China's reforms The second Long March Dec 11th 2008 From The Economist print edition China has been transformed by the changes ushered in by Deng Xiaoping 30 years ago. But the biggest step has yet to be dared 中国因为邓小平三十年前发动的改变而转变了。但没人敢发动更进一步的改变。 “ENGELS never flew on an aeroplane; Stalin never wore Dacron.” Thus China’ s late leader, Deng Xiaoping, to a meeting 30 years ago that is now officially seen as the starting-point of his economic and political reforms. Deng’s words meant Maoist dogma was out and pragmatism was in. A dramatically transformed China is now commemorating the anniversary. But even as officials trot out a litany of achievements they attribute to the country’ s “reform and opening” policy—200m fewer citizens living in poverty, a 6% share of global GDP compared with 1.8% in 1978, a nearly 70% increase in grain production—the world’s financial crisis weighs heavily on their minds, and their leaders are struggling with unfinished business. 恩格司没坐过飞机，史达林没穿过戴克龙，邓小平三十年前在某场会议如是说。现在， 这个会议已被视为中国经济和政治改革的起点。邓小平的话意为着毛主席主义淘汰， 务实主义正夯。积极改变的中国现在正纪念着三十年的改变。但即便丰功伟业罗列若 江河─包含两亿拖贫，占全球GDP的6％（1978年时为1.8％），谷类生产量成长近七成 等等─世界金融危机的重担仍然压得他们有些紧张，他们的领导人正在努力解套，摆平 危机。 Vice-President Xi Jinping, heir-apparent to President Hu Jintao, is said to have been appointed chief organiser of the celebration programme. It includes concerts, exhibitions and endless speeches celebrating the “turning point” in China’s history when Deng gained the upper hand over the Maoists. His victory was evident at two meetings held in November and December 1978. The first was a month-long “work conference” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, probably the liveliest gathering of its kind ever held (it was here, according to some Western scholars, that Deng mentioned Dacron). A more scripted and formal plenum followed it. 习近平，胡锦涛的接班人，据说已被指派为三十年纪念大典的主要规划人。这次大典包括 演奏会，展览，以及无数的演讲，欢庆中国的转捩点。邓小平对毛派的胜利可由两次 1978年的会议中看出。第一个会议是十一月，接近一个月长的共产党中央委员会的 「工作会议」：这次或许是同类型会议里头最活泼的一次（根据一些西方学者说法， 邓小平就是此时讲到戴克龙的）。第二个会议则在十二月，是比较形式化的大会。 Next year the country will mark its 60th birthday as a people’s republic (in Confucian tradition, 60th birthdays are particularly significant). Reform and opening has thus taken up half of China’s communist life. But officials are being careful to manage expectations of further change. Deng once suggested that direct elections to national leadership posts could be held by 2050. No one mentions that now. On the economic side huge challenges loom, among them an ageing population and a blighted environment, both of which could drag down growth. 明年，中华人民共和国则要欢庆60大寿（儒家文化里，60岁是大事）。改革开放已经让 中国的共产主义消弥大半，但各级官员仍在努力控管改变的速度。邓小平曾经建议 国家领导人直选可能可以在2050年举行。现在没有人谈这个了。经济方面，中国 面临巨大挑战，且其中也包括了老龄化人口和环境的破坏，两者都可能会拖垮成长。 Deng, who died in 1997, is often described as the chief architect of reform, as if the sweeping changes of the past 30 years were mapped out by him. He himself more accurately described his approach as “crossing a river by feeling the stones”. The ultimate objective has never been clear. Since 1992 it has been to set up a “socialist market economy”, but officials struggle to explain how this differs from a real one. Deng announced that year that the party’s “basic line” (party-speak for reform and opening under one-party rule) would not change for 100 years. This implies a lot more stone-groping. 邓小平於1997年辞世。他常被形容是改革的主要操盘手，好似三十年的改变都是他 起草铺陈的。邓小平则形容自己的方法是摸石过河。改革的最终目标一直不明确。 自从1992年，改革的目的号称是建立「社会主义市场经济」，但官员们不太能解释 这个市场经济与实际市场经济的差异在何处。邓小平那年宣布共产党的基本路线 （共产党依据一党专政概念对改革开放的说法）一百年不变。这似乎意味着要摸的 石头更多。 Party leaders revel in this obscurity. It gives them flexibility in policymaking and makes it easier for them to forge compromises between factions. One of the most important political changes in China over the past 30 years has been a move away from the vicious factional strife of the Maoist era, a tendency that persisted well into the 1980s and fuelled the pro-democracy upheaval of 1989. In 2002, for the first time in China’s communist history, power was smoothly transferred from one set of leaders to another without killings or purgings. The new leaders express the same commitment to reform, but have a more left-wing agenda. 共产党领导对这不明确的状态挺满意的。这意味着他们有更多制订政策的空间，并且 让他们更轻松地模糊党派间的争议。三十年来最重要的政治改革，就是迈出脱离以 斗争为主的毛时代：这斗争心态在1980年间也於波荡漾，甚至形成了追求民主进程的 1989天安门事变。200年，中国共产党有史以来第一遭，国家权力从一群领导人手中 和平转移到另外一群人手中，且没有腥风血雨。新领袖则表示对改革同样的承诺， 只是多了些左派内容。 Papering over some of the party’s history has helped them too, damping public demands for political change. The history of the reform programme itself has been sanitised and simplified in order to minimise public questioning of leaders’ motives and actions. No mention is made, for example, of a vital part of the background to the party meetings, Democracy Wall—a 200-metre-long brick structure in front of a bus depot west of Tiananmen Square. For a remarkable four months in the winter of 1978-79, until Deng decided to shut it down and jail some of its activists, citizens plastered the wall with posters calling for freedom and democracy. The area is now a plaza flanked by shopping malls. 撰写共产党史也有效的让大众对於政治改革的需求降低了些。改革计画的历史本身 不断在被净化和简化以降低大众对领导人动机和行为的质疑。例如，民主之墙（一座 两百公尺长的砖造建筑，位於天安门广场西侧）这个伴随了共产党1978年会议的重要 社会事件，就鲜少被提及。1978到1979之间四个月的寒冬里，民主之墙被人民贴满 海报，要求自由和民主，直到邓小平决定制止这些行动并且把一些人士关起来才做罢。 这个区域现在是个大广场，有许多购物商店。 Party officials, preferring their heroes to be larger than life, have massaged history to imply that the meetings 30 years ago were a clarion call for reform and opening. They were not. The dismantling of the Maoist edifice after the Chairman’s death in 1976 began more by stealth. A shift of emphasis towards rebuilding the economy was already under way long before the meetings began. Political rapprochement with the West—a key part of the “ opening”—began several years before Mao’s death, driven by a shared dislike of the Soviet Union. 共产党官员夸大他们的英雄，把历史美化成为三十年前因两场会议而掀起了改革开放。 历史不是这样。毛派的瓦解是1976年毛泽东去世後静悄悄地发生的。早在1978年开会 以前，重建经济的步骤已经开始。与西方的政治互动（改革开放的重要步骤），早在 毛去世七年之前就已经开始，且让苏联十分不爽。 The rule of prudence 智慧之道 The word “opening” did not even appear in the communiqué issued on December 22nd 1978, at the end of the two meetings. “Reform” was mentioned only once. A draft policy document on agriculture adopted by the leaders and promulgated the next year specifically rejected the idea, now considered a hallmark of China’s rural reforms, of contracting out rural land to peasants to farm by themselves. By contrast, Mao’s disastrous “people’s communes” were praised. Deng’s reformist victory was suffused with compromise, a pattern that persists to this day. 「开放」这词甚至并没有在1978年12月22号的公报中出现。改革只有提出一次。一份 重领袖共拟的农业政策草稿中甚至排斥了改革的想法，排斥了将农地租给农家作为自耕 地的作法。比较之下，毛泽东的人民公社概念反而被强调了。邓小平的改革胜利在妥协 下被消音，而这个模式在今天仍然持续着。 Some in the Chinese media now talk of a “Beijing consensus” as an alternative philosophy to the “Washington consensus” of liberal economics that lately seems so discredited. China’s state-run news agency, Xinhua, recently said the Beijing consensus meant “prudence in market reforms”. Deng was certainly prudent. He knew the importance of giving the Maoists some face, even as he consolidated his grip on power and allowed experiments to be carried out with precisely the kinds of changes the Maoists disliked. Rural reforms began in late 1978 in the central province of Anhui even as the party was holding its meetings in Beijing. Peasants in one commune there secretly started parcelling out land, expecting death for it, but soon gained backing from a provincial leader and Deng ally, Wan Li. Others gradually followed suit. By the time communes were formally dismantled in 1984, most had long disappeared in all but name. 一些中国媒体现在唱着「北京共识」作为「华盛顿共识」的自由派经济主义的对应逻辑。 中国的国营媒体新华社最近说，北京共识意味着「「有智慧的市场改革」。邓小平当然 智慧。他知道给毛派面子的道理，就算是他正在逐渐掌握权力，并且能够让毛派不爱的 实验性质的计画运作下去。农村改革於1978年在安徽实行，此时共产党正在北京开会。 平民在当地悄悄地分出土地，心底有准备会遭遇不测。但农民的行为马上获得省级领导 、邓小平派的万里支持。其他人也就逐渐跟进。当人民公社正式於1984年瓦解时， 多数公社老早就不见了。 Prudently, too, the government itself avoids pushing the idea of a “Beijing consensus” as an alternative to Western capitalism. It is fearful of accusations that it harbours plans to challenge American power and change the world order. It was actually an American, Joshua Cooper Ramo, who helped the phrase gain currency in 2004 with the publication of an enthusiastic pamphlet for the Foreign Policy Centre, a British think-tank. “What is happening in China at the moment”, Mr Ramo wrote, “is not only a model for China, but has begun to remake the whole landscape of international development, economics, society and, by extension, politics.” 政府也有智慧地避免把「北京共识」这个概念作为西方资本主义的替代方案。北京政府 不希望让一些关於北京意图挑战美国权力以及改变世界秩序的指控出现。北京共识这个 概念就是一位美国人RAMO推广出去的。他的平台是一个英国智库。「中国现在正在发生 的事情不只是中国的模型，而是逐渐重塑国际发展的整体地貌，经济、社会，以及这些 的延伸，政治。」 For at least the first half of the reform period, few were so confident. Today ’s soaring city skylines are mainly the product of rapid growth in the past 15 years. And much of that growth is a product of hard-nosed liberal economics rather than any magic Chinese touch. Two of the most far-reaching reforms of the past 30 years—the dismantling of tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the privatisation of urban housing—did not take off until the late 1990s. In the case of enterprise closures, massive suffering (and not a little protest) was involved as millions were left unemployed. 至少在改革的前半期，很少人有把握会成功。今天中国城市春笋般冒出的天际线主要是 建立在最近15年的迅速成长。这些成长主要是靠着自由经济的拉拔，而非出自中国魔术 之首。过去三十年来，两个影响最大的改革─数以千计的国营事业以及城市房产自由化─ 要一直到1990年代才开始。至於企业倒闭问题，有数以百万计的人在没有任何抗争 的情况下就这麽失业了。 Pro-democracy unrest in the late 1980s played a far bigger role in turning China capitalist than either officials, or admirers of China’s supposed gradualist approach, suggest. The protests in China were ruthlessly crushed, but they—and the collapse of communism elsewhere—triggered fierce debate among Chinese leaders about the direction of reform. Some argued that a planned economy and tight social control were essential to the regime’s survival. Others said the tumult had been fuelled by precisely these strategies. Deng, at long last, decided Maoism should be dealt a decisive blow. He emerged from retirement in 1992 to put a stop to the bickering and set China on a decisive path towards a market economy. The boom was instantaneous. 1980年代末期的民主诉求，比起任何官员或对中国渐进主义的粉丝都还要来得有效。 这些诉求被无情地震压了，但这些诉求─以及苏俄的瓦解─一同燃起了对於中国未来 改革的方向的激烈辩论。一些强调要走计画经济以及抓紧社会控制等面向，确保政权 生存。另一些人则说这些民主诉求就是被这些政策给激起的。邓小平终於决定，毛派 思想要被彻底击溃。他1992年自退休状态复出，结束纷争，并把中国导向市场经济路线 前进。经济起飞成为瞬间的事情。 In 1978 Deng showed no such clarity of thought. He astutely read the tea-leaves of public opinion but had no grand vision. The 1980s were consumed by leadership struggles. Bao Tong, a former member of the party’s Central Committee who was jailed for sympathising with the protesters in 1989, says Deng’s original plan for the meetings 30 years ago was no more than to produce a consensus on the need to focus on the economy, then in tatters after the ravages of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 until Mao’s death. Reform and opening was not even on his agenda. 1978年时，邓小平还没有完整概念。他捡阅片片的舆论之言，但没有愿景。1980年代 充斥着领导班子的斗争。鲍彤（共产党中委会的前任成员，曾因为同情1989年学运 而被监禁）提到，邓小平於三十年前会议时的计画不过是产生出着重经济的共识。 当时的中国经济在1950年代的大跃进以及1966年掀起的文化大革命其间，落魄非常。 改革与开放等并不在邓小平的计画之中。 But the meetings did not proceed as expected. Deng, who was away on a foreign tour for the first few days, came back to find that discussions had been taken over by festering political grievances aired by leaders who had suffered under Mao. Delegates demanded the rehabilitation of purged colleagues and a re-evaluation of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1976, a few months before Mao’s death, which had been declared “counter-revolutionary” . For ordinary Chinese, it was the Beijing party committee’s decision, while the work conference was under way, to declare the Tiananmen protests “ entirely revolutionary” that signalled the biggest change that year—not anything Deng or his allies said about the economy. 但1978年的会议并没有达成预期效果。工作会议起初的几天，邓小平出访外国，返回时 发现讨论的内容竟是一些曾被毛派恶整的人的自吹自怜。代表们要求平反被肃清的同事， 以及重新评估1976年天安门广场的抗议事件。这次抗议就在毛泽东死去前几个月爆发， 随後被打成反革命。对一般中国人来说，北京共产党委员会主动宣布天安门抗议为 「革命性」才是当年最大的改变，而非邓小平或他的盟友对经济发表的看法。 Voices from below 来自基层的声音 The party likes to gloss over this. June 4th next year will be the 20th anniversary of the crushing of Tiananmen’s more famous protests, in 1989, in which thousands may have died. As they celebrate reform’s 30th birthday, officials do not want to suggest that any re-evaluation of the 1989 unrest may one day be possible. Not that they are likely to face much pressure to do so. The bloodshed is a distant memory now. 共产党对这件事一直遮遮掩掩。明年六月四日将会是1989年天安门事件的二十周年 纪念。正当中华人民共和在庆祝30岁时，官员们并不想要提起重新评估1989年学运 事件的可能性。并非他们可能会面对巨大压力要求这麽做。事件已经逐渐陌生成为 回忆了。 But public opinion continues to shape the progress of China’s reforms. Liberal Chinese economists complain that the country still falls well short of what they would call a market economy. The currency is not fully convertible, so capital flows in and out of the country are controlled. So too, still, are some prices, including those of electricity, fuel and water. In January the government imposed new controls on some food prices. It lifted them again this month. Non-state-owned enterprises are now producing two-thirds of China’s manufacturing output, but SOEs dominate key sectors such as banking, telecoms, energy and the media. Between 2001 and 2006 the number of SOEs fell from 370,000 to 120,000, but this still left assets worth $1.3 trillion in state control. There is much more work to do. 但舆论不断在推动中国改革的进度。自由派中国经济学家抱怨，中国仍然不是他们所谓 的市场经济。货币不能彻底兑换，资金流动被空管。一些如电力、油气、和水价，都被 控制。这个月这些经济学家又再次提起这个议题。非官方营运的企业现在包办了中国 生产总额的2/3,但国营企业掌握了关键性的行业，如银行、通讯、能源、和媒体。 2001到2006之间，国营企业的数自从37万掉到12万，但仍然有相当於1.3兆美金的 资产为国有。市场经济化仍有一段路要走。 But the present set of leaders headed by President Hu and the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, worry more than their predecessors did about public reaction to painful restructuring. They have reason to be cautious. In the late 1990s around 30m workers were laid off as a result of SOE reform. China Labour Bulletin, an NGO based in Hong Kong, said in a September report that millions of these workers were left barely able to support their families, thanks to widespread corruption and a lack of clear policy guidelines. Messrs Hu and Wen, with their signature slogans of building a “harmonious society” and “ putting people first”, want to give the impression that theirs is a more caring kind of capitalism. A change of tack, they feel, is necessary to avert a public backlash. 但是，现在胡锦涛和温家宝率领的领导班子反而比前人更担心痛苦重建的社会观感。 他们有理由小心谨慎。1990年代，将近三千万工人因为国营企业改组而被迫下岗。 中国劳工通讯（香港营运的无政府组织）说，这些劳工中将近有百万计无法养活他们 的家庭，且是拜泛滥的贪污和不明确的政策规条所致。胡锦涛和温家宝希望建立一种 更温馨的资本主义，强调和谐社会和人民优先等。改变手段才可能避免社会的反动力。 Brakes began to be applied in 2004 after Larry Lang, a Hong Kong-based scholar and popular TV commentator in China, drew attention to asset-stripping during management buy-outs of SOEs, then a common form of privatisation. This struck a chord with many Chinese, who felt that factory bosses (officials, in effect) were getting fabulously rich as a result of such buy-outs, while workers were getting next to nothing. Officials responded by suspending the practice. Two years later, to stop him riling the public even more, they cancelled Mr Lang’s TV show. 2004年，多种煞车开始启动。郎咸平，一位香港学者和知名电视评论人，唤醒注意 当时普遍私有化模式的问题，特别是国营企业卖出时的淘空行为。关注这个问题挺合 许多中国人的脾胃，他们感觉到工厂老板（国营事业的政府官员）竟然不可思议地 富有，且全是因为贩卖国营事业，而工人却毫无获益。政府官员的对策就是停止贩卖。 两年之後，为了让郎咸平闭嘴，政府乾脆勒令郎咸平的电视节目停止播出。 Cao Siyuan, an economist who helped draft China’s first bankruptcy law in the 1980s and now runs a bankruptcy consultancy, says the privatisation of larger SOEs has now all but ceased. Talk in the 1980s of encouraging private involvement in all competitive industries, he says, has been abandoned in favour of giving SOEs privileged positions in sectors the government regards as strategic (a term liberally interpreted). Mr Cao expects about 3,000 firms, most of them SOEs, to go through formal bankruptcy proceedings this year compared with 3,200 last year. The numbers that qualify for bankruptcy are ten times higher and rising, he says, but local officials are blocking SOEs from applying in order to preserve government reputations. 曹思源（1980年代曾帮中国政府撰写中国第一份破产法，现在经营破产谘询事务所） 说道，大型国有企业已经停止私有化了。1980年代鼓励私人介入所有具有竞争力的 产业的说法，现在已经全面被抛弃，取代的则是给予国有企业在产业中的特权位置， 也就是政府认为具有关键意义的位置。曹思源预测，将有三千间左右的企业，其中 多数为国营企业，将於今年宣告破产（去年为3200间）。符合破产条件的企业数量是 这个数字的十倍，并且正在增加中，他说。但地方政府官员正在阻挡国营事业宣告 破产，以保护政府名声。 The lagging land 迟滞的土地 China was highly praised around the world for dismantling the communes and for the big increase in agricultural output that followed (although raising prices paid to peasants for their grain helped, too). But the rural power structure has changed little since commune days. Land remains collectively owned, even though it is leased out to individual households to farm. This system has shut farmers out from the boom that cities have enjoyed as a result of the rapid emergence in the past few years of a free market in property. 中国解散公社以增加农业产出的举动曾被世界称赞（提高付给农民的谷价也有帮助）。 但公社之後的农业区权力结构并没有多大改变。土地仍然共有，即便土地能够出租 给个体户自耕。这个共有系统阻止农民享受城市区等级的成长，阻止地产自由市场化 进入农村区。 In October President Hu chaired a Central Committee plenum that was clearly intended to echo the one held 30 years ago. But it proved an anticlimax. Mr Hu and his colleagues remain fearful that any big change in the land system will unleash an avalanche of peasants on cities already struggling with meagre social provision. Although turning peasants into city-dwellers is crucial to maintain the fast growth of the past 30 years (nearly 10% a year on average since 1978), the government wants to keep a firm grip on the process. Migrants are allowed into big cities on sufferance. During the outbreak of SARS in 2003 Beijing was all but emptied of them. Many left in August during the Olympic games, as officials put indirect pressure on them to stay away. 十月，胡锦涛主持了中央党代表大会，明显是希望与三十年前的大会相呼应。但这 证明是制造了反高潮。胡景涛与他的同事仍然惧怕任何剧烈的土地政策改变会引发 大规模平民潮，淹没已经无法分配微薄社会福利的城市区。虽然把农民转为城市居民 是维持过去三十年来快速成长的重要关键，但政府希望能够掌握成长过程。移民仍然 可以移入大型城市。在2003年SARS爆发时，北京把移民将近赶光。奥运後，政府 则对留下的许多人施加非直接的压力，要他们离开城市。 Like Deng and like Jiang Zemin who succeeded him, Mr Hu has paid little more than lip service to the idea of political reform. He repeats Deng’s disingenuous line that without democracy there can be no socialism or socialist modernisation. But some Chinese scholars have pointed out that even communist Vietnam—whose leaders eye with envy the success of China’s economic reforms—has done better on the political side. In an article published in May by an official journal, Reform Internal Reference, Gao Shangquan, a prominent Chinese economist, said that Vietnam had “fewer ideological obstacles than we have”—fewer arguments, he said, over what constitutes socialism and capitalism. In another article in June he noted that only last year a petition signed by 170 people (many of them former senior officials) had accused the party of leading China towards a “ capitalist restoration”. 如邓小平以及江泽民，胡锦涛仅对政治改革打些高空。他重复邓小平的说词，即没有 民主，就没有社会主义和社会主义现代化。但许多中国学者指出，就算是共产越南 （他们的领导人对中国经济改革十分羡慕）都在政治改革方面作得比中国好。 在《改革内参》（一份官方杂志）发表的一篇文章中，中国知名经济学家高尚全表示， 越南「比起我们，有比较少的意识型态障碍」─更少关於社会主义和资本主义内涵的 论辩。在另一篇六月份的文章中他指出，就在去年，一份有170人签署的请愿书就指控 共产党带领中国朝向「资本主义回魂」的路子。 Mr Hu certainly has no plans to weaken the party’s influence, much less to allow opposition to organise. The authorities have detained or questioned several signatories to an unusually bold call for political liberalisation issued by around 300 intellectuals on December 10th to mark the 60th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights. And Mr Hu has devoted considerable effort (and the party considerable funds) to rebuilding the party’s grassroots organisation, which was dealt a body-blow by the closure of state-owned enterprises and the rapid growth of the private sector. Party officials have sent thousands of teams to persuade private firms to allow the establishment of trade unions (which in China are controlled by the party) as well as party cells. 胡锦涛显然不会计画减弱共产党的影响力，更不会容许反对派组织起来。政府已经 针对十月十号发布的一份政治自由化的呼吁文章，监禁与审问几名知识份子。该份声明 有近三百名知识份子签署，发布时间是世界人权宣言公布的六十周年。胡景涛投入了 显着的力量（以及可观的共产党资金）来重建共产党草根组织。这些组织在国营产业 被迫关门以及私有部门茁壮阶段时遭受致命打击。政府官员派遣数以千计的小组， 说服私有企业设立贸易工会（共产党掌握）以及共产党小型驻点。 Their efforts have met some resistance, not least from foreign-invested enterprises. Wal-Mart, an American retail chain with around 100 superstores in China, was especially stubborn. Repeated meetings were arranged by party officials with Wal-Mart representatives in the eastern city of Nanjing in 2006 after the firm’s (reluctant) decision to allow a union branch. The officials, on instructions from the trade-union chief, Wang Zhaoguo, demanded a party cell too. Only six party members could be found in a workforce of more than 400, and those six did not feel a cell within Wal-Mart was needed. But the company succumbed, and others have followed. By the end of 2006, party cells had been established in more than two-thirds of larger non-state enterprises. 政府的努力也面临了阻碍，且甚至来自於外国企业。美国连锁店WALMART特别顽固。 2006年，就当WALMART不情愿地同意设立贸易工会部门後，中国政府不断安排党部 官员与WALMART代表在南京谈判。这些官员被告知要也要求设立共产党小型驻点。 在四百人里头，只有六名共产党成员，而这六个共产党成员并不觉得需要在WALMART内部 设立小型驻点。但WALMART妥协了，同时其他企业也就照办。2006年底，共产党小型驻点 已经在超过2/3的非国营企业中设立。 Early this year, some official newspapers published calls for a new round of “thought liberation”. Some Chinese scholars openly appealed for a new phase of reform focusing more on politics. But crises intervened—upheaval in Tibet in March, an earthquake in May that killed tens of thousands—and so, too, did the deadening impact of the Olympic games, during which the authorities tried to suppress any hint of dissent. Now Chinese officials fret about the possibility of growing unrest as the economy suffers the impact of the global crisis. Democrats must wait. 今年初，一些官方媒体呼吁进行新一回合的「思想解放」。一些中国学者公开要求 新一阶段的政治改革。但西藏暴动和四川地震，当然还有北京奥运，阻碍了任何进程。 政府官员在这些危机中不断压制任何一丝的不满。现在，中国政府对於经济危机 所兴起的不安与不满开始恐惧。民主派的又得等了。 http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12758848&fsrc=nwlgafree 烦请注意附上原稿来源 -- --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 60.245.64.237 ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 219.81.84.61 (12/15 21:10) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 219.81.84.61 (12/15 21:11) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 219.81.84.61 (12/15 21:20) 我是用更温馨的资本主义是对译"a more caring kind of society"，不知适不适当 重建是对译restructuring，改革在文中对应应该是reform，不知道这样通不通 ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 140.123.43.211 (12/16 09:59) ※ 编辑: pursuistmi 来自: 140.123.43.211 (12/16 17:42)