课程名称︰个体经济学 课程性质︰财金系必修 课程教师︰吴玉莹 开课学院：管理学院 开课系所︰财金系 考试日期（年月日）︰101/01/09 考试时限（分钟）：180分钟 是否需发放奖励金： （如未明确表示，则不予发放） 试题 : Q1 and Q2 are required. And please pick 3 questions from Q3 to Q6. Note that there WON'T be extra score even if you aswer all the qusetions. 1. (25%)Nobita and Ginambi one day discover a stream taht flows wine instead of water in the deep mountain. They decide to bottle the wine and sell it. Because of Doraemon's help, the marginal cost of bottling wine and the fixed cost to bottle are both zero. The market demand for bottled wine is given as: P = 90 - 0.25Q where Q is the total quantity of bottled wine produced and P is the market price of bottled wine. a. (5%)What is the economically efficient price and quantity of bottled wine? b. (5%)If Nobita and Giambi collude with one another and produce the profit- maximizing monopoly quantity of bottled wine, how much bottled wine will they produce and charge for? c. (5%)Suppose that Nobita and Giambi decide not to cooperate and act as Cournot duopolists, what are the reaction functions for Nobita and Giambi? What are the output and price level of Nobita's bottled wine when the long run equilibrium is reached? (Suppose the math is not a problem for him...) d. (10%)Suppose that after Nobita and Giambi have arrived at their long run equilibrium as Cournot duopolists, another individual, Suneo, disco- vers the streams. Suneo, who sell no wine before its time, decides to bottle wine as well. There are now three Cournot firms producing at once. In the long run, what level of output will Nobita produce? 2. (15%) Sheryl operates a ceramics factory in Yingge and sell her products to retailers around the country. Sheryl sells the ceramics for $50 each, a price the firm considers given. Sheryl's production function is given by the expression: Q = 600L - 5L^2 where Q = number of figurines per day, and L = number of skilled workers per day. a. (5%)Write an expression for the firm's marginal revenue product. b. (5%)Sheryl currently pays $1500 per day for each of its skilled workers. How many skilled workers shouled the firm employ? c. (5%)Sheryl's workers are highly skilled artisans with a great deal of job mobility. The firm's managers fear that they must increase the workers' total compensation to $2,000 per day to remain competitive. What impa- ct would the wage increase have upon the firm's employment? 3. (20%)Xialmi and HTC are in a local market competing for the sale of new smartphone. Each firm must decide if they will offer a warranty or not. The pay-offs of each firm's strategy is a function of their competitor as well. The pay-off matrix is presented below. HTC Offer warranty No Warranty _____________________________________ | -5 -10 | Offer Warranty | -5 0 | Xiaomi |_____________________________________| | 10 0 | No Warranty | -10 0 | |_____________________________________| a. (5%)Does either player have a dominant straegy? If yes, what is the strategy? b. (5%)Does the game have any Nash equilibrium? If yes, what's that? c. (5%)Should the players use a mixed strategy? d. (5%)Is there any possible to change this outcome? 4. (20%) A certain firm can hire two types of workers: Group H workers who have high productivity and Group L workers with low productivity. Group H workers will add $27,500 to the firm's revenues per year, while Group L workers will increase the firm's revenues by $15,000 per year. The firm's managers expect workers to be employed for eight years. The differences in the workers' productivity levels are reflected in their costs of education per year. Each year of education costs an H worker $12,500, while each year costs a L worker $25,000. Answer the following questions according to the scenario mentioned above. a. (5%) Under competitive conditions, how much would H and L workers earn? b. (5%) Assuming that the firm is unable to distinguish H from L workers and that it is equally likely that a worker is of either type, what pay scale will the firm offer? c. (10%)Suppose that the firm decides to use education as a market signaling device to distinguish H workers from L workers. What education requirement could the firm set to let H workers be educated but L workers not? 5. (20%)Assume that the owners of a firm know that the firm's profits will depend upon two parameters: (1) how hard the managers work, and (2) the state of the economy. For simplicity, assume that the managers can exert either High or Low level of effort and that the economy can be either favorable or unfavorable. The profits under various situations are represented by the matrix below. ____________________________________________________________________ | | Favorable Economy | Unfavorable Economy | |___________________|_______________________|_______________________| | High effort level | 700,000 | 400,000 | |___________________|_______________________|_______________________| | Low effort level | 400,000 | 200,000 | |___________________|_______________________|_______________________| The firm considers there to be an equal probability of either state of the economy. The manager considers the cost of effort to be C =55,000x , where x=1 for HIGH effort and 0 for LOW effort. The firm is consider- ing the pay scheme described below. Evaluate each alternative in terms of their incentive effects for the manager and their effect on the firm's profitability. a. (5%) a flat salary of $30,000 that is not tied to the firm's performance. b. (5%) a bonus of 0 if profit equals 200,000 or 400,000 and a bonus of 120,000 if profit equals 700,000. c. (5%) a bonus determined by the formula: B= 0.20(PROFIT-300,000) d. (5%) a bonus determined by the formula: B= 0.24(PROFIT-300,000) 6. (20%)"Plutocrat" is a monopoly in oil refinement in the local market. The demand for Plutocrat's oil is : P = 65 - q. The relevant marginal revenue function is: MR(q) = 65 - 2q. Plutocrat's marginal cost function is: MC(q) = 8. In the refinement of oil,, Plutocrat emits pollution that has the marginal external cost function: MEC(q)=2 a. (5%) What level of output will Plutocrat select to maximize profits? How much do consumers pay for plutocrat's refined oil? b. (5%) What is the marginal social cost of Plutocrat's profit maximizing output? c. (5%) Is this level of output efficient? Should more or less oil be refined to reach the optimum output level? d. (5%) Should the local government charge Plutocrat a pollution fee for each unit of oil she refines? In what way can the social otipmal output level be reached? End --

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