作者onechina ()
看板Economics
标题Re: [心得] 赛局分一块钱的故事
时间Mon Nov 17 23:24:23 2008
※ 引述《pig030 (猫博3号)》之铭言:
: 这一次是一个一阶段的赛局,即两个人分一块钱的故事。
: 规则是这样子的,两个人A、B同时提出要多少钱,如果
: 两个人提出之合超过1元,则两个人一毛钱都拿不到。
: 其中假设两个可以要的钱是,A为a=[0,1]元,B为b=[0,1]元
: 若 a + b > 1 则 两个人的报酬是 0
: 若 a + b <=1 则 两个人的报酬是 a 及 b
: 请你找出上述所有pure的Nash 均衡解!
: 另外请你证明 (a=1,b=1)也是一个NE均衡解!
: (最令人觉得奇怪的解,为(a=1,b=1))
(1)
Any (a*,b*) with a*+b*<1 is not NE .
Because player 1 could choose a'=1-b*>a* to be strictly better off.
(2)
Any (a*,b*) with a*+b*=1 is NE .
Given b* , player 1's utility is
U1(a,b*)= 0 if a>a*=1-b*
= a* if a=a*=1-b*
= a if a<a*=1-b*
clearly , player 1 optimally chooses a=a*=1-b* . Likewise , player 2
optimally chooses b=b*=1-a*
(3)
Any (a*,b*) with a*+b*>1 and min{a*,b*}<1 is not NE
Here both players got zero.
Min{a*,b*}<1 implies that a*<1 or b*<1.
Suppose b*<1.
Then player 1 will be strictly better by setting a =1-b*>0,so that it is not NE.
Argument is analogous for a*<1.
(4)
(a*,b*) with a*+b*>1 and min{a*,b*}=1 is NE. That is, a*=b*=1
Given b*=1 , player 1 gets zero utility for any a ,so a*=1
is one best response for plater 1.
Silimarly , b*=1 is also one best response for player 2 given a*=1
In sum , NEs are those (a*,b*) st a*+b*=1 or a*=b*=1.
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