作者wolfpeter (可爱的狼)
看板CrossStrait
标题[闲聊] 英日同盟
时间Tue Dec 3 17:09:36 2013
在IA版看到有人提英日同盟本以为她在豪小每想到欧洲战略智库真有学者提出这种构想
碍於是新人无法在IA发言先在这理转PO SORRY~~
http://ppt.cc/Opk6
Britain and Japan: two islands at the centre of world power?
Typhoon Haiyan – which recently befouled the Philippines – has enabled the
United Kingdom (UK) to demonstrate once again its continuing global military
reach. Although the UK’s relief effort has been motivated primarily by
altruism, it has also provided another opportunity for the British government
to reconfirm its long-standing commitment to South-East Asia and build trust
with its Indo-Pacific allies. Indeed, distracted as they have been with the
United States’ (US) own ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ to East Asia, many
analysts have overlooked the fact that the UK is also now placing a greater
emphasis on the region. One example of this is HMS Daring’s tour of East
Asia – today, the vessel docked in Tokyo, having been very active in the
Pacific for the past few months. This ability to project naval power shows
that – uniquely among European countries – the UK has the capabilities
needed to play an active role in the Indo-Pacific’s emerging strategic
order. While France has some reach into the Indian Ocean, only the UK has the
strategic means to push as far as South-East Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
The UK’s ‘strategic array’ of military installations – from air stations
like Akrotiri, to naval facilities like Diego Garcia and Sembawang, as well
as army garrisons like those in Brunei – which hang around southern Eurasia
like a necklace, give the British a unique ‘power extension’ capability.
This array can also be utilised to project force and to provide relief after
natural disasters. Other than France and the US, the UK is the only non-Asian
country with overseas military installations in the Indo-Pacific. And as
Julian Lindley-French and the anonymous author Sir Humphrey have both pointed
out – for all the negative portrayals in recent years by the media of the
Royal Navy’s seeming decline – British naval power is actually being
enhanced. Approximately 500,000 tonnes of modern warships and auxiliaries
will have been built or ordered between 2000 and 2020 for the Naval Service –
roughly the same as the gross tonnage of all the French and German navies’
main combatants combined.
These new vessels will furnish the UK with a highly advanced and mobile
fleet, centred around two giant aircraft carriers – HMS Queen Elizabeth and
HMS Prince of Wales – each likely to be equipped with an onboard suite of
Lightning II strike-fighters and various attack and reconnaissance
helicopters. Likewise, the Astute class nuclear attack submarines, the last
of which will soon be completed, will provide the UK with the means to fire
Tomahawk cruise missiles, making it the only other country bar the United
States (US) with the ability to do so. The now-complete Type 45 class
destroyers will protect the carriers with a world-beating air-defence system,
while the future Type 26 Global Combat Ships will give them a brand new
generation of anti-submarine warfare escorts.
It is perhaps in this sense that London seems particularly keen to foster a
closer relationship with Tokyo. Japan is in many ways a mirror of the UK. As
Philip Shetler Jones points out, the two countries are populous island states
with constitutional monarchies. Both also have highly advanced economies
founded on international trade and overseas investment. Moreover, both, in
one way or another, are natural maritime powers, defended as they are on all
flanks by the sea. And given that each sits just a stone’s throw away from a
continental mainland, both the UK and Japan must be ready to engage –
sometimes assertively – with their surrounding geopolitical environments.
This gives both countries a preponderant position in respect to Europe and
Asia – amplified further by their special relationships with the United
States. As Nicholas Spykman realised during the 1940s, US power could only
maintain an effective balance of power in Eurasia with the active consent and
participation of the UK and Japan – and never against it (of course, he also
realised that the same holds true in reverse).
Like the UK, Japan is also in the midst of – not so much a new militarism or
naval re-armament programme – but a significant naval reconfiguration. While
the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force’s number of ships is not increasing,
their size and capability certainly is. Japan is currently bringing online
two new generations of what it describes conservatively as ‘helicopter
carrying destroyers’ – the Hyuga and Izumo classes – which are larger than
some other countries’ aircraft carriers. Equally, Japan’s destroyers are
among the world’s most capable and sophisticated and – with over forty of
them – it has more than the British, French and Dutch fleets put together.
According to Alessio Patalano, Japan therefore has ‘no choice’ but to
continue to develop into the UK of the Far East.
Most significantly, while London is courting Tokyo, the Japanese also seem
keen to foster much closer relations with the British. In 2013 – the
four-hundredth anniversary of British-Japanese relations – London and Tokyo
signed a new security and defence treaty. Equally, prior to becoming prime
minister, Shinzo Abe stated his desire to see Japan join the Five Power
Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a security alliance set up in the 1970s between
Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK to uphold security in
South-East Asia. To retain and even regenerate Britain’s – and by
extension, the European Union’s (EU) – strategic relevance, London should
now consider doing two things: firstly, it should bolster the UK’s ‘passive
’ military power in the region by setting-up a standing – but adaptable –
naval squadron, operating out of the British maritime facility in Singapore
(or even from Darwin in Australia); and secondly, but perhaps more
importantly, it should begin negotiations to incorporate Japan into the FPDA.
Not only would this double movement represent a visible reconfirmation of the
UK’s commitment to South-East Asia, but it would also make sound strategic
sense. After all, this ‘Asian Mediterranean’ is the equidistant meeting
point between British and Japanese power, as well as the vectors of
Australian and US power. With China’s rising assertiveness and unknown
intentions, South-East Asia could well become to the twenty-first century as
Central Europe was to the twentieth (albeit in a maritime guise) – that is
to say, the fulcrum of global geopolitics. Thus, by militarily reinforcing
and expanding the FPDA, the UK (and the EU) – although distant – could help
to tie a highly resistant geostrategic knot at the heart of South-East Asia,
supported also by Japan and Australia and potentially even the US and India.
This would enhance British and European influence in the Indo-Pacific, help
support smaller regional powers and contribute to a lasting peace.
跟我在德国外交政策网站看到的差不多 总之大概念就是欧洲军团要重新走出去由皇家海军在印度的基地做支点 在跟新加坡 南韩 日本澳洲这些国家配合~~
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◆ From: 123.193.71.8
※ 编辑: wolfpeter 来自: 123.193.71.8 (12/03 17:12)
1F:推 zebra101:朝鲜也提出要建设“强盛大国啊” 有梦最X 117.136.0.83 12/03 18:39
2F:→ zebra101:有梦最美。皇家海军连航母都卖光了 117.136.0.83 12/03 18:40
3F:推 artpower:看看就好123.240.188.221 12/03 18:59
4F:→ tychiou:如果英国与欧陆不同步 日本亲英 中国就可 123.192.17.34 12/03 19:32
5F:→ tychiou:在欧陆下功夫 123.192.17.34 12/03 19:33
6F:→ wolfpeter:其实英国这几年武器也卖不少给中国 只是 123.193.71.8 12/03 19:53
8F:→ wolfpeter:政治上的同盟很难分割的 123.193.71.8 12/03 19:56
9F:推 ianlin45:这代表陆权国家崛起 180.204.188.6 12/03 21:14
10F:→ ianlin45:海权国家以前各霸一方 现在要被边缘化 180.204.188.6 12/03 21:15
11F:→ ianlin45:紧张了 180.204.188.6 12/03 21:15
12F:→ tychiou:推楼上 海权国家可能会被网权国家取代 123.192.17.34 12/04 00:42