标题:Russia and a new democratic realism 俄国核心民主现实主义 By Francis Fukuyama Published: September 2 2008 19:34 | Last updated: September 2 2008 19:34 One idea that you will never hear expressed by either Barack Obama or John McCain in this presidential race is the notion that a chief task of US foreign policy in the next administration will be to gracefully manage an adversely shifting global power balance and significantly diminished US influence. This is not a hypothetical issue, but one that stares us in the face today. 有个想法是不会从欧巴马或马坎阵营提出的：美国下一任执政政府在外交政策上的 主要任务会是优雅地控管不利於美国的全球权力平衡变动以及显着消退的美国影响 力。这不是假设性议题，而是眼睁睁上演的现实。 The failure to recognise this shift in power has been all too evident in the events leading up to the Russian intervention in Georgia. Since the Yeltsin years, the US has had a series of policy differences with the Russians, including Nato expansion, the Balkans, missile defence, policy towards Iran and human rights in Russia itself. Diplomacy, such as it was, consisted of persuading Russia to accept all of the items on our list and telling them their fears and concerns were groundless. The US never regarded the relationship as a bargaining situation in which it would give up things it wanted in return for things the Russians wanted. Like the proverbial Englishman speaking to a foreigner, we thought we could make them understand us by repeating ourselves in a louder voice. 美国无法正视全球权力变动十分明显：就因此俄国才介入乔治亚争端。叶尔钦时代 以来，美国与俄国意见不合屡见不鲜，包括北约组织扩张，巴尔干问题，飞弹防御 问题，对伊朗政策，以及在俄国境内的人权问题。诸如此类的美国外交政策目的是 说服俄国接受我们所有的条件，并告诉他们那些恐惧和担忧都是没有根据的。美国 从没有认为美俄之间是谈判关系，要为了美国要的东西而让步，给予俄国要的东西 。如俗语中英国人对外国人说话：我们认为我们可以用更大声的声音，重复一遍我 们所说的，来让他们了解我们。 This posture by the Bush administration reflected the balance of power that existed in the 1990s, when Russia was weak and had few cards to play. But that has changed. The contrast between Moscow’s intervention in Chechnya in 1994 and Georgia in 2008 is dramatic: much as the US did not like Russian behaviour in crushing Chechen separatism, the Russian military operation was so incompetent that it seemed to set few ominous precedents. Today, all thoughts are on where Russian power will be used next. 布希政府的这个态度代表的是90年代的权力平衡，那是俄国国力弱，没什麽牌可打。 但这已经改变了。莫斯科1994年介入车臣与2008年介入乔治亚之间的反差是戏剧性 的大：美国再怎麽不喜欢俄国打压车臣独立运动的行径，俄国军事行动是如此无能， 似乎成不了什麽危机的先例。如今，所有顾虑都是接下来俄国力量会落在哪里。 If we could roll the clock back to before February when Kosovo declared independence with US support, the elements of a bargain were there. Of the desiderata on the American list, the most expendable were anti-ballistic missile defence and support for Kosovo independence. The former was a pointless irritant to the Russians who never believed the US story that it was a response to a threat from Iran. Kosovo independence does not improve the security of Kosovars, but sets an unhappy precedent of legitimising separatism, which explains why Nato members such as Spain did not back it. 如果我们可以把时钟拨回到二月柯索沃在美国支持下宣布独立，谈判的元素就在那里。 美国谈判选项中最能丢出的就是反弹道飞弹防御系统和支持柯索沃独立两个选项。 前者对俄国来说是个无意义的刺激物：俄国从不相信美国那套针对伊朗做出回应的说词。 柯索沃独立不会让柯索沃人安全更有保障，反而是建立起合法化分离主义的不祥先例。 这也可以解释为什麽北约成员如西班牙并没有支持这个议题。 A more difficult choice was Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine. These democratic countries deserve strong US support. But Angela Merkel, German chancellor, is right in believing that the core of the Nato alliance is its Article V guarantee that an attack on one member should be regarded as an attack on all. This means that the US should be prepared to station forces on a permanent basis to defend any alliance member under threat, as it did on the inter-German border during the cold war. Nato membership is not a talisman that magically confers protection. It requires operational planning and expensive defence commitments. 比较难选择的是乔治亚与乌克兰的北约会员资格。这些民主国家配得美国的强力支持。 但德国总理梅克尔是对的：她相信北约联盟的核心是北大西洋公约第五条保证：对任一 缔约国之攻击应视为对全体之攻击。这意味着美国应该准备永久部属部队护卫任何受 威胁的北约成员，一如美国在冷战时期於两德边境所做一般。北约会员资格不是护身符， 神奇地提供保护。北约会员资格需要军事部属以及极为昂贵的防御承诺。 The Bush administration was not and could not have been serious about Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine to the extent that it meant providing not just arms and advisers, but real security guarantees of US forces. To the extent that that was so, leading the Georgians on to believe that we would get them into the club soon was a big mistake. 布希政府没有也不可能对乔治亚和乌克兰的北约资格持认真态度─至少美国不可能提供 超过军备和顾问以外的美军军势的真实安全保障。就这个限度来说，让乔治亚方相信 美方会把他们弄进北约是个极大的错误。 An understanding that may have been possible a year ago is not workable now. The Bush administration has turned Kosovo independence and ABM defence in Poland into faits accomplis, making them unusable as bargaining chips. And rushing to accommodate Moscow while Russian troops are still occupying parts of Georgia proper is unthinkable. In saying this, I do not want to be seen as apologising for Moscow’s behaviour. Russia is not justified in holding on to Georgian territory or trying to overturn a democratically elected regime. Mr Putin’s talk about Georgian “genocide” and US conspiracies is unsettlingly reminiscent of the “big lie” of Soviet times. The fact that Russian feelings of resentment are understandable does not make them morally right. 一年前可能实现的共识现在已经不可能了。布希政府已经把柯索沃独立和反弹道飞弹防御 系统这两生米煮成熟饭，无法再成为谈判筹码。而当俄国部队还在蚕食乔治亚领域的同时 让莫斯科舒舒服服的也不可能。就此而言，我不希望被视为帮莫斯科的行为说话。俄国 没有依据持有乔治亚领域，没有依据推翻民主程序选举出来的政府。普丁谈话中关於 乔治亚方的「种族屠杀」以及美国阴谋论与苏联时期的「大谎言」十分类似。俄国的 情绪是可以理解，但这并不代表他们道德正确。 As Kishore Mahbubani of the National University of Singapore pointed out on this page (August 21), one of the chief ways that US power has been diminished in this decade is in its moral credibility. After the Russian intervention, US officials asserted that “21st century powers don’t violate the sovereignty of other countries to overturn regimes”. Adding the qualifier “in Europe” reduced the snickering only marginally. Democracy promotion – a good thing – has been deeply tainted by its association with the Iraq war and US security interests. 如国立星加坡大学的Kishore Mahbubani指出的，这十年内美国力量衰退的主要原因之一 是美国的道德信用。俄国介入之後，美国官员称「二十一世纪强权不会侵犯其他国家主权 并推翻其政权。」加上「在欧洲」的修饰语能减少的讥笑有限。推动民主─好事一件─ 已经因为和伊拉克战争和美国安全利益挂上钩而深受污染。 The past two US administrations could assume American hegemony in both economics and security. The next administration cannot, and a critical task will be for it to better balance what we want with what we can realistically achieve. 过去两任美国政府可以维持美国经济和安全的霸权姿态。下任美国政府则不可能，而其 需承担的关键任务就是让我们想要的和我们真能挣到的保持较好的平衡。 This does not mean giving up on idealistic goals such as promoting democracy. But the next president will have to “detoxify” (in the phrase of Tom Carothers from the Carnegie Endowment) the very concept of democracy promotion. We will have to think of ways of supporting Georgia and Ukraine other than by new alliance commitments. And we need to plan in concrete terms how to defend existing Nato members – particularly Poland and the Baltic states – from an angry and resurgent Russia. 这不代表我们需要牺牲如推广民主的这种理想目标。但下任总统必须「去污名化」 推广民主的概念。我们必须思考如何用新的联盟承诺以外的方式支持乔治亚和乌克兰。 我们必须计画用具体的方案来保卫现存的北约成员─特别是波兰和波罗地海诸国─ 免受一个生气并正崛起的俄国的威胁。 The writer is professor of international political economy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and, most recently, author of ‘After the Neocons’ (Profile, 2006) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66ca01da-78fa-11dd-9d0c-000077b07658.html 新闻来源: (需有正确连结) -- --

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