow the nascent science of strategic bombing to take flight. Of the 34 bridges over the Meuse, not one fell to bombs from the air. No one yet knew, in short, how to attack the enemy’s logistics instead of his defenses. 没有人知道该如何运用他们刚刚起步的空中力量，或是笨重的长程炮火 来封锁50英里的道路，或摧毁默兹河上的桥梁。炮弹击中了道路和卡车， 但380公厘火炮的数量和射程不足，无法阻断如此密集的交通。8千多人 日夜不停地工作，沿着壕沟来维修道路。德国飞艇和战斗机轰炸了车站， 切断了铁路，并破坏凡尔登的道路。但能见度太差，以及损失率太高， 他们忙於侦察、炮兵观测、争夺制空权，无法积极发展新兴的战略轰炸。 在默兹河上的34座桥梁，没有任何一座是被空袭炸弹摧毁。简而言之， 还没有人知道该如何攻击敌人的後勤而不是防御。 於凡尔登战役时，德军或许应该运用更多空中力量来攻击後勤，这样的检讨， 参考Alistair Horne《The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916》第17章，可回溯 一战时担任无线电员与飞行员，参加了凡尔登战役的Hans Ritter，於1926年 出版的《空战》（Der luftkrieg），其中提到德军当时拥有足够的轰炸机， 但却重复运用在炮兵火炮已经有效攻击的铁路枢纽上，而没有更加重视攻击 「神圣之路」，一举削弱法军的後勤。 What disruption carefully organised and constantly renewed bomb attacks would have wreaked upon this communications’ artery (i.e. the Voie Sacrée), crammed to the most extreme limits of its capacity, requires no details. Even after the first attacks numerous destroyed, burning vehicles would have blocked the road. Exploding munitions’ transports would have increased the confusion. Craters of heavy bombs would have cut the road in many places. A chaos that could not be disentangled must have arisen…. He goes on to point out that the Germans had standing by three squadrons of heavy ‘C-Machines’, seventy-two in number, each capable of dropping a 200-lb. bomb, which could reach their targets after half an hour’s flying. Thus twenty tons of explosives could have been rained down on the Voie Sacrée each day, not to mention demoralising night attacks. But for some extraordinary reason these bombers were wasted on attacking rail junctions that were already under effective artillery bombardment. 〔Hans Ritter〕这条已经过度饱和的交通要道（即「神圣之路」） 若遭到精心组织并持续轰炸的破坏，其严重程度不必赘述。首波袭击後， 大量被摧毁的燃烧车辆将会堵住道路，运送的弹药爆炸时会加剧混乱， 重型炸弹的弹坑会切断多处道路，造成无法收拾的混乱。…… 他又指出，德军有三个「Rumpler C」的中队，共有72架，每架能搭载一枚 200磅的炸弹，半小时就能飞到目标上空。这样一来，每天可以对神圣之路 　　投下20吨的炸弹，还能夜间袭击，让敌军士气更低落。但出於某些原因， 　　这些轰炸机被浪费在攻击已遭到有效炮击的铁路交会枢纽上。 ※ 编辑: carsen (114.44.48.57 台湾), 04/25/2024 22:37:59