At 20:53 04/06/2004, Crist J. Clark wrote: >We haven't had many syslogd(8) vulnerabilities lately, but one >less daemon running as root seems like a Good Thing. I do not >see any drawbacks from a security point of view. The log files >would have to be owned, or otherwise writeable, by this other >user, but so what. Obviously, I may be missing something. One consideration is that if syslogd is not running as root, it will no longer be able to write to a filesystem which is already "full". On systems where non-root users can write to the filesystem containing /var/log (and are not limited by quotas) this would allow non-root users to disable logging, which would probably be a Bad Thing. Colin Percival _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"