※ 引述《cobrachen (mustang)》之铭言： : ※ 引述《tomasvon (lvye)》之铭言： : : 笑﹐大陆这边的人都已经根据本世纪出版的日本机动部队 : : 作战记录英文版在踢爆渊田的牛皮了﹐台湾这边还抱着被 : : 渊田给蒙了的普兰奇那本上世纪80年代那本书当宝﹐还信 : : 口开河大陆这边只知道美军的情报优势? 大陆上世纪关於 : : 中途岛出书不下10本﹐渊田和普兰奇的书都在80年代就翻 : : 译出版﹐不过这些书统统都被渊田给蒙了^_^ : : P.S.以上都是我友DDG的论述﹐他有闲钱和那个劲头去买日本 : : 机动部队作战记录英文版来读﹐我可没有:P : 讲了半天根本就是拾人牙慧之外，连书名是啥都不知道，还要乱引别人当背书。 : 我今天问过DDG，这个所谓的英文版就是我提过的Shattered Sword，在网路上 : 的评价很高，被认为是当大家觉得中途岛已经不会有新的分析和资料出来的时候， : 两位作者居然有如此的成绩。 说真的我还真不知道有这本书 有一阵子没关心这些太平洋战史的研究了（又是模型军事学派的缺点） t老大提到，那也很好，上亚马逊订书去 不过感谢万能的网路，总是找的到书评的 我们来看看这本书大概讲了什麽 （p.s，小弟前一篇文大概就是『市面上目前对中途岛战役的解释』之大全，那这本书 当然是要翻一些案，才有他卖的价值，的确跟一般人理解的有所不同） ok开始了 首先，我引用三流网文时习惯附连结 http://mcsmith.blogs.com/general/2006/09/shattered_sword.html 又，小弟全民英检中高级居然复试倒在写作那一部份， 如有理解错误，请先进们指正， In his 1951 book on the battle, Fuchida painted the picture, up to now the accepted version of the Japanese side - of an essentially flawless IJN carrier strike force that was literally moments away from destroying the outnumbered and outgunned U.S. carriers when the errors of its commanders came home to roost and it was destroyed by U.S. dive bombers that miraculously found the ships at precisely the right moment, with flight decks loaded with fully fueled and armed aircraft. It's a great story, but like many great stories, it turns out that's all thatit is. The truth was quite different and far more complex, ----- 大意翻译：渊田美津雄画虎烂， SBD临空时一二航战并不是满甲板的满油满弹战机而且正在准备起飞打击老美 实情没那麽简单而且也复杂的多 （小r按：这里打了那个告诉华特劳得他把炸弹扔进飞机群中的某SBD飞官一个巴掌） and as the authors point out at the beginning, just about the only thing miraculous about the battle was that the U.S. carriers achieved as much as they did given how badly two of the three carriers managed their strikes that morning. (Put it this way - the U.S. carriers had nine attack squadrons between them. Holding one in reserve, they launched eight against the Japanese carriers that morning. The three torpedo squadrons had virtually no chance of scoring any hits due to bad planes and bad torpedoes, leaving five dive bomber squadrons. Two never saw the enemy, leaving three. Two of those also took a bad heading and only by the sheerest luck did they find the carriers, by running across an escorting ship and following it. Only one single squadron out of eight did what it was supposed to do. A better illustration of how it's more important to be lucky than smart would be hard to find). 以上这段陈述了美军有多狗运，其成果与他们实际的战术表现相比有多『奇蹟』 （也是这篇三流网文作者认为，原书作者认定在本战役中唯一的奇蹟） 盖对南云发动攻击的八个中队，扣掉因为鱼雷跟飞机太烂本质上不可能成攻的三 个鱼雷机中队，再扣掉两个根本没看到敌人的中队，事实上干事的只有三个中队 然而其中的两个中队又仅仅是因为狗运才找到日舰，换言之八个中队出去只有一个 中队完全作到了他们该作的事 （r按：讽刺的是，那是打萨拉托加号上面调到约克镇号的中队，晕........） （中间略过一段...） Because the latter is really what this book is about. Eschewing the traditional analysis of IJN carrier operations based on the assumption that they were the same as U.S., the authors have reconstructed how Japanese carriers fought, and discovered in the process of computer analysis of hangar space and elevator cycles (surprisingly, a hell of a lot depending on the inadequate number of bomb carts in the hangars - a good illustration of the old saw that for the want of a nail the kingdom was lost) in conjunction with Japanese carrier operation doctrine (much of which apparently was not available in English until the 1990's) that （紧接後文） 以上大致是在说， 之前对日本航舰作业的描述只是依照猜测他们会跟美国人一样 阿这两位作者翻了原始教范加上用电脑模拟机库空间等等来还原日军的航舰作业流程 於是发现..... Fuchida's story that the carriers were ready to launch at the time the U.S. dive bombers appeared simply wasn't true. 於是发现渊田在虎烂 Their planes were still in the hangar decks, and not on the flight deck, and were at least 45 minutes away from being ready to launch. 攻击机群不是在甲板上（r按：咦？那个说甲板上有很多飞机的是哪个开SBD的混蛋？） 而是在机库甲板上（r：喔，头上多了一层薄甲板），而且最少要45分钟以後才能起飞 干老美 The carriers were constantly landing and lauching their fighter cover, and could not even begin arranging aircraft on deck and warming them up for a strike until the U.S. air attacks stopped. 因为小日本当时被老美的空袭烦的要死，正在用力的起飞以及换防CAP， 没办法搞空袭准备 This then provides the real reason why the sacrifices of Torpedo 8 and Torpedo 6 mattered - it wasn't that they pulled the fighter cover down so that the dive bombers could get through, as the popular view has it. Torpedo 8 attacked an hour before the SBDs even got there, a fact that has been conveniently overlooked, and Torpedo 3 actually attacked the Hiryu after the dive bombers did 这才是鱼8跟鱼6真正的贡献--把小日本烦死--而非把屏卫零战引到低空让SBD闯空 （r按：不过SBD没碰到任何屏卫零战是事实不是？），盖事实上印地安人在SBD群到达前 一小时就去送死了，而鱼3事实上是在SBD攻击後才开搞 (didn't do much good - two of the Japanese carriers were actually faster than the American torpedoes - although the effect on Japanese flight operations of constantly having to run away from the torpedo planes to maximize their fighters' ability to shoot them down is an important theme in the morning's battle). 为啥是送死？因为有两条鬼子航舰事实上比美帝鱼雷快 （r：虽然早就知道了，但还是很想说：码的，这啥鸟鱼雷） It was that they kept the carriers from even beginning to prepare to launch a strike against the U.S. task forces. 是这些送死鱼雷机让日本人无法安排空袭 （r曰：一小时不够用就对了） When the dive bombers got there Nagumo was nowhere near being ready to launch, 总之渊田是在画孟加拉虎烂 and the attack planes, while fueled, were not on the flight deck, where their explosions would have been largely vented into the air. 而且在机库甲板上的满油弹战机反而比在甲板上被炸造成更大的损害 （r：喔，所以还是那些满油弹战机被炸搞出来的把戏） They were stuffed in the two levels of hangar deck cheek by jowl, where the explosions would cause far more damage. For example, the Kaga was essentially blown apart from the flight deck to her original battleship main deck some 50 feet below over half her length (the book includes an artist's rendering of this horrific sight, which no other book has ever noted). 例如，加贺号的结构，打飞行甲板到它原本战巡设计本体的甲板被炸飞掉了一大块 这本新书独家、独步全球的画出了那可怖场景的现场示意图 And the Akagi was burned out as a result of a single bomb hit by Dick Best (describing him as a "deadeye" was another terrific piece of wordsmithing. I heard Best in 1992 at the same Nimitz symposium and he was crystal clear on what he saw. He reminded people that he remembered that day very well - due to a lung injury he sustained in that afternoon's attack, he never flew in combat again.) 迪克贝斯特的炸弹则让赤城号烧个痛快，贝老大清楚的记着那一天 （再删一部份） The same painstaking analysis debunks other parts of the accepted tale. For example, that the Tone's scout aircraft was late actually didn't affect anything - if it had launched on time, it would still have missed the U.S. carriers - they were on another plane's search leg, 脱奶号的侦察机有没迟起飞根本无关紧要，因为美帝航母不在那架飞机预定搜索的范围内 ---在另外一架飞机的责任区内。 and even if it had sighted the U.S. carriers much sooner, it wouldn't have done Nagumo any good. He could not attack until the attacks from Midway and the U.S. carrier planes stopped, and - more importantly - unless he could attack the U.S. carriers before they launched the fatal strike, it really didn't matter. 而且即便可以早点看到老美航母，南云也不能在没收回中途岛打击机队跟老美航母的苍蝇 停止嗡嗡嗡之前发动攻击，而且除非南云可以在老美航母打击群起飞之前 就先炸到老美航母，不然就没啥差别 （r按：这点，如果原书是这样写，则似乎应该有所保留，盖老美即便在南云机群到达前 起飞，首先南云的船就空了，怎会没差别？再者，起飞跟可以如史实般打击是两 回事，把老美飞行员想成跟一二航战一样未免托大） For this reason, the real flaw was - well, first of all, not launching an adequate search and launching it in time to locate any naval targets early enough to hit them before they could launch, but specifically that a Japanese search aircraft did apparently overfly the U.S. fleet in time to have allowed Nagumo to hit them before they launched. For some reason - the authors claim sloppy search procedures - it just didn't see them, although the pilot and observer had a wonderful morning traipsing through the cloud cover before returning to their cruiser. 所以真正的问题是小日本的侦察机队无能，数量不够，也没即时给南云任何海上目标 的资讯，而且很诡异的即便真的有那麽一架即时的飞过老美航母头上也没看到 （r按，这部分跟以前提供的事实与观点一致，日本侦察机的确比较早的就发现美舰 但是很後面才报告有条航母跟着） The book also explains that, contrary to the accepted wisdom, the Japanese carrier fleet was hardly the crack unit that is portrayed. Although well- trained, it was exhausted from six months of war, and needed time to repair and refit. Incredibly, it was also short on aircraft - the carriers sailed with approximately 80% of the aircraft complement, due in part to the shortage of carrier planes. Not shortage as Americans understood it, meaning that there were competing demands for the thousands of planes rolling out of the plants, but shortages as in the Japanese aircraft industry wasn't making them anymore - only a few dozen replacement carrier bombers were made in all of 1942 as the plants retooled to make different planes. 此外，作者陈述当时的一二航战，虽然训练精良但是已经因为过去六个月的征战没力了 因为飞机工厂的问题（改去生产别的飞机），连舰爆的数量都不够，整体来说只有应备机 的80趴机数，这点物资充裕的老美无法想像 (r按：大概是补充机不够吧，对中途岛发动空袭的数量很正常阿，跟珍珠港一样 至於是不是没力的问题，山口多闻手下的表现可以说明一点事） Another interesting point is the conditions under which Nagumo had to make his decision on the tiny bridge of the Akagi. Unlike the American carriers, which had separate bridges for the captain and the flag in their relatively spacious islands, the Japanese crammed one to two dozen people into one tiny (about 12 x 15) bridge, with the admiral and his staff shoulder to shoulder on one side, and the captain, his staff, and various enlisted on the other. Under these cramped conditions, with no privacy, it would have been unlikely that anyone would have offered Nagumo a frank disagreement in front of that crowd. Plus the fact that that ship was under continuous air attack all morning, including an almost direct hit by B-26 (not its bomb - the entire plane nearly took the island out as it crashed). No other book has ever remarked on these conditions 作者认为赤城号的小舰桥也影响南云的决策。南云的staff得跟青木的手下挤在一起， 而这种环境使作者认为南云将得不到任何不同的意见，此外包含一架差点直接往赤城 号舰桥撞上去的B-26在内，赤城号整个早上都在被老美搞。 没有别的书提到这个环境条件 r曰：这部分我以为是作者过太爽。去日本搭地铁看看就知道日本人早就习惯一伙子人 挤在一个小地方，恁爸我小学就跟着我留学东大的舅舅搭过东京地铁，那个左右 转头都看到穿着西装裤的屁股在你眼前5公分的场景真是令人难忘。 而且不管挤不挤，日本人基本上不会顶撞上司。 又，出主意的是S3源田实。 我看别的书不提到这个是有原因的 The authors also put new light on the events after the bombing of Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. Conventional wisdom is that Nagumo was in shock, and the admiral commanding the remaining carrier, Yamaguchi Tamon charged to the attack, leaving Nagumo behind. In fact, Yamaguchi trailed behind Nagumo, who was acting aggressively to engage the Americans in a surface battle (his expertise was, after all, in torpedo engagements using destroyers). 此外作者也点出：一般认为南云被搞了三条航舰之後意志消沈， 山口多闻不管它迳自发动攻击。 但事实上，当时南云正在积极的想发动传统的海战（这才是他的专长） r按：这点跟之前显露的事实并没有很大差距不是吗？南云的确有这样做 心态描述上的差别而已 Surprisingly, it was the Japanese that was using carriers to bring about a surface action - Nagumo allowed the Hiryu to unnecessarily sacrifice itself by charging the U.S. fleet, when she could, and should, have pounded the Yorktown and then turned for home, preserving at least one of the IJN's precious and irreplacable flight decks. Instead, Nagumo ordered the three (soon to be four) burning carriers scuttled - something the records were later redacted to delete references to - to free up the torpedo tubes on the escorting destroyers for a night engagement. Nagumo's action were bold and correct - if Spruance had blundered by continuing to close the distance with the Japanese fleet that night - as Yamaguchi did that afternoon, costing him his carrier, and as some historians claim Spruance should have done - Nagumo would have had the night surface engagement the Japanese Navy had trained for. That they were unmatched in their night-fighting skills was to be shown a couple of months later at Guadalcanal. 这段怪怪的 不过大意大概是南云允许了飞龙号去单挑美国航母，反而让飞龙号作了没必要的牺牲 不过南云下令凿沈3（很快变成4）条航母，集中水雷战队准备夜战史普劳的动作是勇敢而 且正确的---如果史普劳继续往西追击的话（如一些美国历史学家建议），因为美军在夜 战方面半点不如日本人，瓜岛海战的结果说明一切 If Spruance kept his distance, his planes would finish off the burned out wrecks the next day (as they did two days later with the cruiser Mikuma which was accompanying its crippled sister Mogami). Akagi and Hiryu probably were not fatally damaged and could have been towed back to Japan - but not under the American air attacks that were sure to come. 不过史实上史普劳往东跑了 所以三隈号完蛋了，也许没有严重受伤的赤城号跟飞龙号也拖不回去了 （亦即：南云的水雷战队计画在美军站着远远的放飞机打的状况下无法实现） A few other points. First of all, it turns out that a Japanese invasion of Midway would probably have failed due to Japan's lack of a good amphibious assault capability. For that matter, Japan could never have seriously threatened an invasion of Hawaii for the same reason, plus that it would have been numerically overwhelmed by the U.S. military on the islands, and it could never have achieved the sort of air superiority that such an invasion required - as events turned out, it really couldn't do so over Midway either. 又，作者指出因为日本欠缺两栖作战能力，可能根本无法威胁中途岛守军 ，更不用提夏威夷，甚至会被数量上占优势的美国陆军守军踢回海里去，在夏威夷 上空也无法达成空优，而且因为史实上发生的事，在中途岛上空也不可能拿到空优 （r按，如果不是本文作者对原书作者的转述有误，这里的说法我就觉得有待商榷 有点结果论的感觉。 对陆军作战的方面可能是，但对空优争夺的方面...？？ 夏威夷大概是太大块了，但中途岛如果一切照日本计画进行，真拿不下来吗？） Its carriers were a raiding force, not an occupying one, and they had nowhere near the strength or logistical capabilities to stand offshore and support landings in the same way that the U.S. carriers later did off of, say, Okinawa in 1945. 日本的航舰是攻击兵力，不是可以搞占领的，没有任何合理的能力支援海外登陆作战 以及发动如同冲绳战役那种规模的登陆战 （r按，感想如上面那一段，老觉得这作者忘了面临头上有飞机扫的地面攻势感觉如何 ........这两位作者是美国人吗？是的话就不意外了） More importantly, however, the authors put a whole new light on Nimitz' decision to commit the three carriers he had to the battle. They were not actually defending Midway at all - they were there to seek out and destroy the Japanese carriers. Had they been unable to do so, he would simply have recalled the surviving ones and let the Japanese have the island (if they could take it). For a nation with little (soon to be virtually none due to U.S. submarine warfare) merchant capability, Midway would have been a tremendous problem to keep supplied, and would have essentially been a convenient place for U.S. air power and submarines from Hawaii to destroy Japanese planes and supplies. The Japanese would have been forced to convoy massive supplies all the way from Japan to what would quickly become a beleagered garrison well within range of U.S. planes from Hawaii, and Nimitz could sink their convoys and raid their airstrip at his leisure until he decided to retake the island. Viewed in this light, losing Midway was in fact no net loss to the Americans - it would have provided an exceedingly efficient way to destroy Japan's already limited war material. With three carriers and an unsinkable air base, Nimitz was spoiling for a fight with the Japanese fleet. He could afford to lose the base and even his forces. The Japanese, on the other hand, could not. Why? Because of the nature of the war the Japanese had gotten into. 这段，总之就是在陈述尼米兹的心机重。作者认为尼米兹根本不是在防御中途岛， 而是在找机会干掉日本航母（r按：我想，山本五十六真正的目的也不是拿下中途岛） 如果用手上三条航舰干到这件事那很好，干不到，那就生还者招一招回夏威夷去等着用 潜艇加飞机打日本维持中途岛占领的补给线即可。 换言之：尼米兹可以承受扔掉中途岛跟舰队的损失，日本不能。为什麽？因为最後一句。 (r按，这个令人看的头痛。挖咧合着尼米兹往中途岛上面砸的援军盖的防线，作者是都 不打算考虑，还是认为尼老大准备随便的把这个岛牺牲掉？再没登陆能力，这个岛 在重炮跟飞机的夹击下又能撑多久？还是作者根本认为尼老大是打算送这些守军 去死？因为我没看到他有计画要把中途岛守军也在大局不利时落回珍珠港去耶。 如果尼米兹原先计画是这样的话，则中途岛根本不该加以防御。派飞机上去以其为 基地协助航母作战得了，顶多派派机场守卫的兵力，挖坑道埋沙包的干嘛？还让约 翰福特上去呢！不怕这些人万一海战不利一家伙全落入日本人手里？要撤退有撤那 麽快吗？说实在这不像一个美国人会有的算盘........ 亦即，当然很有可能这交战双方都意不在中途岛，但是按照史实上尼米兹对中途岛 的经营，实在也不像他丢不丢这个岛都无所谓，随时准备放弃的样子，真要这样的 话，在上面的地面部队兵力应该越少越好，够作机场警卫足矣，没必要又陆战队又 特战部队还放鱼雷艇的的摆，即便原来就有，如果计画是如此也该先撤一点走了。 而且，1942/6尼米兹真的有本钱连舰队都丢掉吗？50年後看当然是没差， 换到1942/6去看，可能会严重不少吧.......................................） 下面的个人认为就不是太相关了 反正t兄想提的上面大概都提过了 至於以上这些会不会根本的颠覆史实呢，大家讨论讨论 小弟自己的感想是，（根据以上简介作者的转述的话） 日本海军在中途岛的失败原因，其实还是跟之前认定的差不多 1.侦查不力 相较於美军航舰甚至直接编了一个VS中队（舰载侦察机中队） 日军在此役中只依靠了利根级重巡的侦察机 虽然利根级那个空出来的後甲板就是来干这个事的，但那些挂浮桶的东西跟SBD比.... （p.s，SBD者，三个字母分别代表『侦查/斥堠』-『轰炸』-『道格拉斯』也..... 这是那年代到越战前一段时间内美国海军机的命名方式 ） 等到日军终於正经的看这件事时，手下却已经没有好的飞行员了 下场就是1944/6的火鸡节 2.舰载机攻击波在整备时被美军炸了个痛快 本书只是告诉英语系的读者，被炸个痛快的时间没有那麽戏剧化 也许有命运的60、50分钟，但绝对没有所谓『命运的5分钟』 会造成这一点的原因跟前面那个原因脱不了关系 但这本书，以及SIG先进提到的是以往对日军航舰操作的误解 之前的英语出版品都是以美军的方式去理解日本的操作， 亦即，要起飞攻击波时全部攻击波机队都会在舰尾排排站 但日军则习惯放在机库里，要起飞才快速的用升降机运上甲板去 当然如前所述，美军攻击机飞行员的证词如是 不止SBD的飞官， 印地安人的手下唯一回来那个也说他飞过飞行甲板的时候看见一大堆飞机 以及周边的支援装具，然後他就被打下来了 搭配两波的攻击时间来看，则最起码日军在这一小时多的时间内都是满甲板的飞机 当然，照本书的说法的话，那应该都是屏卫的零战在换防干嘛的 跟这个议题有关的就是山口多闻那个率先出击的建议 t兄说这是莽夫行为，说渊田的说法是在为他『塑造形像』 well，我不知道原书中有没这麽写 但我没这个感觉 SIG先进提供的那个中文讨论区有人认为作为二航战的指挥官，山口的建议问题不大 但也有人称：即便依照山口多闻的建议，且山口的舰爆还真的能 在美机到达之前先离舰 .....日军甚至可能败的更惨 其中一个原因是因为：那些舰爆会在没战斗机掩护的状况下出击 然後依照史实上有战斗机掩护的飞龙号反击战果去三下五除二，认定战果不会更好 well，首先史实上第一波舰爆的零战屏卫只剩下重松大尉等4架 （因为之前想偷鸡干老美返航机被打伤两架先回家了，一开始就只有这六架） 面对CV-5的12架CAP，外带後来TF-16支援的几架，差不多等於没有 但史实上18架舰爆的战果是那样 第二波舰攻的鱼雷攻势亦然 美军CAP照样有，舰攻的兵力还更单薄，结果...... 总之，把当时的日本海航跟美国同行想成一样的水准是不大正确的 3.美军大大的走狗运 要问我的话这才是关键，没有美军的狗运的话，以上日军的问题都不再会是问题 设想一下，如果没点狗运，真正能发动有意义进攻的美军就只剩一个SBD中队 那在当下不管日本鬼被鱼雷机烦的多厉害，就顶多能挂掉一条日本航舰 而不管剩下三条还要多久才可以发动攻势，总之会比TF-16/17的机群回去再挂弹要快 然後.....搞不好满船的整备中飞机被炸的就会变成美国那一方 以当时日本海航与美国同行的水准差距，几乎可以确定美军是全灭的局 当下战损就会由史实上的美0日4变成美3日1 : 过去因为资料的关系，大家都被渊田的输给误导，我引DDG给我的话： : [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 怎么说呢 : [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 对于一些基本情况 : [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 当然不会推翻 : [12:10] DDG-Pickett Charge: 但是关于南云和山口的评价 : [12:10] DDG-Pickett Charge: 主要是战役的复盘 : 所以，过去的书和资料有误解被误导，你也是包括在内，只不过今天DDG先拿到SS， : 看过内容之後，让你来爆料？不是你自己看的，也不是你自己去找的，你凭哪点 : 认为别人看的旧又缺？在这本书出来之前，你们那些中译本或者是自己写的东西有没有 : 问题你自己心知肚明，但是也不敢讲。DDG看了也没一副你这种样子。 : 你凭哪点说人家看的不够？讲德国空军的时候你看书了？ --

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